Diplomacy with pakistan

Ever since Mr. Modi swept to power in the summer of 2014, his foreign policy has been packed mostly with spectacle and some boldness. He kicked off by inviting the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) leaders to his swearing-in, but soon let strident[strI-d(u)nt(harsh,तीक्ष्ण)] rhetoric[re-tu-rik(speak efficiently,वाक्पटुता)] lead the bilateral engagement with Pakistan. That early spark of hope was dashed by aggressive statements from the highest levels, and almost a wanton[wón-t(u)n(unmotivated,व्यर्थ)] abandonment[u'ban-dun-munt(give up,त्याग)] of restraint along the International Border (IB) and the Line of Control (LoC).

Diplomatic engagements with Pakistan nosedived[nowz-dIv(drop,गिरावट)] to embarrassing childishness. In August 2014, Foreign Secretary-level talks were called off after the Pakistani High Commissioner, Abdul Basit, met Kashmiri separatists; the same excuse was given a year later to call off National Security Adviser (NSA)-level talks in New Delhi. The Modi government’s strategy gave a new lease of life to Hurriyat factions, while adversely affecting the situation in the Kashmir Valley and along the IB and the LoC.

Militant infiltration and the occasional provocation from across the border have long been the routine, but the tough posture adopted in the wake of the April-May general election in India coincided with, if not resulted in, a dramatic rise in cross-border firings. Dozens of civilians and many paramilitary personnel were killed or injured, and normal life along the border was disrupted.

The pattern of terrorists sneaking[snee-king(hidden,गुप्त)] into India from across the border and, within hours, launching attacks on a target close to the border, be it a security installation or a civilian target such as Gurdaspur in Punjab in July 2015, became more pronounced. In the Kashmir Valley, the fog of war intensified. While more local youth took to militancy, the mysterious rise of flamboyant[flam'boy-unt(showy,भड़कीला)] militant commanders, their unusual escape from several encounter scenes, and final elimination after a few months of their stardom was a recurrent phenomenon.

The new aggressive phase wasn’t all that surprising, given the verbal volleys lobbed by Mr. Modi against Pakistan in the run-up to the 2014 general election.

Reality from South Block

The grand settings of Lutyens’ Delhi have an uncanny[ún'ka-nee(supernatural,अतिप्राकृतिक)] capacity to temper a ruler, even if he pretends to be a macho outsider. Mr. Modi is finally showing signs of realism that his neighbourhood policy cannot be complete without engagement with Pakistan. His efforts over the past few weeks, to rekindle India-Russia bilateral ties and to reach out to Pakistan, are signs that the former Gujarat Chief Minister is now finally becoming the Indian Prime Minister. Dramatic summits and humongous[hyoo'múng-gus(big,बड़ा)] announcements do not often account for great diplomacy; it requires patience and perseverance[pur-su'veer-un(t)s(determination,दृढ़ता)].

Against the new mature phase of Mr. Modi’s diplomacy, it was, in hindsight['hInd,sIt(Understanding the nature of an event after it has happened,पश्च दृष्टि)] , not a great surprise that he flew into Lahore from Kabul, on December 25, where the vagaries[vey-gu-ree(An unexpected and inexplicable change in something,उतार चढ़ाव)] of violence are interspersed with buried egos of empires and signposts of India’s strategic interests. If Afghanistan wasn’t the real reason that prompted Mr. Modi about the need to calibrate[ka-lu,breyt(measure,नापना)] his Pakistan policy, then he has to only walk a few yards from his office to an unnamed government bungalow close by, where the widow and children of former Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah have been staying for over a quarter century. It was from the remnants[rem-nunt(leftover,अवशेष)] of the Afghan mujahideen who fought Najibullah’s forces that the Kashmir insurgency of the past three decades acquired sophistication, weapons and manpower, after New Delhi messed up its Kashmir policy.

Young warriors from madrassas of Pakistan who rode into Kabul to drag Najibullah by a pickup truck, in 1996, and hang him in the streets were soon to shelter the al-Qaeda. From this sponsorship by Pakistan, of non-state violence and regressive political Islam, the world got its new generation of terrorists and their broader ideology. From New York City’s World Trade Center complex to Paris’s Bataclan theatre, from Mumbai’s streets to the many bombed markets across India, the signatures of violence nurtured by sections of the Pakistani establishment and flourishing under its guidance cannot be ignored. Precisely for this and other factors, India needs to remain engaged with the Pakistani establishment.

Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh eras

Rhetoric about large-scale annihilations[u,nI-u'ley-shun(destruction,विनाश)] and macho responses to a dysfunctional democracy sound impressive in the heat of an election campaign but for a government, the challenge is to find ways to deal with the delinquent[di'ling-kwunt(guilty of misdeeds,अपराधी)] next door. Mr. Modi seems to have now picked up the gauntlet[gont-lut(challenge,चुनौती)] .

It is the realisation of the complexity of dealing with Pakistan that forced successive Prime Ministers to risk so much to engage with the neighbour, often without much success. Atal Bihari Vajpayee took the gamble of riding a bus across the contentious border, only to be faced with the Kargil incursion a few weeks later. It may be a mere coincidence that Nawaz Sharif was the one who hosted Mr. Vajpayee in Lahore then, and now Mr. Modi, despite his perilous[pe-ru-lus(dangerous,खतरनाक)] survival in a military-dominated state.

Both Mr. Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh worked with a significant number of Pakistan experts, within the Prime Minister’s Office and Ministry of External Affairs and on the track II circuit, to steer their policies. Pakistan is a state like none other. As you sit back taking in the success of diplomatic outreach, militants can sneak across the border to occupy strategic heights; as you prepare for a major push to improving bilateral trade, you may find a few men rowing across the sea to launch a deadly terrorist attack on your commercial capital. Pakistan is a state in deep crisis, fighting its many demons, and with statecraft deeply embedded in misguided military chauvinism[show-vu,ni-zum(blind patriotism,अंधदेशभक्ति)] . However, those, and other factors, cannot be the only issues to dictate India’s engagement with Pakistan.

The engagement should be primarily informed by the fact that India’s economic growth, including its ability to keep government expenses under check, enjoy global market trust and attract investment, is all critically hinged on(depends,निर्भर)] a peaceful South Asia. No other reason is needed to appreciate why India will have to keep talking to Pakistan.

Dealing with Pakistan is like playing football on a rainy day and on a muddy ground. The team needs to have the skill, the ability to anticipate the unexpected, the response without losing one’s nerve, and the stamina to keep playing despite the downpour. No one who has watched the Modi government closely will grant all that to his narrow, centralised, decision-making structure where very few seem to have any influence on foreign policy. If the Lahore drop-in was the first key step in Mr. Modi’s new balanced Pakistan policy, then it must immediately be followed by a broadbasing of intellectual inputs that inform his decisions.

Defining permanent interests

The excuses offered by the Modi government to muddy India-Pakistan relations over the last year-and-a-half were no new discoveries. For long, even under both Mr. Vajpayee and Dr. Singh, India has introduced new goalposts, or moved existing ones. On the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Kathmandu in 2001, Mr. Vajpayee’s Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, was clear with the demand: he produced a list of 20 wanted people allegedly living under state protection in Pakistan, and asked that Islamabad dismantle[dis'man-t(u)(break,तोडना)] the infrastructure of terror. By the end of 2008, after the Mumbai attacks, the Manmohan Singh government’s demands were focussed on action against those responsible for the attack on Mumbai.

The fact is that India still does not have a consistent diplomatic posture against Pakistan, which has been perilously close to being a full-blown, dysfunctional nation state over the past several years.

Mr. Modi’s diplomatic moves since he took office in 2014 capture the bigger trouble with India’s international positioning. It still does not have a grand strategy regarding its diplomatic and military ambitions on the global stage, including how to deal with Pakistan, that carries political approval across the spectrum.

If states have only permanent interests, then India is yet to define them. Until then, New Delhi will swing between chaotic[key'ó-tik(disorder,अस्तव्यस्त)] state responses to terrorist attacks and that of dramatic bilateral summits.

josy.joseph@thehindu.co.in

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