Thursday, March 31, 2016
The Kohli special
“Incredibly fantastic,” exclaimed the original little master after India beat Australia in the T20 league match (NDTV 24x7). Make that “after Virat beat Australia” and forgive Sunil Gavaskar his double superlative: Kohli was incredible and fantastic so who cares about grammatical niceties[nI-si-tee(rightness,बारीकी)]?
So incredible and so fantastic that news channels just couldn’t resist: They simply had to compare him with the little master-blaster: “Is Kohli better than Sachin?” (CNN IBN), “Is Virat the new Sachin?” (NDTV 24x7). They hurled statistics at their panelists like bouncers. The likes of Gavaskar, “Deano” Jones (NDTV) and Sourav Ganguly, Nasser Hussain (India Today) weaved and ducked out of harm’s way by repeating in their own words what K. Srikkanth said in his inimitable[i'ni-mi-tu-bu(unique,अनोखा)] style: Sachin Tendulkar is Sachin Tendulkar, Gavaskar is Gavaskar and Virat is Virat — which nobody can deny! (CNN-IBN).
Cricket commentators during the match — Harsha Bhogle, V.V.S. Laxman, Shoaib Akhtar, Kapil Dev and others were confronted with the same googly and patted it out safely, just like the other cricketers (Star Sports). Since this was extremely tedious[tee-dee-us(boring,उबाऊ)] for viewers and not what they wanted to hear at all, the question was tweaked: Okay, is Virat the better finisher of a game? They all heaved a sigh of relief (phew!) and said, he was the best finisher in the game.
But that wasn’t the end of it — we still had to hear from the man himself. When Sachin T was asked to comment on Virat K, he met it with that straight bat of his: He lavished Kohli with extolment[ik'stówl-munt(praise,प्रंशसा)] without anointing him his successor and carefully praised the entire team for its efforts (India Today). Dead ball.
After Kohli’s one-man rescue act, news TV went ga-ga: Aaj Tak even replayed him dancing Gangnam style during an earlier show to prove that he was fun and very much today’s man. No praise was too extravagant[ik'stra-vu-gunt(excessive,अत्यधिक)] for the Delhi cricketer: Superlatives flew off tongues like fours off Kohli’s bat.
Have you listened to the Hindi commentary — especially when India plays (Star Sports)? It’s like the ball screeching to the fence after you-know-who has hit it. It’s like an opera singer going from bass to soprano at the speed of the white cherry racing to the boundary: “Aur yeh chaaaaaaR RUN!”, “ek auR CHOWKA!”And just like opera singers have to raise their voices to be heard above the music of the orchestra, so too the Hindi commentators screamed above the cheering of the maddened crowds in the stand. Enough to give you a heart attack, especially during a heart-stopping run chase. On India Today, Boria Majumdar has predicted that India will be in the finals; so suggest you keep the ambulance number handy.
By the way, the jugalbandhi of Virender Sehwag and Shoaib Akhtar is hugely enjoyable.
As we have discovered, cricketers-cum-commentators can be loud, colourful characters. None more so than Very Very Special Laxman. On Sunday, he appeared on the analysis show after India had beaten Australia wearing a pink polka dot shirt under a blue and white check blazer, an orange kerchief peeking out of its pocket, with dark blue trousers, brown shoes and a gold watch. Such magnificence cannot be matched so Akhtar was dressed discreetly in black and white.
Meanwhile, Deepak Chaurasia (India News) seems to have taken our advice of last week when we suggested that stuffy TV news anchors should lighten up a little in this season of T20. He exchanged his shirt and jacket for something more comfortable: A red T-shirt. So did most of his panelists and they set about dissecting[dI'sekt(analysis,विश्लेषण] Kohli’s game with the same precision that he dissects the field.
India has found itself a new hero at a time when there are only villains. “Talisman” Kohli.
Meanwhile, wonder what Laxman will wear for today’s semi-final.
Courtesy:indian express
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Road map for a robust defence industry
After the Modi government came to power, one of the early reforms ushered[ú-shu(show,दिखाना)] in was the raising of the Foreign Direct Investment limit in defence from 26 per cent to 49 per cent under the automatic route.
The reform could have hardly been deferred. India, the world’s largest arms importer, relies on imports to meet more than 70 per cent of its defence requirements. This figure could rise embarrassingly if the value of foreign components in defence ware, touted as indigenous[in'di-ju-nus(native,स्वदेसी)] products, is not excluded from the category of defence imports.
The new policy evidenced the rejection of misplaced notions[now-shun(belief,मत)] of patriotism and protectionism that had previously, in all but name, frustrated the entry of both the domestic industry and foreign companies into the defence sector. The reform was further leavened by the Prime Minister’s statement that a robust indigenous defence industry is imperative to make India “self-reliant in the area of security”.
Upbeat response
Major corporate houses are now scrambling to forge tie-ups with foreign defence companies. While this is a very encouraging development, many attendant reforms need to be embraced to achieve the policy goal outlined by the Prime Minister. This is because the defence industry is like no other. It is evolutionary, highly technology-intensive, and demands continuously high levels of research and development (R&D) investment.
Therefore, the focus of any policy should be to draw foreign defence manufacturers to India and, in the process, gain technology transfer. To accomplish this, an enabling architecture that would guarantee the protection of their Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and commercial interests is key. This would require two strategic changes: the FDI ceiling in defence should be revised upwards and the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) has to be fine-tuned to integrate its various components with the liberalised investment regime.
The following strategies related to these two aspects could be implemented to yield[yee(-u)ld(Give,देना)] rich dividends. First, with regard to FDI, we are almost there. Given the peculiarities[pi,kyoo-lee'a-ru-tee(speciality,विशिष्टता)] of the sector, it would be pragmatic[prag'ma-tik(practical,व्यवहारिक)] to permit even 100 per cent under the automatic route, subject to certain conditions. The case for this is compelling[kum'pe-ling(forceful,बाध्य)]. Even after raising the ceiling to 49 per cent, the inflow in 2015 under the head “defence industries” was only $0.08 million. A major reason is that there is no real difference between 26 per cent and 49 per cent for investors, save their entitlement to larger profits.
Profit is not the main issue; it is the absence of the desired level of control that investing entities will have over their technologies with 49 per cent ownership that acts as the dampener. As economics professor Jurgen Brauer has cautioned, no transferring country will idly stand by while their products are “shipped abroad and effective competition is created”.
Given the overwhelming concern for safeguarding IPR, the removal of the FDI ceiling would yield rich dividends. The transformation of the Indian automobile industry after 100 per cent FDI was permitted may be an educative example. It helped India become an important export base for some of the best brands. Arguments that lifting the ceiling on FDI in defence would “decimate” the local industry do not deserve any serious consideration as they are starkly similar to the fears expressed when limits were lifted in the automobile sector.
Offset obligations
Second, use the mandatory offset (compensations that buyers obtain from sellers) to bolster[bówl-stu(Support,सहारा)] the ‘Make in India’ programme. When using this strategy, it would be wise to remember that offsets do not come free. They are indeed paid for by the buyer. A study conducted in Belgium concluded that an additional cost of 20-30 per cent was loaded on contracts as expenses for discharging offset obligations. Such loading emanates from the fact that offsets are trade distorting.
As offsets come at a substantial cost, they would need to be steered. For fulfilling offset obligations, identify equipment from a shelf of projects carefully created to fill identified gaps in Indian defence technology. Make it compulsory for companies to locally produce such equipment with predetermined levels of indigenisation to be achieved over the years. For such projects, permit up to 76 per cent FDI under the automatic route, thereby giving foreign investors sufficient control over the established entity.
Third, complement the above strategy by employing multipliers (assigning higher value) where foreign companies manufacture defence wares identified to be of critical need for the services. In such cases, allow 100 per cent FDI, mandating only a reporting requirement to the Ministry of Defence.
Fourth, establish a separate Department of Overseas Acquisitions in the Ministry of Defence for establishing Special Purpose Vehicles with identified private sector entities to take over foreign companies. The department should in effect function as a Defence Sovereign Wealth Fund.
Fifth, finance and support R&D/production in the private sector as the U.S. does (the development and production of U-2, the highly successful reconnaissance aircraft, in the 1950s is a good model).
Sixth, create a body in the Ministry of Deference consisting of civilian officers, defence personnel and industry leaders to evaluate FDI flows, steer these flows and offsets, identify foreign companies for acquisition, etc. The mandate of this body should be to achieve convergence of various strategies being implemented by multiple bodies.
In conclusion, development of the indigenous industry in the country would require multiple strategies, a synergic approach and unconventional thinking, taking some lessons from China which has successfully adopted many of them. With the present conducive[kun'dyoo-siv(contributive,सहायक)] political environment, it is a goal that is immensely achievable.
Courtesy:the hindu
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On the margins in a city of dreams
A week after a fire broke out in the Deonar dumping ground in Mumbai, fires in smaller pockets continue to blaze. But toxic smoke is only an addition to a long list of problems in Deonar. The oldest and largest dumping ground of India receives over 5,500 metric tonnes of waste, 600 metric tonnes of silt[silt(mud,कीचड़)], and 25 tonnes of biomedical waste daily. Between March and June every year, the daily amount of silt rises to more than 9,000 metric tonnes because of drain cleaning before the monsoon season. As of December 2014, the waste had reached a height of around 164 ft, equivalent to the height of an 18-storey tower.
The high mounds of trash in which children and stray dogs loiter[loy-tu(hang,घूमना)] around, and around which the air smells of burnt plastic and putrefying garbage makes Deonar most certainly unfit for human habitation.
From slums to dumping grounds
Since the early 1970s, this peripheral ward has evolved into a space for dumping garbage, waste from polluting industries, from abattoirs['a-bu,twaa(butchery,कसाईखाना)], and so on. It is not only unwanted things but “unwanted” people too who were and are dumped in this place. Poor people living in inner city slums, and migrants displaced from other parts of the country were all forced by circumstances to settle here.
In 1972-73, poorer residents from inner city areas were relocated to Shivaji Nagar, Baiganwadi, and Lotus Colony. More people (largely Dalits and Muslims) relocated around the dumping ground, following acute[u'kyoot(sharp,तीक्ष्ण)] droughts in rural Maharashtra and other parts of the country. In 1976, people were internally displaced within the ward, when residents of Janata colony within and around the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre were shifted to Cheetah Camp. The Prime Minister’s special grant for urban renewal from 1986 to 1993 resulted in massive eviction of poor people from inner city areas to Deonar. This trend of relocating a large number of slum households from all over the city for “development” continued from 2003 to 2006, with World Bank-funded infrastructure projects.
Now, M-East ward, with over 80 per cent of its people living in slums, has emerged as an expanded poverty space. Along with the lack of decent housing, there is lack of potable water, adequate[a-di-kwut(enough,पर्याप्त)] drainage, electricity, and welfare services such as public health facilities and government secondary schools.
Housing is not the only prism of legality and realising fundamental rights. When people are dislocated, or when they migrate to the city because of distress conditions back home, they are uprooted from their social, economic, and environmental contexts. They may put up/rent a hut in the ward, but lose access to workplaces, schooling, water and sanitation, and social capital. The cost of being displaced from established slum areas and villages and being relocated close to the dumping ground is devastating[de-vu,stey-ting(destructive,विनाशकारी)] particularly for children, women, the elderly, and persons with disability or illness.
People’s rights to minimum standards of living here are challenged on a daily basis. M-Ward’s Human Development Index is the lowest in the city, at a meagre 0.2. The unemployment rate is 52 per cent. Of those ‘employed’, the income of 71 per cent of the ragpickers is uncertain. The average monthly income of a family is Rs. 8,000. Talking about the sudden shift from village life to life in a garbage dump, Aamna Bi, 16, who has come from Kolhapur to Nirankari Nagar after marriage, says: “It feels strange to live with garbage all around you. The water is not clean, and the place stinks all the time. But what is good is that this very dump is also a good source to fill our stomachs. If you work hard to collect sufficient recyclable garbage, you will have food at the end of the day. The dump sees to it.” But with the Municipal Corporation deciding to cancel licenses of ragpickers, the economic condition of Amina Bi and several thousand families is bound to get desperate.
There are at least 17 settlements on the edge of the dumping ground. The people here are constantly afraid of the threat of eviction, particularly during peak monsoon season. Their lives take on a repetitive pattern of construction and breakdown — first families reclaim the land from the marsh, lay the ground, build the walls, and raise the tin roof. Then a bulldozer accompanied by the police mows these houses down. After a few days, the families start rebuilding their lives all over again.
Says Salima of Nirankari Nagar: “Working filled with insects, with just our heads above it, my husband and I slowly pushed it back, made the ground solid, and built a home on it. And we paid registered rents to the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation. Suddenly ward officials came with bulldozers and the police and demolished it. They said this is not my father’s land.” Straddling the Shankar Nagar housing colony and the vast dumping ground, the residents of Nirankari Nagar live on the edges of both. Even though they are registered renters to the BMC, the expanding garbage dump has now spilled over into their homes.
With open defecation, acute air and water pollution, and decaying garbage, M-East Ward has the lowest life expectancy rate of less than 50 years, and the highest infant mortality rate with around 20 per cent of all deaths in 2015 accounted for by infants. Every second child is underweight. Over 90 per cent of pregnant women in 2014-15 were anaemic[u'nee-mik(weak,कमज़ोर)], and there is a high instance of maternal mortality. There is a high threat of contacting diseases such as tuberculosis. Healthcare is grossly inadequate; the ‘health service’ providers are mostly quacks[kwak(fake doctor,फ़र्ज़ी चिकित्सक)]. Education is poor, and seven out of ten households have no access to piped water connection.
To add to the challenges, factors such as caste, religion, region of origin, and occupation also affect the experience of poverty. The parameters of human development in parts of this ward are, in fact, comparable to some of the poorest regions in the world, and overall ward development is still much lower than the rest of the city.
Rural prosperity
But M-East ward is not an isolated phenomenon of our human condition. At its roots is the systemic agrarian distress in India’s villages. This has to be addressed through accountable and efficient welfare and development programmes. It is here that the late President Abdul Kalam’s vision of creating secured villages (through the Provision of Urban Amenities to Rural Areas framework), and comprehensively articulated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the Sansad Aadarsh Gram Yojana, becomes important. This programme has the potential to retain people in the villages and ensure that they live with dignity. Such rural prosperity can contribute substantially to creating sustainable cities and better economic development.
Forty years ago, when Mumbai embarked[em'baak(enter,प्रवेश)] on several redevelopment programmes, spatial transformations, ‘beautification’ and ‘cleansing’ drives to become the economic capital of India, it seemed to close its eyes to communities which are at the very bottom of its class, caste and gender pyramid. In M-East ward, over half a million people living in the most difficult conditions contribute immensely to keep the city moving. They maintain our antiquated[an-ti,kwey-tid(old,पुराना)] colonial sewage disposal system, clean the streets, take away and sort garbage, work as security staff, as maids in well-off households, as constables, and provide other basic services. Their abject['ab,jekt(low,निम्न)] standard of living has no place in a ‘global city’. Surely, Mumbai’s rich and powerful are capable of showing some compassion to address the existential problems of a few millions of fellow citizens who were dumped, along with the city’s garbage, in M-East Ward and other peripheries of the city.
Courtesy:the hindu
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Wednesday, March 30, 2016
Together in Brussels
The recent events in Brussels, following the terror attacks in Paris last year, once again re-emphasise the vulnerability[vúl-nu-ru'bi-lu-tee(weakness,कमज़ोरी)] of all parts of the world to militancy and extremism of all kinds. I stayed in Brussels from 1999 to 2001, working for the Indian embassy. Brussels was a quiet, sleepy little city, beautifully organised, with green areas interspersed with concrete structures. It’s the headquarters of the European Union (EU) and I had a great deal to do with the European Commission, which is effectively the secretariat of the Union. The EU has a Council, which is the highest political body and it has a Commission, which is the administrative wing. There’s also a European Parliament, which functioned then more like a giant civil society organisation that would suddenly and unexpectedly take up issues throwing many countries off balance from time to time. Belgium is a beautiful country. It is small and it used to be said that if one drove 40 minutes in any direction, one would be out of the country.
Belgium prided itself on its intelligence mechanism and security network. It generally followed a policy of not interfering with demonstrations, or “manifestations”, as they were called, of any kind unless driven to the extreme. On one occasion, when K.P.S. Gill came to Brussels, it was reported that he had been slightly manhandled by a Sikh agitator. When Gill decided to come again to Brussels during my tenure there as deputy chief of mission, I was apprehensive. I thought the Belgian authorities would provide him some security but they were categorical in asserting that their intelligence information was that he was safe and that they would maintain discreet surveillance without any overt security support. I tried to persuade Gill not to come through the MEA, but he can be adamant. Fortunately, the visit passed off without any incident.
The confidence of the Belgian government and the Belgian security establishment must have been seriously shaken by the recent incidents and the knowledge that the nerve centre of European terrorism was probably located in this small country, which plays host to many international organisations. Shockingly, the explosion at the Maelbeek metro station took place barely 200 meters from the headquarters of the European Commission.
This brings me back to the general Western approach to the issue of terrorism and its evolution over the years. The first ever India-EU Summit was held on June 28, 2000, when I was still in Brussels. While I was responsible for negotiating the portions of the proposed joint declaration on matters relating to trade and economy, political issues were negotiated by my foreign service colleagues in the embassy and in the MEA. India argued vehemently[vee-u-munt-lee(intensely,तीव्र रूप से)] for strong language on Afghanistan, then ruled with an iron hand by the Taliban. European diplomats at that time held that the Taliban should be slowly and patiently encouraged to join the global mainstream through persuasion[pu'swey-zhun(opinion,धारणा)] and friendly overtures. Terrorist events at that time were confined to India and some other developing countries, and the West felt terrorism would never cross its own boundaries. I particularly remember Vivek Katju, then joint secretary in the MEA, putting forward his case brilliantly with a great deal of conviction. The joint secretary in charge of Western Europe, Bhaswati Mukherjee, with her remarkable fluency in French, was forceful and persuasive.
At the end of the day, however, India could not persuade the Europeans to make specific references to the burgeoning militancy and terrorism in Afghanistan. The language used was as follows: “We share the conviction that terrorism remains a major threat to international peace and security, and constitutes a serious violation of the rights of innocent individuals and of the integrity of states.” It went on to talk of “unreserved condemnation of terrorism” and of strengthened cooperation within the UN Charter and in accordance with international law.
Along came 9/11, and the West suddenly realised that terrorism in its most extreme form could strike it, too, with horrific impact. What was considered to be essentially a third-world problem now began to be seen as a global threat of massive dimensions. In fact, the entire approach of Western states to the problems arising out of terrorism had been guided throughout the past several decades by their own perception of their geopolitical interests and the positioning of countries vis-à-vis the Cold War. In that sense, 9/11 marks a watershed in the history of global policies on terrorism. The suspicion with which India was viewed gradually began to diminish[di'mi-nish(decrease,कमी)], aided also by the statesmanlike policies of Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and, now, Narendra Modi.
The changed approach to terrorism was reflected in the third EU-India Summit in Copenhagen. Much stronger language was used in the joint declaration. It talked of the “determination to combat[kóm,bat(fight,लड़ना)] terrorism”, emphasised that “there can be no justification for terrorism and that those who perpetrate['pur-pu,treyt(perform,करना)] and sponsor it will be brought to justice”. It supported the new Transitional Authority under Hamid Karzai and expressed the “determination to support the Afghan government in combating the forces of terrorism.”
That the joint approach of India and the EU to terrorism became stronger and stronger over the years is evident from the joint communiqués issued from time to time. The ninth summit, held in Marseille on September 29, 2008, reaffirmed “their strong and continued commitment to the government of Afghanistan in its efforts to build a democratic and pluralistic society” and to strengthen Afghan security and military forces. Nor is the concern with terrorism confined to Afghanistan. The fact that terrorism can strike anywhere at any time and that all countries are equally at risk has now become obvious to all political leaders across the globe. Western policies are, in my opinion, still rather ambivalent[am'bi-vu-lunt(uncertain,अनिश्चित)] and the on-off approach followed in dealing with terror-related issues results in a lingering malaise[ma'leyz(unease,बैचेनी)] which may take many hundreds of lives before the world sees reason and acts cohesively. The decision of the Indian prime minister to attend the current summit in Brussels, regardless of the recent terrorist attacks, is a bold step which sends a strong message that will resonate across the world.
Courtesy:indian express
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Starving MGNREGA
As India faces the onslaught of another severe drought, and water, food, and employment dry up, the government will claim that it is doing its best to cope with the adversity. But, given the facts, that will be a patently false statement.
The cynical[si-ni-kul(distrustful,दोषदर्शी)] attitude towards the MGNREGA is an example of how policymakers are deliberately and knowingly — by squeezing funds and subverting the legal mandate of the law — causing immeasurable misery and suffering to people. Through the fund squeeze, the government has consciously crippled the MGNREGA’s ability to help people facing drought.
Officially, the drought has affected over a third of the country — nine out of the 29 states, 248 out of 660 districts, 2,327 out of 6,800 blocks, and 96,954 out of 2,57,000 panchayats. Unlike natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes, which destroy ecosystems in a few moments, droughts take hold slowly and provide clear warnings to policymakers, thus giving them a chance to plan and execute effective drought management strategy. Yet, once it settles in, a mismanaged drought can wipe out economic progress made over decades, pushing an entire generation back into abject[ab,jekt(pitiful,दयनीय)] poverty.
The MGNREGA was inspired by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act, passed in 1977, wherein policymakers found wage employment as the best way to empower people against drought. The funding for the state scheme came from four taxes, imposed on those less affected by the drought. The money so received went into a fund dedicated to the scheme.
However, the MGNREGA hasn’t been as fortunate. Despite its proven success, the scheme is itself facing a monetary drought. Some facts: A whopping Rs 10,588 crore is currently pending in payment delays.
In other words, nine crore workers in 25 states are facing illegal delays in wage payments. More than half of this amount is in drought-affected states.
The saddest part is that notwithstanding the government’s grand announcement — increasing the number of workdays to 150 in the nine drought-affected states — all these states have a negative cash balance. It’s hardly surprising then that only 5 per cent households have completed 150 days of work. This is conclusive proof that the government is ignoring the two most important legal requirements of the MGNREGA — work on demand, and full and timely payment of wages.
Despite its proven success, the scheme is itself facing a monetary drought.
The fund squeeze sets off a vicious[vi-shus(inhuman,अनैतिक)] cycle — delayed payments leading to lesser demand and still fewer payments — resulting in helplessness and distress migration. The continued shortage of funds severely undermines the credibility of the law.
State governments and local administrators, too, are in a quandary[kwón-d(u-)ree(uncertainty,उलझन)]: The law requires them to provide work but they don’t have enough money to pay the wages. Communication accessed under the RTI Act shows that state governments have been unsuccessfully appealing for adequate[a-di-kwut(enough,पर्याप्त)] fund releases, and are being forced to ration funds for the year. This distortion turns the law into a cruel joke.
But drought-affected people are not the only ones distressed. Many company heads, who have unpaid dues stacking up as bank NPAs, such as Vijay Mallya, too, have been forced into distress migration! In the budget, there’s a full section on taxes forgone for the corporate sector. And on March 23, Ravi Shankar Prasad, the minister for communication and information technology, announced a Rs 14,724 crore Holi gift for government employees, with a 6 per cent increase in their daily allowance. It’s perspicuous[pu'spi-kyoo-us(clear,स्पष्ठ)] that there are many competing priorities in India.
As prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri had suggested that the well-off should forgo meals so that the starving could be fed. That noble thought never worked. The MGNREGA was an attempt to institutionalise responsibility and move beyond such individual efforts. But this has been systematically undermined, with calamitous[ku'la-mi-tus(disastrous,विनाशकारी)] consequences[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)]. The MGNREGA is not the only measure required to fight a drought but an honest implementation of the law could make a huge difference. There’s no substitute for an honest effort.
Courtesy:indian express
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Tuesday, March 29, 2016
Why we must have water budgets
The protest by farmers in Chikballapur recently, over the scarcity of drinking water, received extensive news coverage as it halted Bengaluru in its tracks after key highways were blocked. Interestingly, very little of that coverage was devoted to the groundwater crisis that underpins the problem in such regions.
Groundwater plays an important role in our lives and India’s economy, but it is disappearing fast. There is mounting evidence that we are extracting more than can be naturally replenished[ri'ple-nish(refill,भराई)]. In the hard-rock aquifers of peninsular India, drilling 800 ft or deeper is becoming the norm. Groundwater-dependent towns and villages spend an increasing fraction of their budgets chasing the water table. Stories abound of farmers spending their life savings or taking loans to drill a borewell, but failing to find water. If we “run out” of groundwater, millions of people will be left without any means to sustain themselves.
Scientific evidence also points to over-exploitation. The Central Ground Water Board classifies all blocks in India based on the fraction of recharge that is extracted and trends in long-term groundwater levels. Since 2004, almost a third of blocks have been classified “over-exploited” or “semi-critical”. If we understand the problem and if the consequences[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)] are so severe, why are we unable to address it? The answer lies partly in politics, partly in the invisible nature of groundwater, and partly in our reliance on simple techno-economic fixes.
Flawed regulatory structure
Electricity is supplied to farmers free of cost. This policy made sense when groundwater was abundant[u'bún-dunt(plentiful,प्रचुर मात्रा में)] in the 1980s. Indeed, it helped millions of farmers escape poverty. But today, where groundwater levels have fallen hundreds of feet below the ground, the subsidy is actually only utilised by the richest farmers who can afford to drill deep. And even so, not all are serendipitous[se-run'di-pu-tus(lucky,भाग्यशाली)] enough to strike water. Access to groundwater in hard-rock regions has almost become a lottery. Yet in the absence of alternative water sources, charging farmers for electricity is seen as political suicide.
Groundwater is inherently difficult to monitor and control, in part because of its invisibility, which also perpetuates[pu'pe-choo,eyt(cause to continue,बनाये रखना)] the illusion that each well is independent. The myth is enshrined in Indian groundwater law that allows landowners to extract as much as they want. In reality, not only is groundwater within an aquifer interconnected, but aquifers and rivers are also interconnected. So depleting groundwater means drying rivers. Despite this, groundwater and rivers are regulated by different agencies that do not properly account for the linkages between them, often double counting the quantum of the resource.
Much of the current action on the ground is through techno-economic fixes. These have clear benefits in terms of reducing pumping costs and using local aquifers instead of building big, expensive dams. But what they do not do is create “new” water.
Boosting recharge through rainwater0 harvesting structures such as small check dams is a popular measure. However, any water that recharges is water that does not flow downstream. Often users located near check dams simply extract more water, while users further downstream wonder why their rivers and tanks are drying up. Another technological solution is to improve efficiency through subsidised drip irrigation or energy-saving pumps. Again, these have often resulted in farmers increasing their irrigation area with no decrease in water extracted. And farmers are not alone; conscientious[kón-shee'en-shus(careful,कर्तव्यनिष्ट)] urban dwellers take pride in reusing wastewater for gardens and parks. But this could result in more wasteful water use, with the additional “wastewater” used in lawns or golf courses where none previously existed.
Science and fairness
Techno-economic fixes do not address the underlying “zero-sum game” nature of water resource use. Ultimately, the water management problem is that of allocating the water available each year among users — both people and the ecosystem. Without understanding how much water is available, how much is being used and by whom, solving India’s water crisis is going to be a non-starter.
The way forward is comprehensive water budgeting, simultaneously in each watershed and the river basin as a whole. Water budgets at the watershed level will inform communities about how much water they have, so it can be equitably shared within communities. Water budgets for the river basin will inform communities how much must be left for downstream users, ensuring that water resources are allocated between communities fairly and transparently.
Given the zero-sum nature of the game and the impossibility of creating “new” water, it is likely that we cannot restore the water balance in severely depleted regions without painful cuts in water use. However, there are some glimmers of hope. Water users everywhere are worried about the disappearing resource and willing to engage. The trick lies in combining technology (low-water-use crops, xeriscaping) and economic incentives that reduce actual water use (“cash-for-blue” schemes) without reducing productivity or quality of life. This needs a vehement[vee-u-munt(strong,मजबूत)] water governance system based on awareness building, science and a commitment to fairness and sustainability.
Courtesy:the hindu
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Monday, March 28, 2016
Providing transparency in rural electrification
Rural electrification has been an enduring[in'dyûr-ing(permanent,चिरस्थायी)] challenge for successive governments. Given India’s federal structure, States provide last-mile connectivity which includes providing access to and distributing electricity, and maintaining infrastructure, while the Central government provides policy and financial support.
However, un-electrified villages present an enormous[i'nor-mus(big,बड़ा)] challenge as they are often located in inaccessible or left-wing extremism-affected areas. Over the last three years, there has been a rapid decline in the pace of rural electrification to only 5,189 villages. Several States, particularly in eastern India, have seen even lower levels of electrification. For instance, in these three years, Uttar Pradesh electrified just 64 villages against the 1,518 that were sanctioned while Bihar electrified only 1,248 villages against the 9,246 that were sanctioned. The slow pace meant that this task would require more than a decade. Due to such tardy[taa-dee(slow,सुस्त)] performance in the States, the National Democratic Alliance government launched the Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) to ensure rapid electrification, feeder separation, and strengthening of rural distribution infrastructure. It is necessary to monitor progress intensively for smooth and fast implementation of electrification.
On August 15, 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that all the remaining villages would be electrified within 1,000 days. Based on Census 2011, States had provided a list of 18,452 un-electrified villages as on April 1, 2015. To transparently monitor the process, the Central government, in November 2015, appointed 309 young and passionate Grameen Vidyut Abhiyantas (GVAs or rural electrification engineers) from the same areas. Reports by these GVAs are shared through the GARV (Grameen Vidyutikaran) app (http://garv.gov.in) with officials as well as the public. It puts pressure on State governments for timely and quality delivery.
Transparent monitoring system
Transparency in rural electrification brought to fore a number of issues which were traditionally swept under the rug(To conceal something in the hopes it won't be discovered by others). Villages are electrified as per the old 10 per cent household connectivity criterion, but the Central government aims at connecting 100 per cent households of the 18,452 villages. Habitations with less than 100 people (Dhanis, Majalas, Tolas, etc.) outside revenue villages were not even included earlier, but are now electrified. Prior to GVAs, only data provided by the States was available, which in many cases does not represent ground reality. GVAs provide a verification mechanism in a bold, transparent, and reliable manner. We are delighted that the media is taking an interest in tracking rural electrification.
On December 10, 2015, media reports highlighted discrepancies[di'skre-pun-see(difference,असंगति)] in some State data and it was decided that post January 1, 2016, GVA verification would be mandatory for electrified villages so that States provide accurate data. Thus GVAs have the huge task of verifying all the old data generated by the State governments since April 1, 2015, and public and media participation was solicited for scrutiny[skroo-t(u-)nee(examine,जाँच)]. This will ensure highest degree of probity and accountability in the system.
Articles on rural electrification published in The Hindu on March 26 (“On paper, electrified villages — in reality, darkness” and “Here, the light goes out of their lives at sunset”) fulfil this very purpose and are a step towards bringing accountability. Though these articles aim to highlight certain shortcomings in rural electrification, they are themselves outcomes of a transparent monitoring system adopted by the Centre.
Analysing specific cases
Let’s look at specific cases. Haldu Khata in Uttar Pradesh was declared electrified by the U.P. government on November 6, 2015 but during a visit by GVAs on Jan 1, 2016, no works of grid extension were found in the village. As an interim arrangement, the village stands electrified with solar power. Dimatala in Assam was declared electrified by the State on September 27, 2015 and was confirmed by GVAs. But on January 18, 2016, a visit of GVAs found that the distribution transformer was damaged. The State was directed to take corrective action. Kadam Jheriya in Chhattisgarh was declared electrified by the State on October 9, 2015 and was confirmed by GVAs. Pagara Buzurg in Madhya Pradesh was declared electrified on September 28, 2015 and was confirmed through a GVA visit. However, a GVA visit on March 22, 2016 revealed that existing infrastructure has been stolen; this remains the responsibility of the State. Panalomali, Kusadangar, Patyetapali in Odisha, and Sunwara in M.P. were declared electrified by the States on November 27, 2015; December 4, 2015; November 12, 2015; and September 28, 2015 respectively. GVAs have recorded these as uninhabited[ún-in'ha-bi-tid(deserted,निर्जन)] villages, but State governments have not declared them so. Birni in Jharkhand was declared electrified by the State on October 15, 2015. A GVA visit on March 23, 2016 confirmed that village works are complete, but line charging remains and is being expedited[ek-spu,dIt(hasten,शीघ्र निबटाना)].
Additionally, 300 villages were declared electrified by State governments but not verified by GVAs. They were declared electrified before GVAs joined. GVAs are verifying all the villages and will complete the process by March 31, 2016.
The articles mention that 342 villages were marked as not electrified by GVAs but are shown as electrified. We are not sure how the figure has been arrived at by the reporter, but State governments’ data remains our primary reference complemented by field verification. There are indeed some villages such as Firozpur Darga, Fajalpur Habitat in U.P., and Bukanari in Bihar which were declared electrified on September 30, 2015 by U.P. and on September 29, 2015 by Bihar, but found un-electrified during GVA visits. State governments have been requested to reconfirm the basis of their data and take corrective action. The underlying focus remains transparency. If the purpose was to hide the status of the villages, even the “not electrified as per GVA” status will not show on the app.
The app itself highlights that 3,604 villages were found electrified during the survey by GVAs. Instead of the data first coming from States, GVAs directly captured the electrification data on the app with subsequent State government confirmation. These villages were electrified before deployment of GVAs.
Despite our commitment during meetings in the third week of March to provide precise[pri'sIs(accurate,सही)] field data after the Holi vacations, the reporter went ahead with the articles, making a case for State governments to improve data accuracy and quality.
Power Minister Piyush Goyal said on March 22: “I urge all to monitor the implementation of rural electrification carried out by States to support the efforts of the Central government to bring in transparency and ensure that proper quality is maintained and works are completed on time.” Also on multiple occasions, the Minister has asked the public and the media to scrutinise rural electrification work of States and ask for accountability. With enhanced funds, pro-people guidelines, constant monitoring and speedy delivery, Central government has embarked on a time-bound mission not only to electrify 18,452 villages much before the scheduled time but also to take it to the next level to provide connectivity to all the households in these villages and meet the ultimate goal of 24X7 power for all.
Courtesy:the hindu
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Come clean on nuclear security
This week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will touch down in Washington, DC for the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit, a biennial conference series initiated in 2010 by the Barack Obama administration. Mr. Modi will no doubt seek to showcase India’s nuclear regime as one that adheres[ad'heer(follow,पालन)] to the highest standards of transparency and safety through rigorous[ri-gu-rus(strict,सख्त)] regulation of nuclear products and institutions. Although that would be welcome, what Mr. Modi’s interlocutors[in-tu'lók-yu-tu(middleman,वार्तालापि)] in the U.S. may be hoping for is that he will break with India’s tradition of maintaining a masterful silence on two questions surrounding its nuclear policy. First, how can India address disquieting signals that have emerged in recent times, which point to growing concerns over the security of its nuclear materials? Second, at a time when India’s macro strategy of rapid economic development is premised on a climate of neighbourly peace and stability in the region, is it not appropriate that Mr. Modi call for an end to the nuclear arms race in Asia, and address environmental risks of India’s covert weapons plants?
Let us consider each of these questions in turn.
India’s nuclear security
First, the need for heightened nuclear security has now become urgent, especially with the emergence of global jihadi threats such as the Islamic State. In this context, three potential nuclear terrorist threats relate to extremists making or acquiring and exploding a nuclear bomb; the danger of radioactive material being fashioned into a “dirty bomb”; and the risk of nuclear reactor sabotage[sa-bu,taazh(destruction,विनाश)].
The first and second scenarios are vectors of imminent[i-mu-nunt(close,आसन्न)] concern in Pakistan, with analysts citing[siting(mentioned,उल्लेख)] as examples a series of terrorist attacks in 2007 on nuclear weapons facilities in that country, including a nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha and a nuclear airbase at Kamra.
However, a paper published earlier this month by Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government cautioned that U.S. officials ranked Indian nuclear security measures as “weaker than those of Pakistan and Russia”, and U.S. experts visiting the sensitive Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 2008 described the security arrangements there as “extraordinarily low key”. Further, the Harvard report notes, there are concerns about threats within Indian nuclear facilities stemming in part from “significant insider corruption”, and what appears to be inconsistent strength of regulation. An example that the report cites relates to the 2014 case of Vijay Singh, head constable at the Madras Atomic Power Station at Kalpakkam, who shot and killed three people with his service rifle. According to the report, this event may have been avoided had the Central Industrial Security Force’s personnel reliability programme been able to detect Mr. Singh’s deteriorating[di'teer-ee-u,reyt(worsen,बिगड़ना)] mental health, which it failed to do “despite multiple red flags, including his telling colleagues that he was about to explode like a firecracker.” With a scarcity of data points on insider threats and the attendant concerns about sabotage and nuclear accidents, the unsurprising conclusion of the report was: “Given the limited information available about India’s nuclear security measures, it is difficult to judge whether India’s nuclear security is capable of protecting against the threats it faces.”
Weapons development programme
This brings us to the second question, which relates to India’s clandestine[klan'des-tin(hidden,गुप्त)] weapons development programme.
Set within the broader context of nuclear deterrence[di'te-run(t)s(preventive,निवारण)] vis-à-vis Pakistan and China, it has quietly steamed forward since the 1998 Pokhran-II tests. Recent evidence that this shadowy realm of government activity has been proceeding apace beyond the scrutiny[skroo-t(u-)nee(examine,जाँच)] of the media and public surfaced in June 2014 when IHS Jane’s, a U.S.-based military intelligence think tank, discovered satellite imagery showing efforts underway to extend a Mysore nuclear centrifuge plant constructed in 1992 at the Rare Metals Plant at that location. According to Jane’s, the purpose behind this extension may have been the covert['kow,vurt(secret,गुप्त)] production of uranium hexafluoride, which could be channelled towards the manufacture of hydrogen bombs or naval reactors to power India’s nuclear submarine fleet.
One month later, another U.S. think tank, the Institute for Science and International Security, revealed additional satellite imagery suggesting that India was building a Special Material Enrichment Facility, including constructing an industrial-scale centrifuge complex in Chitradurga district in Karnataka. Some time during 2009 and 2010, approximately 10,000 acres of land were allegedly diverted at that site for various defence purposes, including 290 acres in Khudapura allocated to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for developing and testing drones.
A few years later, in December 2015, a study by the Centre for Public Integrity (CPI), reported in Foreign Policy magazine, confirmed that India’s under-radar ambition to acquire thermonuclear weapons at the Chitradurga site had advanced much further than many had suspected.
There are likely to be a number of other such walled-off weapons development zones across the breadth of the country, and this begs two critical questions. First, what are the broader implications of India’s covert nuclear programme for the triangular standoff vis-à-vis Pakistan and China? Second, while the Nuclear Liability Law protects its citizenry from the potentially catastrophic[ka-tu'stró-fik(ruinous,विनाशकारी)] fallout of a nuclear accident in the civilian nuclear sector, what guarantees do we have that India’s nuclear black sites do not endanger the health of the people and the environment?
On the first question, India’s search for thermonuclear weapons certainly exacerbates[ig'za-su,beyt(worsen,बिगड़ना)] the nuclear arms race with its neighbours, specifically by sparking dangerous games of tit-for-tat weaponisation, loose talk about tactical superiority and theatre nukes, and growing doubts about deterrence stability. The region is already a potential hothouse of nuclear posturing — a fact corroborated by the independent Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s estimates that India has something in the range 90-110 nuclear weapons, Pakistan has around 120, and China has close to 260.
Environmental impact
On the question of environmental impact, evidence suggests that the Chitradurga and Khudapura sites may be degrading the surrounding grassland ecosystems called kavals, which are habitats for critically endangered local species such as the Great Indian Bustard, the Lesser Florican and the Black Buck, not to mention the livelihoods source for thousands of pastoral communities.
In February 2014, NGOs in Karnataka including the Environment Support Group complained about government land acquisitions for DRDO and BARC in the Challakere in Chitradurga, and obtained a direction from the National Green Tribunal to halt[holt(stop,रोकना)] construction activity that had commenced[ku'men(t)s(start,शुरू)] without securing permission from the Karnataka Forest Department and the Union Ministry of Environment and Forests.
Since then, it is unclear whether the government ever paused its weapons development activity to conduct proper environmental assessments, but the CPI study indicates otherwise, citing as evidence an October 2012 letter marked “Secret” from the Ministry to atomic energy officials which suggested approval of the Mysore site’s construction as “a project of strategic importance” that would cost nearly $100 million.
When he meets Mr. Obama at the end of this month, Mr. Modi may come laden with a “house gift” as a sign of India’s sustained commitment to nuclear security. If this could be an indication that India is willing be more open about discussing its nuclear weapons programme with a view to ultimately denuclearising the neighbourhood, it would by far be one of the most courageous contribution that India could make towards a lasting subcontinental security.
Courtesy:the hindu
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1991’s golden transaction
India’s balance of payments situation had deteriorated[di'teer-ee-u,reyt(worsen,बिगड़ना)] sharply by the end of 1990. Even as attempts were being made to obtain normal and extraordinary funding from multilateral institutions, private banks and other market players were also being approached. With frequent changes in government, the responsibility of the RBI increased. Governor S. Venkitaramanan was so active that he was described by an economic daily as “lone (loan) ranger”.
In the course of talking with various market players, one question that came up frequently was: What was India doing on its own to tide over the crisis? The implication was simple. India had a fairly large stock of gold as reserves. Why could not India use it? This was not outside the thought of the RBI as well. Several steps were being taken to activate the banks’ gold holding. The first step was to revalue the gold holdings at market price. This was done by the government through an ordinance in October 1990, which was later approved by Parliament. In January 1991, the State Bank of India proposed to raise foreign exchange through the lease of gold held by the government. In April 1991, the government agreed to the proposal to utilise 20 tonnes of confiscated[kón-fi,skeyt(seized,जब्त)] gold and raise foreign exchange. The gold was dispatched in four consignments in May 1991. This was actually executed in the form of sale with a repurchase option. The RBI was totally involved in this arrangement. But this was not enough. The RBI was thinking of how to use its own gold to tide over the crisis.
In using the RBI’s gold, there were three sets of issues to be cleared. First, at the policy level, a decision was needed: Given the sentimental attachment to gold, it was felt from the beginning that outright sale of gold was not an option. Pledging gold and raising a foreign exchange loan was the only thing contemplated[kón-tum,pleyt(think,विचारना)]. Second, whatever was to be done had to be consistent with the provisions of the RBI Act, 1934. Under the act, the RBI could borrow only from other currency authorities. Third, there were issues connected with the physical task of selecting, packing and sending out gold. It bristled with many problems.
The advice of the RBI for pledging gold to raise a foreign exchange loan was accepted by the government. It was a bold decision by a government which at that time was only a caretaker one.
Governor Venkitaramanan and I visited several central banks to sound out how far they would be helpful. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) had to be ruled out because it was not strictly a “currency authority”. It turned out that the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan were two central banks who were willing. But both institutions insisted that the pledged gold must be kept outside India, despite India being a depository country under the IMF. The RBI Act does permit keeping of gold outside India but with some restrictions. To conform to the provisions of the act, with respect to borrowing, the RBI had to transfer the asset from the Issue Department to the Banking Department and this was done before transshipping gold. Since the RBI is permitted to borrow only for a month, the borrowing had to be rolled over from month to month.
The third set of issues relating to the shipment of gold turned out to be more arduous[aa-joo-us(difficult,कठिन)] than expected. Since the quantity of gold to be pledged was around 50 tonnes, it was decided to use the gold that was in stock in Mumbai. The gold in stock was in various forms. Not all of them satisfied the London Good Delivery (LGD) specifications in terms of fineness and weight. It was decided to send pure gold bars as they were and the Bank of England was entrusted with the responsibility of converting the non-LGD bars into LGD bars.
Packing, insuring and finally sending the gold through airlines had to be done in a short span of time without attracting much attention. This was an operation in which various departments of the RBI, such as the External Investments & Operations (DEIO), Issue, Banking Operations and Legal had to come together and act. P.B. Kulkarni, the chief of the DEIO, and his band of devoted colleagues did a tremendous job. In all, 46.91 tonnes of gold were dispatched in four consignments by air, beginning July 4. The largest consignment was the second one, which had to be transported through a chartered carrier. It is interesting to note that the actual dispatch happened after the new government led by P.V. Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh (as finance minister) took over. The new FM raised no objections and he, in fact, defended the action in Parliament. The loan raised against the pledging of gold was repaid by November 1991. However, that gold was not brought back but kept abroad.
The entire episode was not without its drama. For example, when any commodity is sent out of the country, the nature of the commodity has to be declared. I spoke with the commissioner of customs and a special authorisation from the finance ministry was obtained to send the gold without such a declaration. As one of the consignments had an intermediate stopover, a sudden doubt arose whether this was covered by insurance. On a Sunday, I had the office opened to check the policy and was relieved to find that it had a “Vault to Vault” insurance cover. Finally, when the gold was moved from the vault of the Bombay office to the airport, the movement along the road was closely monitored. In the case of one large consignment, the bullion van had to stop because of a suspected tyre burst in one of the cars in the convoy. Fortunately, before much commotion could happen, the convoy resumed.
The total loan raised against the pledge of gold was $405 million. Today, it may look small, but this amount was crucial to prevent a default at the time. There was no intention on the part of the RBI or the government to hide the transaction from the public. The RBI wanted to make it public once the operation was over. The shipment of gold made everyone cognizant[kóg-ni-zunt(aware,जागरूक)] of the enormity[i'nor-mi-tee(wickedness,भयावहता)] of the crisis facing India, and paved the way for economic reforms.
Courtesy:indian express
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Quadrants of a renal quandary
It’s a health puzzle waiting to be solved. For over two decades, pockets of farmlands in four different corners of the country have reported a high prevalence[pre-vu-lun(t)s(widespread,प्रचलन)] of chronic kidney disease (CKD). The cause of the malady, which is otherwise linked to diabetes and hypertension in individual cases, remains undefined in these four areas where it has been observed in clusters.
Doctors in Canacona taluka of South Goa, Narasinghpur block in Cuttack district of Odisha, villages along the Purna river in the Buldhana-Akola-Amravati belt in Maharashtra and the coconut plantation-rich Uddanam area in Srikakulam district of Andhra Pradesh have for years been reporting an unusually high number of CKD cases, with surveys pointing at contamination of groundwater as a possible cause.
Making the connections
These surveys could be highlighting a serious concern, but have remained limited in their scope, with only a few dialysis centres or kidney check-up camps in the affected villages. The lone scientific study proposed to connect the dots is stuck for funding.
Doctors in Uddanam, bordering Odisha, had been reporting a high incidence of CKD for the last 15 years, a concern big enough for the State’s health officials to seek a proper survey. “We wanted to establish a reason,” says Dr. T. Ravi Raju, former Director of Medical Education in Andhra Pradesh and currently vice-chancellor of Dr. NTR University of Health Sciences in Vijayawada. He says the affected people are agricultural workers working in coconut plantations. “The issue was even raised in the Assembly. The point is, we also need to establish if the prevalence is indeed high,” says Dr. Raju. He, however, does go on to estimate a 25-30 per cent prevalence of CKD in Uddanam (as against the 7-10 per cent prevalence in the country), but then again,there is no proper scientific data to corroborate it, he adds.
Over a thousand miles from Srikakulam, located on the western coast is Canacona, where the prevalence of CKD since the late 1980s led to a survey by the State government and the National Institute of Occupational Health in 2005-06 that studied the presence of heavy metals in drinking water, fish, soil and blood samples. The study had found clinical similarities between Balkan Endemic Nephropathy — a familial, chronic renal disease — and the CKD cases in Canacona. It noted that the level of Ochratoxin A, a food-contaminating fungi metabolite, was found to be higher among people who suffered from the condition, like it did in the Balkans. A decade later, doctors in Goa are still unsure of what is causing the disease. “People who were born in Canacona but migrated to other parts have the same type of disease,” says Dr. Shital Lengade, consultant nephrologist with Apollo Hospitals in Goa. Another study was carried out by the Goa Medical College (GMC), but nothing conclusive was found, says Dr. J.P. Tiwari, head of the Department of Nephrology at GMC. The Goa government has since opened dialysis centres in the area.
Dialysis centres have also come up in Jalgaon (Jamod), Sangrampur and Shegaon talukas of Buldhana district of Maharashtra. Here, local MLA Dr. Sanjay Kute holds kidney check-up camps and has installed reverse osmosis units following a survey which confirmed a long-held belief that the area’s soil quality is leading to higher salinity[su'li-ni-tee(saltiness,लवणता)] in water.
“The soil is impervious[im'pur-vee-us(unaffected,अप्रभावित)] so water doesn’t percolate, preventing groundwater recharge. And this leads to high salinity,” says Dr. Praveen Kathane, senior geologist with Groundwater Surveys and Development Agency, Buldhana, who was part of the survey. He said the concentration of total dissolved solids in the water was found to be as high as 9,000 ppm (parts per million) in some parts when the desirable limit is 1,500 ppm. Independent experts, however, question if high salinity causes CKD. The kidney concern in Odisha’s Narasinghpur and Baramba blocks had led the State government to ask the regional medical research centre of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) in Bhubaneswar to conduct a survey. The ICMR team mapped the villages and carried out a door-to-door census, and proposed further investigation. Last year, the State Health Department undertook another survey and found 572 cases of CKD in Narasinghpur block. Water contamination, officials noted, was possibly the reason. But then they hit another roadblock.
“Only men in the 30-55 age group were affected, but not children, women and senior citizens,” says Dr. P.K.B. Patnaik, Joint Director, Non-Communicable Diseases cell, Odisha government.
Awaiting analysis
There is considerable area-specific CKD knowledge that local doctors and health officials have of their regions. Peculiarly[pi'kyoo-lee-u-lee(Strangely,अजीब तरह से)], however, while they quote examples of similar patterns that have emerged internationally — Sri Lanka, the Balkans — most doctors in each of these regions have no idea that a similar condition is being recorded within the country itself.
Among the few who have information on all the four regions is nephrologist Dr. Vivekanand Jha who, as former secretary of the Indian Society of Nephrology, had heard about the incidence from doctors from all four areas. He had led the ICMR team to Uddanam in 2012 to survey the CKD prevalence, and on his return proposed a study, ‘Chronic Kidney Disease of Unknown Etiology’, to the ICMR. Four years on, the study awaits funding. In response to a query from The Hindu, the ICMR said that owing to funding constraints at the institute, it has requested the Directorate General of Health Services and the Health Ministry to assess CKD in the four areas.
“Whatever has been done (surveys) lacks scientific rigour[ri-gu(hardness,कठिनाई)]. The observations may or may not be true. While there is no doubt this is a water issue, the explanation is then not limited to one area,” says Dr. Jha, who researches kidney diseases and is professor of nephrology at Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research (PGIMER), Chandigarh.
He points out that this isn’t just a health issue, but a human rights issue as clean drinking water is a fundamental right: “It is developing disease by neglect.”
Courtesy:the hindu
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Updating Aadhaar for better privacy
To its proponents, Unique Identification (UID, branded Aadhaar) is the solution to citizen empowerment. To its opponents, UID is a violation of not only citizen privacy but even citizen rights. In reality, like any programme or project, it can be anything we design it to be. It is only through purposeful design that we can ensure that risks and unintended consequences[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)] are kept under control. The government passed the Aadhaar Bill giving statutory rights for the programme, but this still leaves privacy as a specific challenge. However, this can be addressed.
Stated goal of UID
Privacy with Aadhaar isn’t just an abstract[ab,strakt(conceptual,काल्पनिक)] issue, but related to the fundamental view of how data are to be accessed and used. Leaders of the UID project stated in past discussions that privacy was not only paramount, but easily handled because the UID system would only be a yes or no identification system (relying, of course, on the accuracy of underlying registration). The system can be queried to verify if a person is who she claims to be based on the registration. Per design, the UID system would not know or care whether the person was Above Poverty Line or Below Poverty Line — such things would be the prerogative[pri'ró-gu-tiv(rights,विशेषाधिकार)] of the users of the system such as banks, service providers, or development schemes (here, users are not the citizens but system users like listed).
At one level, this sounds appealing. But the problem is precisely[pri'sIs-lee(exactly,शुद्ध रूप से)] the use of UID beyond the intended and appealing aspects, by its partners and systems providers. As Henry Wadsworth Longfellow wrote poetically if not prophetically, “I shot an arrow into the air, It fell to earth I know not where.” Instead of UID being agnostic[ag'nós-tik(doubter,संशयवादी)] to how the system gets used by others, UID’s design should assume the worst, and try to prevent linking of databases by third parties, or unintended usage. Otherwise, these could lead to not only an abstract violation of privacy but also very specific and troubling asymmetries[ey'si-mut-ree(imbalance,असंतुलन)] in commercial transactions and citizen empowerment/rights, including through profiling. We have already seen advertisements of private entities offering to use the Aadhaar database for commercial/private uses.
Who has rights to the data? This needs clarity. The problem with rights to access is the possibility of unintended access. One thing we can learn from other large IT systems is that the boundary matters — just worrying about outsider hackers is wrong for IT systems since most IT security breaches involve an insider (and also mistakes). Similarly, UID’s privacy cannot be viewed simply from an internal database and its security perspective but rather the ecosystem of users of UID. UID is only as secure as its weakest link. This is where segregation[se-gru'gey-shun(separatism,पृथक्करण)] of data can help.
We must ensure that the UID database is not used in a manner that can hurt the citizens either accidentally or through mission creep with unintended consequences. It’s worth thinking about what could go wrong.
The solution
What if we could have a UID that was never inter-linkable across users, but yet at the same time uniquely linked to the person through biometrics? The answer is we can, through the use of not a single UID, but a base UID (like we have today) plus modifications per user (if not per use). Instead of, say, MNREGA using the 12-digit number like today, each authorised user of the system (such as MNREGA, a bank, and so on) would get a modified (longer) number that is cryptographically generated to be unique but based on the base UID number in such a way that it could be proven to be functionally the same. Technologically, this would use a one-way hash that would be irreversible[i-ri'vur-su-bu(permanent,स्थायी)] so that the longer number or code couldn’t reveal the base UID number.
The benefits of this would be twofold. First, a corporation or other user could not create a linked database for profiling — they would all have different UID+ numbers. Second, to even get the UID+, the cryptographic process could be restricted to authorised users. This way, we could prevent the UID becoming a casual identifier. For instance, in the U.S., the social security number morphs into something required by the cable TV operator when you raise a service complaint! Of course, in India we risk a similar link/identifier — our mobile number.
This same concept of separation applies to security from an Indian government-citizen perspective. Given that Indian and global private technology companies are inevitably[i'ne-vu-tu-blee(necessarily,निसंदेह)] involved, breaking up the data (analogous to the UID versus UID+), where it’s stored, broken up, and so on can improve security.
From UID to UID+
One has to get the technology right for any programme, but its long-term success depends on people wanting it. Even if due to misinformation, perceptions matter. Recall how the U.S. nuclear power industry was effectively stalled even before the Three Mile Island accident due to a combination of secrecy, arrogance, and “trust us” instead of engagement and communication.
The proposed update of UID to a UID+ system can address many of the concerns, and its roll-out need not be viewed as a failure of the original system but simply an update. The next step should be an analysis of how it can be done without disrupting the existing UID database(s).
The good news is almost anything is feasible[fee-zu-bul(possible,संभव)], computationally. We simply need to update our mindset of a Unique ID — there can be many such unique numbers, just like many people now have multiple and even disposable email addresses. There will be a small overhead for such designs, including one-time update costs for those who are already using the current UID number, but this is a worthwhile investment for something meant to last more than a citizen’s lifetime.
Courtesy:the hindu
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Know your English
“I’ve been ringing the bell for nearly two minutes. What took you so long? Were you...”
“I was taking a bath. There was no way that I could...”
“Taking a bath? You mean ‘having’ a bath, don’t you?”
“Both are correct. You can ‘take a bath’ or you can ‘have’ one. You know that I usually have a bath around seven o’clock.”
“My grandmother takes her bath at six. Met Sujatha on my way here. She said that you’re getting a new boss. Are you looking forward to working with him?”
“I’m not really sure. People say that he has a heavy-handed style of management.”
“Heavy-handed style of management? Does it mean he is clumsy?”
“Clumsy is one of the meanings of the word. But ‘heavy-handed’ can also be used to refer to someone who uses excessive force when dealing with people. The protesting students accused the police of using heavy-handed tactics.”
“In our colleges and universities, it’s not uncommon to see students being heavy-handed.”
“To keep the workers in check, Raman employed heavy-handed measures.”
“I’m sure it didn’t solve the problem. So, when is your new boss joining the company?”
“Nobody is really sure. Some say it could be as early as next week.”
“You don’t sound very happy about getting a new boss. But you know, you could end up liking him. I hope you have no intention to be rude to him.”
“Don’t worry! I have no intention of being rude to anyone. By the way, it’s ‘intention of’ and not ‘intention to’. For example, the kidnappers had no intention of releasing the girl.”
“The children have no intention of going to bed early tonight.”
“That’s a good example. The students have no intention of calling off the strike.”
“It’s good to know that you have no intention of being rude to your new boss. Do you think he’ll be making a lot of changes?”
“Changes? I don’t think so. Not immediately, anyway. He might start making changes once he succeeds in getting his feet under the table.”
“Won’t he be getting his feet under the table on the very first day? I mean...”
“When you get your feet under the table, you settle in. In other words, you begin to grow in confidence because you’ve figured out what are the things you need to do in your new job. My new boss may get his feet under the table within a week.”
“I don't think that will happen. It may take him several weeks to get his feet under the table. Who uses this idiom?”
“The expression is mostly used in informal contexts in British English. Now, if you’ll excuse me, I think I’ll go lie down for a while. I’m not feeling so good.”
“Is it lie down for a while or lay down for a while?”
“You use the expression ‘lie down’ when you mean ‘recline’. He was rather tired after the long drive. So he decided to lie down.”
“Well, in that case, you go lie down for a while. I’ll watch some TV.
A day without a nap is like a cupcake without frosting.
— Terri Guillemets
Courtesy:the hindu
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Sunday, March 27, 2016
Real estate non-rescue
Parliament has passed the Real Estate Regulatory Act, 2016 (RERA), which is intended to protect homebuyers. However, it’s likely to enhance the regulatory burden and increase the cost of capital and compliance. The buyers, particularly at the lower end of the spectrum, may actually end up paying the price. The RERA aims at bringing cheer to the buyers of property, by providing a framework for reducing conflict with developers, and creates a regulatory authority for this sector. Property developers are not exactly cheering the law because of a sense of unease due to a possible increase in the cost of capital, especially since this industry is already facing a liquidity crunch and mounting inventories. The RERA seems to be recalibrating the balance in favour of the buyers of properties, particularly apartments.
While the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (LARR) and RERA reflect the changes in political perception due to rising social concerns and protests, what both laws fail to recognise is the root of the problem — over-regulation. Although land and real estate are bought and sold all the time, India doesn’t have a functioning market for land and real estate. The high prices in real estate are a reflection of an artificial scarcity[skehr-si-tee(insufficiency,अभाव)] caused by over-regulation, as well as bad regulations, by multiple agencies. The builder-babu-politician nexus is a corollary[ku'ró-lu-ree(result,परिणाम)] of this distorted[di'stor-tid(unshaped,विकृत)] environment.
Yet, one of the key justifications for the RERA is that the real-estate sector is unorganised and unregulated. To rectify the alleged problem, a new round of registrations, regulations and clearances are being created. While there are rigorous[ri-gu-rus(strict,सख्त)] penalties, including imprisonment, for developers if they slip up, there is hardly any provision to make the various government authorities, entrusted to oversee and enforce regulations, more accountable. This will create problems. For example, there are clauses for delays in securing various NOCs. Anyone who has had to get an NOC from a government agency knows it’s not just dependent on whether all criteria have been met. Often, obtaining an NOC is dependent on meeting the needs of the authorities as well. As a result, the RERA could very well increase the disputes between developers and authorities, which would in turn increase the cost of compliance and the cost of the project. Over time, such costs would get built into the project cost, thus increasing the price of property.
Every business depends on cash flow to ensure smooth functioning. Even a kirana store runs on credit from suppliers and often has to give credit to consumers. The RERA’s requirement — that 70 per cent of capital from a particular project be restricted for use only for that project — is well-intentioned but may have little economic merit. The law is likely to raise the cost of capital.
The RERA also lays out a dispute settlement mechanism. But given the experience of consumer courts, it’s only a matter of time before the new mechanism gets as clogged as some of the others. The fact is that regulators and regulations can hardly be a substitute for a vivacious[vI'vey-shus(vibrant,जोशपूर्ण)] and dynamic market. The experience of regulatory overload can also be seen in other sectors, such as banking, electricity, etc. All these sectors are plagued by stressed corporate balance sheets and poor quality of service to consumers.
In any case, the RERA is to watch over primarily new properties entering the market. But this is dwarfed by the number of second or older generation properties that exchange hands annually. Building smart cities will require rapid improvements in land and property records, drastic reduction in regulatory bottlenecks and transaction costs (including taxes, fees and duties) and, most crucially, empowering local bodies to provide basic services and decide on land-use. Contrast the logjam[lóg,jam(stoppage,अवरोध)] in the real-estate sector with the success of India’s IT sector, which is largely due to the relatively light hand of government, including tax holidays. If the real-estate sector was really unregulated and free, it could have been a global force by now, quite like the IT sector.
Courtesy:indian express
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