Puncturing wrong notions of the Northeast

Peace accords[u'kord(agreement,सहमति)] are always met with some amount of cynicism[si-ni,si-zum(distrust,दोषदर्शिता)]. The Naga Peace Accord signed on August 3 was no exception; it too had people just waiting for it to fail. Several of these people wrote long pieces in the media too. The problem with these experts is that they look at peace from the conventional[kun'ven-shu-nul(traditional,पारम्परिक)] prism of the state, putting so much pressure on militants that they eventually surrender. This method of bringing about peace in Nagaland was tried for several decades, but met with no success.This is because the Nagas want an ‘honourable settlement’, and that can only take place when the peace dialogue is among equals.

For someone living in what is conveniently termed a ‘conflict[kón,flikt(battle,विवाद)] zone’, I may be forgiven for expressing hope that the framework agreement signed between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) [NSCN (I-M)] and the Government of India will lead to a process where not just the NSCN (I-M)’s terms will be included but also the terms of other stakeholders in what could finally become a peace deal. The others include elected representatives of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam; civil society groups; and factions of the NSCN, and other militant outfits in Nagaland. Those with dismissive[dis'mi-siv(disregard,उपेक्षापूर्ण)] attitudes towards the NSCN(I-M) are only betraying the mindset of many in this country, particularly those who head institutions of strategic importance.

Conventional wisdom says India has plenty of experience in the effective management of conflicts in the Northeast. But look at the result. Three-fourths of the Northeast is perpetually[pu'pe-ch(oo-)u-lee(always,हमेशा)] declared disturbed and dangerous under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA); there are over 4,00,000 troops deployed to hold the region together; the rule of law has virtually collapsed; there is rampant[ram-punt(uncontrolled,अनियंत्रित)] trampling[tram-p(u-)ling(crush,कुचलना)] of human rights. Does this make India proud? For those who believe that the Northeast is too complex and hence its problems can only be ‘managed’ and not resolved, such tactical management interventions have actually rendered[ren-dur(cause to become,बना देना)] the region untenable[ún'te-nu-bul(indefensible,असमर्थनीय)] and the situation messy.

From management to resolution

Even the NSCN (I-M) talks began with the aim of ‘managing’ the violence. The present dialogue is a paradigm shift from ‘management’ to ‘resolution’, by enlarging the spectrum of engagement. At no point have so many disparate[dis-p(u-)rut(different,पृथक)] groups expressed their desire to be part of the peace dialogue.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that there seems to be serious doubts about the integrity of the citizens of the Northeast and Kashmir. AFSPA has been enforced only in these areas because these regions are ‘disturbed areas’. Yet, despite the horrific uprisings in Central, Eastern and Southern India, those Maoist-hit regions are not seen as ‘disturbed’. This says a lot. Also, how does the government sitting in Delhi expect a ‘disturbed’ region to behave normally when it comes to delivery of governance?

Kashmir has its inherent contradictions[kón-tru'dik-shun(opposition,विरोधाभास)], but the people of the Northeast are, by and large, reconciled[re-kun,sI(-u)ld(harmonize,सामंजस्य)] to the idea of nationhood even though they still battle with a past that privileges ethnicity over nation. Communal tensions are palpable[pal-pu-bul(being felt,स्पर्शग्राह)], but the truth is that except for Nagaland and Manipur, the other five States are moving on an even keel despite the occasional gunfire. And the ordinary people in this region want a climate of peace where they can pursue their education and livelihoods without having to pay the militants an undue share of their hard-earned profit.

We are talking here of a region with disparate forces which had to be brought on board for the peace talks. This required a rather unconventional approach on the part of the government interlocutor[in-tu'lók-yu-tu(middle man,वार्तालापि)], R.N. Ravi. The run-of-the-mill containment policy is passé[pa'sey(old,पुराना)]. People here are tired of semantics[si'man-tiks(meaning of a word,अर्थविज्ञान)] from the warring sides. But they are also acutely[u'kyoot-lee(sharply,तेज़ी से)] aware of the entrenched[in'trencht(established,मज़बूत स्थिति बनाना)] orthodoxy in the higher echelons[e-shu,lón(Level,प्रतिष्ठा)] of this country, which is taking an uncharitable view of the Naga peace process. These people would like to believe that the Naga problem is merely one of law and order. In fact, the entire argument is based on the presumption that the NSCN (I-M) is Thuingaleng Muivah-centric and Mr. Muivah is a hold-over of the past; that his outfit is a debilitated[du'bi-lu,tey-tid(weak,कमज़ोर)] entity; that its resonance[re-zu-nun(t)s(vibrancy,गूँज)] is limited to the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur. How far this is from ground realities!

‘Sovereignty[sóv-rin-tee(independent,प्रभुसत्ता)]’ also has other connotations[kó-nu'tey-shun(intension,संकेत)] that the two parties need to work out. For instance, the concept of sovereign power-sharing between the Centre and the States is not new; this is the essence of Indian federalism. If the States have, in the past decades, ceded[seed(surrender,त्यागना)] much of their powers to a willing Centre because they find it convenient to do so, then they have themselves to blame. When the framers of the Indian Constitution cogitated['kó-ji,teyt(think,सोचना)] on the idea of federalism, they perhaps envisaged[en'vi-zij(imagine,कल्पना)] that strong States actually make a strong Centre and not vice versa.

On the issue of integration, it has been reiterated[ree'i-tu,reyt(repeat,दोहराना)] by the interlocutor that re-drawing the political boundaries of the Northeastern States is not on the agenda. He seems to be suggesting a safety valve for fulfilling the political aspirations of Nagas to live together in future through a democratic process and not by effecting integration under the shadow of the gun.

There are also security experts who assert[u'surt(affirm,दृढ कहना)] that Naga Hoho, the apex body of the Nagas, has not endorsed the peace framework. This betrays their ignorance. The Naga Hoho has repeatedly endorsed it. Even the Nagaland Legislature has adopted unanimous[yoo'na-nu-mus(full agreement,एकमत)] resolution in its support.

It is no joy to puncture certain well-entrenched viewpoints that find expression in the mainstream media and speak of the Northeastern region either from a position of patronage or of ignorance. But it must be done and this article is one such attempt.

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Across the Aisle: Will someone please read the tea leaves

The Prime Minister is entitled to choose the place and subject of his speech. But the speech on Independence Day is different. Citizens have a right to expect that the Prime Minister will address issues that are of concern to them. There are other interested listeners as well — foreign governments especially governments of neighbouring countries, global civil society, oppressed(suppress,दबा हुआ) people, and those who pioneer change.

At the end of the Prime Minister’s 90-minute speech, most people were underwhelmed. The applause was infrequent and listless, sections of the audience began to leave after the first hour, and the criticism was scathing(critical,कटु आलोचना). Given his extraordinary oratorical skills, the Prime Minister has no one to blame except himself.

Issues ignored

I made a list of issues on which the Prime Minister did not speak: the economy, internal security, national security, neighbours, foreign policy, climate change, discrimination(unfair treatment,भेदभाव) against Dalits and minorities, increase in communal incidents, issues of women and children, and natural calamities.

Of all the issues, my foremost concern is the economy. It is possible that the Prime Minister is not well-versed on macro-economic issues. That is why there is a finance minister, a chief economic adviser, a governor of the Reserve Bank, a NITI Aayog, and a host of officials dealing with different aspects of the economy. It was obvious that the Prime Minister had not taken their inputs for his I-Day speech. If he had thought that the economy was not a subject that deserved to be dealt with at length, that was a pity. If he had thought that the people of India did not care whether he spoke about the economy or not, he was plainly wrong.

Earlier this week, Moody’s, the rating agency, lowered the growth forecast for 2015-16 from 7.5 per cent to 7 per cent. GDP growth, under the new series, was 6.9 per cent in 2013-14 and 7.3 per cent in 2014-15. Given that a recovery was underway, one would have expected that the growth rate would accelerate in 2015-16, the first full year of the Modi government. If Moody’s forecast turns out to be correct, it would mean that the growth rate will decline in 2015-16.

Signs of economic stress

Few will be surprised. The signs of stress have been visible in recent months, yet no one in the government seemed to care or took corrective measures.

Credit growth is a crucial indicator. At 8.4 per cent, non-food credit has recorded the slowest rate of growth in 20 years. Bank chairpersons have confided that many weeks have passed without a major big-ticket proposal for a bank loan. Typically, it is the private sector that should provide the lead in new investments, but the private sector is shying away from new investments because corporate incomes and profits have collapsed in the last 12 months. Total corporate income fell in each of the last three quarters ending December 2014, March 2015 and June 2015. The decline, compared to the corresponding period of the previous year, is captured in the following numbers:

Quarter ending

December 2014 : - 0.14% (6.67%)

March 2015 : - 6.00% (8.72%)

June 2015 : - 4.46% (8.98%)

As for corporate profits, the numbers are just as bad. Corporate profits shrank by 32.86 per cent in the quarter ended December 2014 and 15.20 per cent in the quarter ended March 2015, and increased by a minuscule(small,सुक्ष्म) 0.43 per cent in the quarter ended June 2015.

New investment proposals are announced and dropped. During the period July 2014 to June 2015, the number of private sector projects that were announced increased from 1,030 (in the previous 12-month period) to 1,253 but the number of projects dropped also increased from 392 to 478.

Exports have declined, month on month, for eight successive months from December 2014 to July 2015.

The government seems to think that negative inflation in the wholesale price index is a sign of economic good health. It is not. It could mean that demand is sluggish. Besides, it depresses prices for the producers, especially the farmers, leading to distress in the agriculture sector.

The only silver lining is the increase in public investment. Thanks to an unprecedented fall in oil prices (Brent at less than $50 and WTI at less than $42), the government has got a windfall. It has wisely stepped up capital expenditure. That seems to be the only trick in the government’s bag, but that will hardly be sufficient to boost overall investments and growth. About jobs, the less said the better. The biggest casualty in the first full year of the Modi government is the stagnation(inactive,निष्क्रियता) in employment. Speak to any group of young men and women — or to their parents — and you will sense their growing anxiety and fear that not enough jobs are being created in the economy.

Duty to speak

Will Prime Minister Modi address these issues? It is unlikely, given his style of communication. He loves one-way communication from a high and distant stage to a large crowd. He avoids speaking in Parliament in the same way that he spoke rarely in the Gujarat state legislature, because that will mean he must engage in debate with the Opposition. He is unwilling to address the media, because that will mean he must answer probing questions.

It is sad that Mr Modi has chosen to be silent on the economy, when the people expect him to speak.

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Circumventing the Rajya Sabha

The Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, Vice-President Hamid Ansari and the Deputy Chairman, Prof. P.J. Kurien, reportedly expressed their concern recently on attempts being made to whittle away(cut away,कम करना) the legislative powers of the Rajya Sabha and make it a redundant(unnecessary,अनावश्यक) legislative House. Sitaram Yechury, leader of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in the Rajya Sabha, and other Opposition leaders have protested against what they called a move to erode the role and power of the House in making laws.

This controversy arose from a statement by Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley about money bills. Mr. Jaitley is reported to have said that money bills, over which the Rajya Sabha has limited powers, are the answer to the obstructionist(resister,विरोधी) ways of the Opposition in that House. This statement by the Finance Minister came to be interpreted as an attempt to classify most of the crucial bills which go to the Rajya Sabha as money bills to prevent them from being rejected by that House.

P. D. T. Achary
Defining a money bill

At the centre of this controversy is the money bill — a technical term in the Constitution and the House rules referring to a certain class of bills which contain taxation proposals and proposals relating to money matters etc. Under Article 110, a money bill only contains matters such as imposition, abolition(do away with,उन्मूलन), remission, alteration or regulation of any tax. It also includes regulations related to borrowing of money or giving guarantee by the Government of India; the custody of the Consolidated(solid,सुदृढ़) Fund of India (CFI) or the Contingency(possible,संभावित) Fund of India, and payment of moneys into or withdrawal of moneys from such funds; and the appropriation of moneys out of the Consolidated Fund of India.

Besides the above, it includes charged expenditures like the salary of the President, Vice-President, Speaker, judges etc.; the receipt of money on account of the Consolidated Fund or the public account, its custody etc.; and matters incidental to any of these. Article 109 says a money bill can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha. After it is passed by the Lok Sabha, the Bill is transmitted to the Rajya Sabha for its recommendations only. The Rajya Sabha cannot disapprove the money bill but can recommend amendments, which the Lok Sabha can reject in toto(entirely,पूर्णत). Even then, the bill will be deemed to have been passed by both Houses.

Thus, the Lok Sabha alone has the power to accept or reject money bills. The power to certify a bill as a money bill is vested by Article 110 of the Constitution in the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, whose decision is final. Some Rajya Sabha Members have raised concerns about the finality of the Article. Their uneasiness arises from the fact that the Rajya Sabha can’t question the decision of the Speaker even when they feel that they have a strong case for contesting the decision of the Speaker.

Parliamentary convention

It must be mentioned that in all the countries where the parliamentary system of government exists, the directly elected House alone has the final say in financial matters. This primacy of the people’s House is enshrined in the Indian Constitution. The superiority of the Lok Sabha in budgetary sanctions is secured in two ways. One, the demands for grants — the estimate of expenditure of individual ministries and departments of the government — are presented before and passed only by the Lok Sabha. Two, the Appropriation Bills, authorising the government to withdraw money from the Consolidated Fund of India, being money bills, cannot be disapproved by the Rajya Sabha. This constitutional position is well known.

But here the problem is not the primacy of the Lok Sabha in money matters. The apprehension among the Members is that the government may bring bills with financial provisions and push them through as money bills in order to circumvent the situation in the Rajya Sabha. The Constitution makes it abundantly(plenty,rich,large in quantity,प्रचुरतापूर्वक) clear that money bills should contain only the above mentioned matters and nothing else. If a bill is a combination of any of the above and some other provisions not incidental to those matters, it cannot be called a money bill. Such a bill needs to be passed by both the Houses of Parliament.

At first blush, the apprehension of the Members of the Opposition seems out of place because the Speaker of the Lok Sabha is required to apply her mind to the true character of the bill objectively. The Constitution clearly defines the money bill and the Speaker cannot circumvent it. The word “only” used in article 110 (1) strictly limits the scope of a money bill and rules out any liberal or politically convenient interpretation of this term.

Nevertheless, the possibility of non-money bills being certified as money bills and the power of the Rajya Sabha being curtailed(cut short,कम करना) cannot be ruled out. It is rather incongruous(Inappropriate,बेतुका) that the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha — the Vice- President — is placed in the position of having to accept the decision of the Speaker on the money bills issue unquestioningly. The Constitution has vested this power in the Speaker in conformity with the traditions in all parliamentary democracies. Neither the Constitution nor the House rules lay down any procedure with regard to certifying a money bill. This situation is rather unsatisfactory.

The Rajya Sabha is the Council of States and has played a crucial role in strengthening the Indian federation. The Constitution has assigned special roles to this elders’ chamber of the Indian Parliament. For example:

• When the Parliament wants to make a law on an item in the State list, it can do so only if the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution by a two-thirds majority.
•The creation of an All India Service follows a two-thirds majority resolution in the Rajya Sabha.
Moreover, the Vice-President of India, the number two in the order of precedence, is the Chairman of this House.

Precedents show that the finality of the Speaker’s decision has been accepted by the Rajya Sabha. As early as 1953, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, while commenting on the authority of the Speaker to certify a money bill, said, “It is now clear and beyond possibility of dispute that the Speaker’s authority is final in declaring that a bill is a money bill. When the Speaker gives a certificate to this effect, this cannot be challenged. The Speaker has no obligation to consult anyone in coming to a decision or in giving his certificate.”

Constitutional conundrum(puzzle,पहेली)

A caveat(warning,चेतावनी) is in order here. The Speaker, while certifying a bill as money bill, is in effect depriving the Rajya Sabha of its legislative power to disapprove a bill. If it is said that the Speaker has absolute power and she does not have to consult anyone. it is tantamount(equal,बराबर) to accepting even a wrong decision by her, maybe even a mala fide(dishonest,गलत) decision. The Constitution of India does not confer such absolute power on any authority.

The question is whether there is no remedy if a wrong decision actuated by political considerations is taken by a Speaker — not an impossibility. It may be a bona fide mistake but it renders(provide,प्रस्तुत) the Rajya Sabha helpless. An example can be cited(mentioned,उल्लेख) from this year’s Finance Bill, which contains a chapter amending the Money Laundering Act. By no stretch of imagination can it be said to conform to the stipulations laid down in Article 110 regarding a money bill or related to the imposition or regulation of any tax; or regulation of the borrowing of money by the government; or giving guarantee by the government; or undertaking any financial obligations by the government; or relating to the custody of the Consolidated Fund of India or the Contingency Fund; or relating to the appropriation of moneys from the CFI; or receipt of money on account of CFI. Therefore, it cannot be a part of the Finance Bill.

The case of the Senior Citizens Welfare Fund is similar. This fund, which consists of unclaimed money from various statutory funds, does not come within the scope of “Regulation of borrowing of money or the giving of any guarantee by the government” under Article 110(1)(b). Chapter seven of the Finance Bill contains provisions relating to this fund. As a matter of fact, if such non-money bill provisions are incorporated in the Finance Bill, it will cease to be a money bill.

“It must also be stated here that the Finance Bill can contain only proposals for one year. It cannot contain any proposal of a permanent nature as Article 112 limits the time frame of a budget to one year. ”

The Finance Bill gives effect to taxation proposals which are a part of the statement of estimated receipts “for that year”. If proposals of a permanent nature are made a part of the Finance Bill and certified as money bills, the move come into conflict(battle,विवाद) with Articles 110 and 112 of the Constitution.

It is therefore necessary to evolve a proper procedure for the Speaker to arrive at a decision. A committee of the secretaries-general of both Houses may examine in detail the given bill and submit their views to the Speaker before she takes a final decision.

There may or may not be any truth in the Opposition Members’ contention that all the non-money bill provisions were put in the Finance Bill to avoid the Rajya Sabha obstructing the passage of these bills. The only matter of importance here is that the Rajya Sabha should not be deprived of its legitimate rights through legislative strategems.

It may be remembered that Article 122 provides immunity against challenges to the proceedings only on the grounds of procedural irregularities. A wrong decision taken under Article 110(3) is not a procedural irregularity and hence does not grant any immunity.

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New financial commission: a faulty road map

While countries in the West are giving their central banks more authority and regulatory powers, India is proposing a system to reduce the RBI to a shadow of itself.
Amid(in the middle,के बीच) all the talk about a New Financial Code (NFC) and the hullabaloo(disturbance in protest,शोरगुल) about the government’s apparent(clearly,प्रकट रूप से) attempt to curtail(reduce,कम करना) the powers of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), some deeper questions seem to have been missed: what is the exact aim of the proposed Indian Financial Code (IFC)? What is it trying to fix? Is a need for a fix at all?

Much of the discussion has revolved around the proposed creation of a Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), which is to be responsible for all matters relating to monetary policy. The argument in favour of an MPC is that: it is standard practice worldwide to have a committee in charge of monetary policy. So far, India has given that responsibility to the RBI and, in particular, to its Board of Directors.

And, though there is no specific provision for this in the RBI Act, the Board has, by and large, entrusted the RBI Governor with that responsibility. So, to the media and to the lay public, the fact that the RBI has cut or raised interest rates is synonymous with the Governor himself doing it.

Conflict of interest

The proposed MPC, composed of seven members, the majority of whom are to be nominated by the government, will take over from the RBI all aspects of monetary policy, including the setting of interest rates. This has riled(annoyed,चिड़ा हुआ) up a large section of economists, bankers and central bankers. The government, they say, should not be in charge of monetary policy.

The potential for conflict(battle,विवाद) of interest is vast. So far, the government has been interested in securing high growth rates, not only as an electoral plank but also as a means to finance various expenditure schemes proposed in each Budget. The RBI, on the other hand, is tasked with controlling inflation, which often accompanies high growth rates. Raising interest rates is the best tool to achieve this, but it also puts a dampener(reduce,कम करना) on growth.

Instituting a committee stacked(arranged,गठित) with government nominees, thus, creates a conflict of interest. Should the committee try to achieve growth regardless of rising inflation, or should inflation be targeted despite slowing growth?

Much has been written on this even though it is just one of many issues. To realise the other implications, it is important to understand what exactly the RBI does. Hint: it’s not just about interest rates of which the policy rate is just one.

The RBI’s primary responsibility includes monetary policy. However, it is also responsible for maintaining financial stability; regulation and supervision of banks as well as of the Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs). It also accumulates(collect,जमा करना) and maintains India’s foreign exchange reserves and works in the forex, government securities and derivatives markets. And, last but not least, it has the responsibility of handling India’s public debt and currency rates, as well as heading the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation (DICGC), which basically insures all bank deposits. In addition, the RBI is the highest authority when it comes to payment and settlement systems in the country.

Now, let’s see what the Indian Financial Code (IFC) proposes. According to the Code, the RBI will continue to be in charge of monetary policy (via the MPC); the supervision and regulation of scheduled banks; currency management; and payments and settlements systems. There is no clarity yet on its role regarding foreign exchange reserves, but lacking any mention in the Code, the assumption is that it will retain control over them.

The Code goes on to say that the regulation and supervision of NBFCs, and activities in the forex, derivatives and government securities markets will be under a proposed ‘financial authority’. This authority is to “regulate all financial services other than banking and payment systems”, and will have a mix of nominated members from both the government and the RBI.

Regulation of NBFCs

Incidentally, there is already some ground for conflict between the RBI and this financial authority — namely, the regulation of Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs). The IFC defines a bank as a “financial services provider” in the business of accepting deposits from the public. Under this definition, all deposit-taking NBFCs would then become banks. Who, then, would regulate them: the RBI or the financial authority?

The IFC also envisages(imagine,सोचा) the creation of a Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC), “a statutory agency for fostering(strengthen,मजबूत) the stability and resilience of the financial system”. Other bodies being created include a Public Debt Management Agency and a Resolution Corporation, which will take over the role of the DICGC.

The Indian financial sector is governed by a host of different laws that were enacted as and when needed to form various regulatory bodies like the RBI; the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA). Each of these bodies has taken a while to settle down and start working efficiently. SEBI, for example, has taken about 20-25 years to be effective.

The IFC is looking to amalgamate(mix,एक करना) all these agencies into the proposed financial authority that will deem(keep in mind,समझना) the RBI — so far a kind of first among equals — as just one of the many financial agencies, with the Governor and Deputy-Governors being designated as Chairman and members.

So, while developed countries in the West are busy giving their central banks more authority and regulatory powers following the financial crisis in the late 2000s, India is proposing a system whereby the RBI is rendered(provide,प्रस्तुत) a shadow of its former self. In the U.K., the Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been brought back under the Bank of England. Banking supervision in the European Union (EU) is coming under the European Central Bank (ECB), and similar moves are being made in the U.S. with regard to the Federal Reserve.

Separating banking regulation from that of other, non-bank credit institutions will create many possibilities of regulatory arbitrage( when there is a difference in the price of something on two different markets the arbitrageur simultaneously buys at the lower price and sells at the higher price,जब दो जगह किसी चीज़ का मूल्य में अंतर आता है तो ये लोग कम मूल्य वाली जगह से खरीद लेते है और महंगी जगह पर बेच देते है फायदा कमाने के लिये) and could lead to financial instability.

Overall, the key question to be asked is: what is broken that the IFC is trying to fix? The latest Financial System Stability Assessment Update by the IMF, released back in 2013, found that “the regulatory and supervisory regime(rule,शासन) for banks, insurance, and securities markets [in India] is well developed and largely in compliance with international standards.”

Why then this need to destabilise a well-functioning system — in the process sidelining an institution that has held its own over 80 years — by repealing 19 laws and creating five new institutions?

Given the wide-ranging and cascading(rush down,गिरना) effect of such a policy decision, a far fuller discussion of all the issues and not just those relating to monetary policy, is needed — it cannot be driven by the hobby horses of a few.

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Constitutional conversations on Adivasi rights

Even 67 years after Independence, the problems of Adivasi communities are about access to basic needs. These include, but are not restricted to, elementary education, community healthcare, sustainable livelihood support, the public distribution system, food security, drinking water and sanitation, debt, and infrastructure. For them, equality of opportunity remains largely unfulfilled. In this context, it is important to stress that the values of tribal culture are transmitted in a manner that protects the right of the bearers of knowledge to determine the terms of the transmission without exploitation or commodification. Nor can the Adivasis’ unhindered(unblocked,अबाधित) access to land and forests, including full access to the commons, especially in scheduled areas, be understated. Tribal communities have, over the decades, witnessed the fragmentation(broken,विखंडन) of their habitats and homelands and the disruption of their cultures through predatory tourism. All this has left them shattered and impoverished. Entire communities across States have been dispossessed systematically through state action, and have been reduced from owners of resources and well-knit, largely self-sufficient communities to wage earners in agriculture and urban agglomerates(collection,ढेर) with uncertain futures. Yet, we can scarcely(hardly,मुश्किल से) forget that the rights of tribal communities in India are protected by the Constitution and special legislations.

Rights enumerated

While most of these protections are available to groups named in The Constitution (Schedule Tribes) Order 1950, there are some tribal communities that fall within the categories of Scheduled Castes (SC) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) and some that don’t fall into any of these categories. Within the category of Scheduled Tribes (ST), there are over 500 groups listed of whom roughly 70 are part of the sub-classification Particularly Vulnerable(weak,कमज़ोर) Tribal Groups, a small cluster(bunch,झुण्ड) of groups that include the Jarawas of the Andaman Islands, the Chenchus of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and the Baigas of Chhattisgarh. These groups face an acute(sharp,तीष्ण) crisis of survival, evident in their rapidly dwindling(decrease,कम होना) numbers. Therefore, they are in need of special protection even within the larger ST category, protections in relation to non-tribal communities as well as in relation to other tribal communities. Notwithstanding these complex intersections and overlaps (and exclusions in some instances), tribal communities, especially the STs, are the subject of special constitutional attention.

The right of tribal peoples to development through pathways that affirm their autonomy and dignity, as set out in Article 21 and under Schedules V and VI of the Indian Constitution, is often seen as the core of Adivasi rights. And indeed, they are. The oft-quoted Samata judgment of 1997, rich in its defence of the rights of Adivasi communities to their homelands, posits an inter-reading of Articles 14 (equality), 15 (non-discrimination(unfair treatment,भेदभाव)), 16 (equality of opportunity), 17 (abolition of untouchability), 21 (life and liberty), 23 (right against exploitation) from the Fundamental Rights chapter of the Constitution and Articles 38 (securing a just social order), 39 (guiding principles of policy) and 46 (promotion of educational and economic interests of SCs, STs, and other weaker sections) from the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The constitutional arguments in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh resisting the Polavaram dam centred on whether the state could alter (diminish(decrease,कम होना)) the boundaries of a scheduled area without presidential assent. Submergence, in fact, alters boundaries, causes disappearance of villages and village institutions, and renders(provide,प्रस्तुत) people from these communities vulnerable through dispossession by displacement — all of which are the subject of special protections for the STs. The largest volume of litigation in scheduled areas has to do with non-tribal occupation of tribal land and the blatant(openly,खुल्लमखुल्ला) derogation of land transfer regulation laws. Financial inclusion poses the third major problem: despite policy commitments to financial inclusion of vulnerable communities as a measure to lift them out of debt bondage and predatory money lending and usury, moneylenders continue to thrive(grow,पनपना) in tribal areas.

“An important part of Article 19 protections have to do specifically with protection of interests of STs.”

Hidden provision

It is in this overall context that I flag an unused constitutional provision as perhaps holding a key to the justiciable, mandatory protection of the interests of the STs as distinct from other marginalised groups.

Article 19 of the Constitution is commonly understood, through text and case law, as a provision that protects freedom of speech, expression, assembly, association, movement, residence and calling. The first clause of Article 19 reads as follows: 19(1) All citizens shall have the right (a) To freedom of speech and expression; (b) To assemble peaceably and without arms; (c) To form associations or unions; (d) To move freely throughout the territory of India; (e) To reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and (f) omitted (g) To practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Clauses 19 (2) to (4) set out the reasonable restrictions to speech, assembly and association in the interests of public morality, decency and integrity and sovereignty(free from control,प्रभुसत्ता) of the state — these aspects and their restrictions are what figure most often in animated fashion in debates around Article 19.

Clause 5 of Article 19 reads as follows: 19 (5) Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe (emphasis added).

In other words, an important part of Article 19 protections have to do specifically with protection of interests of STs (Clause 5) as distinct(clear,स्पष्ठ) from other marginalised groups through limitations on right to freedom of movement [sub-cause 1(d)] and right to freedom of residence [sub-clause 1(d)]. This, I would argue, when read with existing protections (for instance as set out in Samata or similar cases) offers a core and express fundamental right protection to Adivasis (as distinct from legal/ statutory protection) from a range of state and non-state intrusions in scheduled areas as well as from the perennial(continue,लगातार) threat of eviction of Adivasis from their homelands.

It is the interests of STs that are paramount(dominant,सर्वोच्च) in this fundamental right provision, which is presented importantly as a restriction on an enumerated(count,गणना करना) right that is clear and specific — not a restriction of a general nature, namely, the “sovereignty and integrity of India” or “public order,” “decency” or “morality,” as is the case with the other constituent freedoms in Article 19.

Understanding the situation of tribal communities is key to understanding the Constitution, its framework and its possibilities in the fullest sense. Perhaps it is time to reinvigorate(give energy,स्फूर्ति से भर देना) our reading of the Constitution in the troubled times we live in. We may find answers to other questions as well around an idea of justice that we grapple(fight,लड़ना) with every day.

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An agreement that was called a deal

Ten years ago, on the morning of July 19, 2005, the readers of The Hindu would have seen a boxed news item next to the front page lead story with an innocuous(harmless,अहानिकर) headline that read “Manmohan expresses satisfaction over talks”. It was not just the byline of the writer (N. Ravi, the newspaper’s former Editor-in-Chief) that justified the placement of that report, but its stunning opening line: “In a significant development after the meeting that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had with American President George Bush at the White House, the United States, acknowledging that India is a nuclear weapons power, agreed to cooperate with it in the area of civilian nuclear energy.”

Sanjaya Baru

Thus began the long, rocky and uncertain journey of the “Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” that finally secured the Indian Parliament’s imprimatur(approval,स्वीकृति) three years later. The agreement came to be called a “deal” because it was viewed in transactional terms by many in both countries. One U.S. Congressman put it bluntly(clearly,straight,मुँहफट,साफ साफ) during a meeting with Dr. Singh, “it’s 123 for 126” — the reference being to the 123 Agreement that had to be signed and the 126 fighter jets that the United States hoped India would buy from it. Others rejected such a transactional interpretation and viewed the agreement as the key that enabled both countries to open the door to a longer term strategic partnership.

The 10th anniversary

Interestingly, a decade later it was left to a think tank in Washington DC to bring together a group of some of the former U.S. and Indian officials, associated in various capacities and to varying degrees, with the negotiation of the agreement. There has been no similar high level celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Bush-Singh “deal” in India. Even the Congress Party has remained silent, not making any statement so far to remind the people of an important achievement of its own government. For a party that observes so many ritual anniversaries, it is indeed puzzling that there has been no celebration of such a historic achievement of its last Prime Minister. Of all his achievements in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), Dr. Singh will be remembered for the nuclear deal.

“ Neither the Congress nor the BJP has been willing to openly endorse(support,समर्थन) the fact that the deal was made possible by the actions of successive Congress and BJP Prime Ministers”

In the U.S., on the other hand, given the bipartisan(two party,द्विदलीय) support for the agreement, the gathering last week in Washington DC was addressed by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden. It may be recalled that as a member of the U.S. senate at the time, President Barack Obama had actually voted against the 123 agreement. In government, Mr. Obama has not only endorsed the agreement entered into between Mr. Bush and Dr. Singh but also joined hands with Prime Minister Narendra Modi to complete the journey begun a decade ago by endorsing a mutually agreed fudge(nonsense,निर्रथक बात) on India’s civil nuclear liability law.

Political reading

Despite the fact that the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are implicitly(not clearly express,अव्यक्त रूप से) on the same side as far as the civil nuclear agreement and the strategic partnership with the U.S. are concerned, neither party has been willing to openly endorse the fact that this agreement was made possible by the actions of successive Congress and BJP Prime Ministers — P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi. As I recorded in my book, The Accidental Prime Minister, on completing the 123 agreement with the U.S., Dr. Singh told Mr. Vajpayee, “I have only completed what you began.” In tying up the loose ends of the civil nuclear liability law, Mr. Modi can say much the same to Dr. Singh! While the Bush-Singh agreement was not just about nuclear energy, but also about defining a new relationship between two great democracies, the immediate considerations that defined the timetable of the agreement getting finalised had as much to do with Mr. Bush’s tenure(period,काल) coming to an end as it had with uranium shortage in India and the falling capacity utilisation at nuclear power plants. With some nuclear power plants on the verge of shutdown and with even friendly countries like Russia insisting that India needed the approval of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) before any fresh export of uranium could be authorised, getting the 123 agreement done became important in itself, and not just as a step towards a U.S.-India strategic partnership.

An energy initiative

An important reason why the agreement was projected as an energy initiative was because many in government believed that politically it would be difficult to sell to the public a complex technical agreement without giving it a popular basis. Some political leaders like Lalu Prasad and Sharad Pawar recalled how the Narasimha Rao government was put on the defensive during the Uruguay Round of world trade negotiations because the Opposition projected the “Dunkel Draft”, a draft agreement authored by Arthur Dunkel (the last director-general of GATT — General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) as anti-farmer. Few in India may have actually read the Dunkel Draft but millions of farmers agitated(discompose,व्यथित) against an imaginary enemy named “Uncle Dunkel”.

It was for this reason that a document was prepared explaining how the nuclear deal was all about delivering electricity to people, especially power starved rural India. The document was translated into all languages and copies made available to members of Parliament and State legislatures. The media campaign that followed generated adequate(enough,पर्याप्त) public support for the nuclear deal so that every public opinion poll conducted during the period 2006-2008 showed majority opinion supporting the government on the deal.

This is not to say that India was not serious about increasing generation of nuclear energy. It is not widely known that for years the plan target for nuclear energy generation was that it would constitute a mere 3.0 per cent of total energy generation at home. In actual fact, in the mid-2000s it was not even 2.0 per cent. The proponents of the nuclear deal hoped that with easier access to uranium and new nuclear plants, India could try double nuclear generation capacity by 2020. No more.

Setbacks

Two developments have come in the way of this objective getting realised. First, in his second term Dr. Singh failed to get parliamentary approval for the original civil nuclear liability bill that his government had drafted in early 2010. Neither Prithviraj Chauhan, then the Minister dealing with atomic energy in the PMO, nor Shivshankar Menon, then National Security Advisor, was able to sell the original draft bill to the Opposition. Even though some senior members of the BJP had no problem endorsing the original draft, the L.K. Advani faction of the BJP, including Sushma Swaraj and Yashwant Sinha, teamed up with the Communist Parties, to demand redrafting of the Bill.

In the first such instance of taking the Opposition’s help to draft a government bill (later repeated when Anna Hazare’s supporters were drafted into writing the Lok Pal bill) the Singh government rewrote its own bill and introduced elements that have since made the liability law stillborn.

The second development was the Fukushima disaster in Japan that, on the one hand, increased the cost of building nuclear power plants and, on the other, revived the global anti-nuclear campaign.

For all these reasons, it may be argued that the expected take-off of the civil nuclear energy programme has not happened. However, when the political and business environment is more hospitable for the resumption of a larger civil nuclear energy programme, the U.S.-India agreement, the NSG waiver and the many uranium supply deals India has entered into would all make it easier for new investment to come in.

What of the U.S.-India strategic partnership? The 123 agreement was done at a time when the U.S., under the Bush presidency, and India, during the first Manmohan Singh government (UPA-I) had shared strategic concerns. The 2008-09 trans-Atlantic financial crisis and its aftermath(result,परिणाम) altered the global context. The first Obama administration and the second Manmohan Singh government virtually abandoned(give up,त्यागना) the nuclear deal and strayed(wanted,aimlessly,भटक जाना) away from the nascent(emerging,उदीयमान) strategic partnership. It is only in the last one year that there has been some course correction in both capitals. If in 2005 it was the nuclear deal that opened the door to a strategic partnership, in 2015 it is the strategic partnership that has enabled a closure on the nuclear deal.

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Talking tough with Pakistan

This week’s India-Pakistan tension climaxed with Pakistan shooting down a Chinese-built drone on the Line of Control (LoC). Earlier, a great deal of chest-thumping greeted the Indian Army’s recent raid on terrorists on the India-Myanmar border, and it was accompanied by salutary warnings to neighbouring countries, including Pakistan, not to mess with India. Islamabad dismissed the operation as an inaugural attempt by an Army that had to hitherto(till now,अभी तक) take permission from New Delhi to return fire across the LoC. Then there was the recent book by A.S. Dulat and Aditya Sinha, Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years, which reopened the wounds of the Kandahar hijacking ignominy(ill fame,अपयश), when India failed to immobilise the aircraft at Amritsar. New Delhi’s tepid(unenthusiastic,उत्साहहीन) response to Mumbai’s 26/11 and the subsequent beheadings and killings of Indian soldiers on the LoC have only served to highlight India’s conventional deterrence policy in poor light. Something had to be done to alter India’s image as a soft state.

A response doctorine

Ashok K. Mehta
Over the last six months, the security establishment has been signalling a new policy of robust(strong,मजबूत) response, the kind the country has not witnessed in the recent past. The one time it was successfully attempted was in 1965 when Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri warned Islamabad during its Rann of Kutch offensive not to test New Delhi’s patience. He told Parliament on April 20, “If Pakistan continues to disregard reason and persists in aggressive activities, our Army will defend the country and it will decide its own strategy...” Army commanders were surprised — and so was Pakistan — when he ordered crossing the international border opposite Lahore and the start of the 1965 war, in response to Operation Gibraltar, which was Pakistan’s second variant of cross-border terrorism, its first having been made by tribal raiders in 1947 to capture Srinagar valley.
Both Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval have been sending messages to Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism. The Indian response to brazen(open,खुल्लमखुल्ला) attacks — such as those on its Parliament in 2001 and on Mumbai in 2008 — was varied. From coercive(powerful,मजबूत) diplomacy and attempts to persuade(convince,मनाना) Pakistan, the response moved to not allowing the use of territory under its control to supporting terrorism to virtually no action, barring the traditional politico-diplomatic demarche(step,कदम) after Mumbai.

Following the attack on Parliament, the Americans extracted from Gen. Pervez Musharraf, not once but twice, pledges(promise,वादा) that Pakistan would end terrorism permanently, irreversibly, visibly, and to the satisfaction of India. These pledges were followed by the January 6, 2004 joint statement by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf to the same effect. As long as Gen. Musharraf was around, the commitments held; once he was eased out, the cycle of violence recommenced(restart,फिर शुरू होना), culminating(at peak,उच्च स्तर पर) in Mumbai.

After Mumbai, the United Progressive Alliance government continued to warn Pakistan that there would be consequences(result,परिणाम) to another big attack but it had no punitive(punishable,दंडात्मक) response strategy in hand. With the new National Democratic Alliance government, one thing is clearly emerging: there will be a response. It will not, however, be from the vintage list of surgical strikes on terrorist camps inside Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, a reverse Kargil to secure real estate, or, least of all, any Cold Start offensive with integrated battle groups across the international border.

So, what signal exactly are Mr. Doval and Mr. Parrikar sending to Islamabad? Mr. Doval said in January this year, “We want to deal with Pakistan in a way that is fair, correct and transparent.” He spoke of not bending to pressure tactics or blackmail on the assumption that the nuclear threshold(doorstep,दहलीज़) leaves India with no option but to accept covert(hidden,गुप्त) war. Three months later, he remarked: “We would like to solve problems with Pakistan through negotiations... But, on the other hand, India would like to have an effective deterrent(prevention,निवारक) to deal with terrorism”. And his most potent and direct comment was: “If you do one Mumbai [26/11], you may lose Balochistan”.

Mr. Parrikar has been more nuanced(less error,सूक्ष्म भेद युक्त).Speaking at a public meeting, he lamented(mourn,अफ़सोस) that some former Prime Ministers had compromised India’s “deep assets”, alluding(touch,जिक्र करना) to RAW’s (Research and Analysis Wing) intelligence infrastructure inside Pakistan that had been ordered closed by Prime Minister I.K. Gujral. Rolling back strategic assets was a cardinal(key,प्रमुख) sin that virtually wiped out the country’s undercover capabilities. On another occasion, Mr. Parrikar referred to taking out ‘terrorists with terrorists’. The coupling of hired assassins(murderer,हत्यारा) with deep assets is both a tactical and strategic deterrence.

The joint message is that India will be prepared to employ covert means in PoK and Balochistan to deter(prevent,रोकना) and punish cross-border terrorism. Pakistan TV has been airing Mr. Doval’s threat on Balochistan and Mr. Parrikar’s advocacy of terrorism. For long, Islamabad has accused(blame for,दोषी) India of fomenting(provoke,उकसाना) unrest in Balochistan, through which the $46 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor will pass, linking Kashgar in Xinjiang with Gwadar and Balochistan. This will be the biggest economic endowment from China to Pakistan, making their all-weather relationship even sweeter. India could put a spoke in this wheel.

Reacting to Mr. Parrikar’s ‘neutralise terrorists with terrorists’ remark, Pakistan has said it reflects New Delhi’s support of terrorism against peace-loving Pakistan. Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations, in the latest issue of its in-house magazine Hilal, highlights Mr. Parrikar’s comments. So does Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz: “This confirms our apprehensions of India’s involvement of terrorism in Pakistan”.

The recent leak of two documents alleging India’s support to Pakistan’s MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement) are being linked to Mr. Parrikar’s comments. The alleged funding of MQM by RAW has led to Pakistan threatening to take India to the United Nations for ‘interference’ in its internal affairs. Pakistan is making much of Mr. Parrikar’s remarks to counter the image that Pakistan is a state sponsor of terrorism, and to reinforce(strengthen,मजबूत) its victimhood status.

Pakistan is of the opinion that cross-border terrorism is working in Jammu and Kashmir, where Islamabad claims that India has been compelled(forced,मजबूर करना) to deploy one-third of its Army as well as State and central armed police forces since the early 1990s. New Delhi claims that its counter-insurgency grid and fencing(surrounded,घेराबन्दी) of the LoC has been effective in foiling infiltration as well as reducing terrorists from 3,000 fighters in 2002 to roughly 300 today.

Counter-infiltration moves

The infiltration(घुसपैठ) figure till May-end this year, obtained from the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), is an incredible zero, inclusive of attempted infiltrators, those killed, and those who returned. It would appear that New Delhi’s counter-infiltration moves have blunted(less intense,प्रभावहीन) Islamabad’s moves in Jammu and Kashmir.

Breaking the 13-month stalemate(standstill,गतिरोध) in dialogue at Ufa in Russia this month, the NSAs of both India and Pakistan agreed to meet to discuss “all forms of terrorism”. This will lead nowhere, as Islamabad has now moved itself out of the category of terrorism sponsor to victim. The Parrikar-Doval threats have threaded the needle of a new response centred on covert action. This slow-burn strategy is calibrated for escalation when required. Given the nuclear overhang, any response to another big terrorist attack from Pakistan will be decisive(crucial,निर्णायक). Only when the Pakistan Army realises that this Indian government will respond, and respond meaningfully, will it decommission its terrorism network. That the new needle is sharp is apparent from the chorus of Pakistani protests. At last, India has found its voice, to end terrorism sourced from Pakistan.

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Breaking the ice and avoiding a refreeze

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi is discovering, somewhat to his discomfiture(discomposure,व्याकुलता), managing relations with Pakistan is one thing but managing expectations about India-Pakistan relations is a different cup of , because the two often adopt divergent(different,भिन्न) trajectories. Every Indian Prime Minister, from Jawaharlal Nehru onwards, has had to deal with this challenge. However, it has only become infinitely more difficult today with the Indian media (and its Pakistani counterpart) seeking to convert every summit encounter into a limited-overs cricket match. A diplomatic negotiation only succeeds if the outcome is perceived(understand,समझना) by both sides as a win-win situation but this requires long-term planning and careful management. If either side makes it a zero sum game by firing up expectations for a quick victory, the dialogue quickly flounders(block,अटकना).

Politics behind statement

On the face of it, the “Joint Statement” issued on July 10 at Ufa in Russia, after Mr. Modi’s meeting with his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, is notable for its brevity(brief expression,संक्षिप्तता) and matter of factness. It states that the two leaders met and “exchanged views on issues of bilateral(two sided,द्विपक्षीय) and regional interest”. In the interest of promoting peace and development, they “are prepared to discuss all outstanding issues”. Both leaders also “condemned(disapproval,निंदा) terrorism in all its forms” and agreed to cooperate to tackle this menace(Threat,खतरा). Each of these phrases is loaded with meanings and interpretations evolved(devlop,विकसित) over the decades in the context of multilateral negotiations to steer(guide,दिखाना) clear of terms that were contentious(controversial,विवादास्पद), and became unacceptable to one or the other side in regional fora and the United Nations. “All outstanding issues” is shorthand for covering “Kashmir” just as “terrorism in all its forms” also covers “state sponsored terrorism”.

The five follow-on steps identified in the “Joint Statement” are precise(Clear,स्पष्ठ) and modest — the National Security Advisers (NSA) are to discuss “all issues connected to terrorism”; meetings between the chiefs of the Border Security Force and Pakistan Rangers and Directors-General of Military Operations; releasing fishermen in each other’s custody; facilitating religious tourism; and an agreement “to discuss ways and means to expedite(progress fast,शीघ्र निबटाना) the Mumbai 26/11 attack trial, including additional information like providing [Mumbai attack mastermind Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi’s] voice samples”. Finally, Mr. Modi also accepted Mr. Sharif’s invitation to visit Pakistan in 2016 for the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit. From all accounts, the meeting between the two Prime Ministers developed positively. Mr. Modi had realised that not engaging Pakistan was proving unhelpful. Having abruptly(suddenly,अचानक) called off the Foreign Secretary-level talks last August meant that he had to find a way to get a dialogue going. The SAARC summit in Kathmandu last November came too soon after the cancellation of talks and the tit-for-tat shelling(bombardment,गोलीबारी) across the Line of Control (LoC). After Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s exploratory visit to Pakistan early this year and a couple of phone exchanges, the decks were cleared(prepare for something,तैयारी करना).However, the old format could not be restored because it would signal business as usual. The media and the Opposition would describe Mr. Modi’s policy as “flip-flop” or even worse, a climbdown under U.S. pressure! So, the resumed dialogue had to have its focus on tackling “the menace of terrorism” and for this, India’s NSA Ajit Doval would be the most suitable person. Other issues such as religious tourism and the release of fishermen were humanitarian issues and would resonate well. Mr. Modi had emphasised the importance of “regional diplomacy” and even as he notched up successful visits to Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, he realised that resuming a dialogue with Pakistan, and where he could set the agenda, was necessary for ensuring India’s leadership in the region and image as a responsible major power.

Changes in Pakistan

Mr. Sharif had responded positively to Mr. Modi’s initial overture(suggestion,प्रस्ताव) when he attended his swearing-in ceremony last May but subsequently felt let-down by the rather abrupt cancellation of Foreign Secretary-level talks in August. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s standing and position had since improved. Relations with the United States, China and Russia were moving in a positive direction. A better understanding on tackling home-grown terrorism had developed between Mr. Sharif and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sharif. Senior-level changes in the Pakistan Army had consolidated(strengthen,मजबूत) Gen. Sharif’s position.Tension on Pakistan’s eastern front was an unnecessary distraction which the Pakistan Army could do without, while it concentrated on “Operation Zarb-e-Azb” on its western front and sought to extract greater cooperation from an increasingly impatient Afghanistan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in Kabul. Therefore, keeping the India-Pakistan border quiet was a positive development.

Both sides realised that issues like the Siachen glacier, the Sir Creek maritime boundary delimitation and Tulbul (Wullar barrage) navigation, which had been under discussion for decades were politically not ripe for solution. Therefore, resuming dialogue on these subjects would only become a repetitive exercise. In any case, this would also revert to the old “composite dialogue” started during Prime Minister I.K. Gujral’s days or the six-point and eight-point agendas that began during Prime Minister V.P. Singh’s time in mid-1990 and was carried forward by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao.

Gladiators in the media arena
Apparently, no drafts for a “Joint Statement” at Ufa had been exchanged in advance by the two sides. However, since the talks had concluded positively, it was felt that it would be useful to put out a short “Joint Statement”. This would bind both sides to a common script rather than having each side carry out its own media briefings, which could easily lead to controversy. Indian and Pakistani negotiators have faced the same question many a times during the last 25 years. Sometimes they took the view that it was better to do separate briefings; sometimes, they did a joint briefing and sometimes, they managed to produce a “Joint Statement” as Mr. Jaishankar and his Pakistan counterpart Aizaz Chowdhury did. Seasoned and accomplished diplomats, they delivered a statement to their bosses which faithfully reflected the decisions reached during the discussions, and, where needed, relied on the well-worn catchphrases(phrase,तकियाकलाम) that mark all India-Pakistan joint statements.

But in keeping the “Joint Statement” business-like and crisp, they overlooked the gladiators who descended(fall,उतरना) into the arena of the TV shows almost as soon as the “Joint Statement” was put out. Comparisons with previous statements were quickly made; an absence of phrases over-analysed; the implications of level of dialogues parsed threadbare; all with the aim of scoring quick diplomatic victories so that the exercise degenerated into a farce(travesty,तमाशा). Given that Mr. Modi faces an increasingly irate(anger,गुस्सा) Opposition in the run-up to the next session of Parliament, government media handlers — presumably in the absence of high-level guidance as Mr. Modi was still travelling abroad — were quick to point out how India had scored over Pakistan. Kashmir was not mentioned (a victory for India), terrorism to be dealt with by the NSAs (a victory for India since everyone knows that Mr. Doval is a former ace sleuth(detective,जासूस)), and access to voice samples (a victory for India).

The Pakistani response was predictable. It pointed out that diplomatic phrases like “all outstanding issues” and “terrorism in all its forms” included Kashmir and state sponsored terrorism. India had sought the meeting (a victory for Pakistan), Mr. Modi had committed to visit Pakistan for the SAARC summit (a victory for Pakistan), and additional information was to be provided by India regarding the 2008 Mumbai attacks (a victory for Pakistan). However, the genie refused to go back into the bottle and the Pakistan Army was unhappy. Eventually, three days later, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy and Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz took the stage to make it clear that the outcome at Ufa did not mark the beginning of a new dialogue process, and that Kashmir tops the list of outstanding issues. For good measure, he added that Pakistan would continue to provide moral, diplomatic and political support to its Kashmiri brethren(brothers,भाइयो), the NSAs would discuss Indian interference in Pakistan particularly in Balochistan, additional information would also cover progress on the investigations into the Samjhauta Express bombings in 2007, and there was no commitment on providing Lakhvi’s voice samples.

The Pakistani High Commissioner’s Iftar with Hurriyat leaders that had been postponed was resurrected(begin again,दुबारा शुरू करना) as an Eid Milan event and recent LoC firings have again raised tensions. The chest-thumping protagonists on either side examined in terms of protocol how many steps Mr. Modi and Mr. Sharif each walked to greet the other. The Ufa moment had become an “ouch” moment for both sides. Instead of a win-win, both sides retired hurt.

Lessons for Narendra Modi

Neighbourhood diplomacy for a large country like India needs a lighter touch, and far more attention to managing expectations than has been in evidence during the last 12 months. We also need to understand that as the larger power, the Indian media resonates loudly in the region, often reflecting an insensitivity which generates a backlash. Mr. Modi’s media team has yet to understand this. There will be more engagements with Pakistan, and at different levels, but New Delhi will have to change its tone to ensure that well-crafted diplomatic initiatives do not get reduced to a farce.

From Mr. Narasimha Rao onwards, I have personally witnessed how he and his successors and their senior colleagues, used to keep key political leaders, including the Opposition, fully briefed; in parallel, senior officials used to provide background briefings to retired officials and foreign policy commentators so that expectations could be managed in terms of media projection. This ensured that both the pace and the outcome of the dialogue was kept under control, with an eye to the domestic political environment while taking into account the larger games being played on the geopolitical canvas. After last August, Mr. Modi understood the need for a dialogue with Pakistan. Hopefully, after Ufa, he will also understand the need to manage it in a more productive manner.

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Coming south in search of a bride

The strange case of how women from Kerala are wedding men from Haryana in what often turn out to be disastrous marriages.
Some trends seem astonishing(surprising,चौका देने वाला) at first, but begin to make sense when closely examined. The case of Kerala women marrying Haryanvi men is one such example. Why would women from a State known for its excellent social and human development indicators, particularly its treatment of women, marry men from a State infamous for its skewed sex ratio?

Recent newspaper reports show that in the context of a huge sex ratio imbalance and an imminent shortage of brides, several Haryanvi men are heading to Bihar, West Bengal and Kerala in search of brides. In order to understand the nature of these marriages and the motivations of these women, we visited Kerala recently.

Women incur the costs

In a hegemonic(dominance,प्रभुत्व) and heteronormative society, not being married carries a huge cost, as desperate Haryanvi men seeking wives know only too well. In our study, we found that several men who may not have been seen as marriageable in the local context have made their way to Kerala with no expectation except that of getting a wife. Typically, the brides came from very poor families with more than one daughter. And when the women are above a certain ‘marriageable’ age, it is considered better for them to be married than remain single. It is these women, priced out of marriage in Kerala, who marry Haryanvi men. As the father of a recent such bride put it, “If the family was well off, the girl would not be married away in Haryana”.

The case of Rani (name changed) points to the troubling aspect of this arrangement: how marriage is regarded as indispensable, and how women, in particular, incur the greater costs in the process. Rani, about 32 years old, has studied up to Class 8. About eight or nine years ago, she married a man from Haryana and now has two children. She was introduced to her husband through a relative (also married in Haryana to a Haryanvi but returned to Kerala to marry a Malayali). But Rani did not see her fiancé or even his photo until the day of the wedding. “He was quite old,” she recalls. Rani’s wedding was not registered in the temple or in the Panchayat, as is the norm, as it took place on a holiday. She and her husband left for Haryana in a hurry and she does not have a photo of her wedding or even one of her husband and her together. Upon her arrival in Haryana, she discovered that her husband was an alcoholic, and he would regularly abuse her. Thankfully, with the support of her two brothers and her mother, who paid her train fare, Rani was able to keep coming home.

Finally, last year, Rani decided that she had had enough. She fought with her husband and returned to Kerala permanently. Soon after, her husband fell sick and died. When she went back to Haryana and asked for his death certificate, his elder brother convinced her to sign a blank sheet of paper and gave her a photocopy of the death certificate. She realised that the document would be used to cut her off from any claim to her late husband’s house and the little property his family owned, but signed it anyway. True to her fears, she has not heard from them since.

Several other cases show a pattern in the treatment of women in such marriages. In one, a woman tried contacting her Haryana husband’s family after his death, but she was told there was no one by that name. In another, a woman suffering from cancer died in Kerala, but her Haryana husband did not come to see her, either during treatment or after her death. Her mother told us, “We spent on her treatment because she is our daughter. Who else will do it?”

Ticket to a good future

All the families we spoke to said the same thing: that they had agreed to their daughters’ marriage to complete strangers and going away to a distant place so that they would have someone to take care of them in future. This underlined a bitter fact: that marriage in India is still believed to be the only route to a good future for a woman. If the marriage goes well, this wish is fulfilled; if not, she bears the consequences(result,परिणाम). Many families rush into such marriages with little knowledge about the groom or his circumstances. Some family members rationalised these marriages away as the woman’s ‘destiny’ —“whatever is written in one’s fate is what one gets” said a maternal uncle, whose niece married a Haryana man who turned out to be a different person from the man they saw in the photograph.

In all these marriages, both the family and the woman agree reluctantly(uninterested,अनिच्छा) to the marriage because the woman is desperate to reduce the “burden” on her family and the family is desperate to find her a good life in the form of a happy marriage. It was distressing to listen to how these women agreed to venture into the unknown, to settle in places where they didn’t speak the local language, where the food was unfamiliar, social norms restrictive, and where discrimination(unfair treatment,भेदभाव) based on skin colour are prevalent(famous,प्रचलित). At the same time, their courage is equally startling(surprising,चौका देने वाला). The only silver lining was that in some cases, the women managed to come back to Kerala along with their husbands, and both settled down there.

Recent research pointed out that development may have contributed to a rise in the age of marriage in India, but the institution remains strong and is unlikely to break down in the near future. Our study just reinforced(strengthen,मजबूत) this point.

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Homeless, no longer

On May 7, a day after India and Bangladesh signed the historic Land Boundary Agreement, the residents of Mosaldanga, a hamlet in south Cooch Behar district of West Bengal, marched down the main market. Bharat Mata Ki Jai (Long Live Mother India)”, they shouted, waving the Indian flag. As the parade entered the neighbouring village of Battala, it was blocked by a group of men wielding(handle,चलाना) long bamboo sticks. “They asked us if we have permission to step on Indian land,” said Jayanal Abidin, 25, who was leading the procession.

Mr. Abidin and his people in Mosaldanga are among the 50,000 stateless people of East Bangladesh who, after India’s independence, got cut off from both East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and India, confined to fragments of land belonging to neither country. In an accident of geography, about 51 parcels of Bangladeshi land stayed on the Indian side, known as Bangladeshi enclaves, but with all roads leading to Bangladesh either fenced(surrounded,घिरा हुआ) with concertina wires or guarded by the Border Security Force. And across the border, Bangladesh was left with 111 enclaves with Indian citizens and no access to India. 

After four decades of ditherin(confusion,दुविधा), the conundrum(puzzle,पहेली) has been finally resolved, with enclave dwellers(habitant,निवासी) on both sides now allowed to choose which of the two countries they want to belong to. On the Indian side, the Bangladeshis have decided to become Indian citizens. They consider this a milestone of “freedom” and worth a thousand celebrations.

It was this sense of freedom that Mr. Abidin and his friends were celebrating in Battala village. They told the Battala men that the enclaves would soon be recognised as part of India, and its people would be considered Indians, so there was no need for any permission to rejoice. But the Battala men were in no mood to listen. “They said, ‘go back or we [will] beat you,” Mr. Abidin recalled.

The Mosaldanga group didn’t, however, pay heed(attention,ध्यान देना) to the threats. They regrouped in the village and danced to the drumbeats all through the afternoon. But as dusk fell, the protestors from Battala entered Mosaldanga with knives and sticks, beat up the revellers, and set a house on fire.

But, much to everyone’s surprise, the police arrived — the first-ever intervention made by an Indian law enforcement agency in a Bangladeshi enclave — and arrested an attacker immediately. They are currently searching for five more persons suspected to have been involved in the rampage(violent act,उपद्रव). 

Prior to the agreement, the Indian government viewed the enclaves as foreign territories, where Indian law was inapplicable and where criminals settled for years to evade police arrests. The police’s appearance in Mosaldanga this time sent out a strong message to the residents that the law had finally been established in the enclaves. For the first time, these stateless people today feel that they belong to India and India belongs to them.

The transition from being Bangladeshi to embracing an Indian identity will dismantle(break,तोडना) several oppressive(domineering,दमनकारी) structures that bred the lawlessness. Drug dealers who sold their marijuana in both Indian and Bangladeshi markets; local contractors who smuggled the enclave’s teenagers to Delhi and Mumbai for cheap labour; or Sarpanchs of Indian Panchayats who passed biased(unfair,पक्षपात) judgments on property disputes — all of this will end.

Political and economic players

Indian citizenship will make the enclave’s residents equal players in the local politics and economy.

 The political workers of the Trinamool Congress and the All India Forward Bloc have already sensed the shift. They have started canvassing(poll,प्रचार) support in the enclaves, promising to build everything from scratch for the new citizens. All 51 enclaves will soon merge with the electoral constituencies adjacent to them, and their votes will be game-changers in legislative and gram panchayat elections, where victories are often decided by small margins. 

With the sudden influx of political activism, the community is wondering if it should support a traditional political group or float its own party. The budding state-enclave relationship is empowering, and will help the enclave residents negotiate their rights with the people who have exploited them for decades.

But it’s hard to foresee that change taking place smoothly: the violence in Mosaldanga is evidence of the fact that the people who illicitly benefited from the enclaves are enraged and peace will not be granted so quickly.

On a rainy Thursday morning, a group of middle-aged men in lungis sat in a huddle under a rusty metal roof in Nalgram, another Bangladeshi enclave in east Cooch Behar. They chain-smoked beedis and crushed tobacco in their palms. Several cows wandered by on long halters. A woman in a pink saree fetched water from a hand pump. In the absence of piped drinking water, the people of Nalgram use groundwater. 

The mood was jubilant. “We want to congratulate Mamata Banarjee and Narendra Modi,” Rasidar Mian, a 50-year-old farmer, who seemed to be the unofficial leader of the group, said. “We are very happy that we are becoming Indians very soon.”

More men assembled around Mr. Mian to narrate their stories of suppression. Mushtaq Ali, 38, explained the ordeal of studying as a stateless student. “My father has bribed so many people to get me enrolled in school and college,” Mr. Ali said. “I’m the first graduate of my chitt [enclave] but that doesn’t mean anything. I am still ineligible for a job.”

Mr. Ali graduated in 2010 in political science. The same year he passed an examination for the post of bus conductor in the government’s transportation department. Like most enclave dwellers, Mr. Ali acquired a voter ID, a unique identification number (Aadhaar card), and a driving licence by bribing the local Indian authorities. He submitted all the documents in the transportation department as proof of Indian citizenship. But the Panchayat of the neighbouring Indian village came to know about it, and “the Sarpanch told them that I was a Bangladeshi and got my named removed from the list,” said Mr. Ali.

Finding ways to establish an Indian identity hasn’t been restricted to students. In the last decade, the younger generation in the enclave has tried hard to buy property on Indian territory, so that the sale agreement documents can be used as proof of their Indian identity, allowing them to marry Indian women. Without this, finding a match was difficult. In the winter of 2010, 32-year-old Abdul Rehman of Karola enclave got ready in a groom’s finer. He was to marry a girl in the neighbouring Indian village of Nadina. The bride’s family welcomed Mr. Rehman and his companions with a delicious meal. Before approving the vows(promise,वादा) of consent, though, the cleric crosschecked Mr. Rehman’s name, parentage and address. Mr. Rehman felt it would be inauspicious(unfortunate,अशुभ) to lie about his identity, so he confessed that he was from a Bangladeshi chitt. The bride’s father simply cancelled the wedding and asked Mr. Rehman and his companions to leave.

“As we walked out, everyone [from the bride’s side] said things like ‘we will never send our daughter to that jungle,’” Mr. Rehman recalled.

The women in the enclaves are just as hard up for marriage partners. In fact, they fare worse. The men in their community prefer marrying outside — it is a trend, a status booster. “We are compelled to pay huge dowries to get our girls married to Indian men,” said Mr. Rehman. As a result, a large number of people in the enclaves are reeling under debt. Many farmers have mortgaged their agricultural land. Many of them have uncleared debts dating back to the early 2000s.  Every year, their landlords, the moneylenders, take 70 per cent of the production, leaving them with two or three gunnybags of rice. 

It is in the absence of governance that an informal economy, aimed at exploiting the enclaves, materialised. It has been largely run by Indians from the villages that encircle the enclaves. From small grocery shops, which even have charging slots for cell phones because the enclaves don’t have electricity, to a big cattle and labour smuggling industry, the enclaves are a haven for exploitative entrepreneurs. “It costs Rs. 5 to charge one cell phone here,” said Jamal Sheikh, 20, from Mosaldanga. “There are about 200 cell phones in this enclave and we charge them twice a week.”

Similarly, the middlemen sell the farmers’ rice and jute to Indian merchants for a massive commission. Contractors take Rs. 1,000 per person to smuggle them to big cities as cheap labour. Agents charge Rs. 5,000 for an original voter ID and Rs. 500 for a fake one. For every small step, there is an agent to go through. It’s hard to know whether these exploitative forces will vanish(disappear,गायब) after the enclaves join the Indian mainstream, or whether they will realign themselves to the new reality.   

Hidden voters

Diptiman Sengupta, a social activist from Dinhata distict, is watching the developments closely. Mr. Sengupta has worked for the rights of enclave dwellers, just as his father Dipak Sengupta, a former MLA of Dinhata from Forward Bloc, did. Mr. Sengupta said 3,000-odd “hidden votes” were issued by local politicians to the enclave people, in order to bolster(strengthen,मजबूत) their voter base. “The politicians promised them [hidden voters] jobs. But after the elections, they refused to recognise them. We thought about this vote bank and decided, ‘let’s have them vote for a candidate who’s an Indian but lives in an enclave’”.

Mr. Sengupta found Mayamana Khatun, an Indian who’s married to an enclave resident, and pitched her as a candidate in the legislative elections of 2011 from Dinhata constituency. “She lost the elections but she proved that she was able to turn around [the results of] four-five gram panchayats,” he said. “She got 3,500 votes, which is enough to destroy any [assembly-level] politician.”

Through Ms. Khatun’s electoral advance, Mr. Sengupta earned some degree of power. He utilised it by lobbying the politicians to gather support to “Indianise” the enclaves. “I told them we will support you in the next elections if you convince the Chief Minister to support us,” he said. By 2014, the West Bengal Chief Minister had changed her stance, from being critical of merging the enclaves with the Indian mainland, she endorsed the settlement bill passed by the Indian Parliament in May 2015.

On June 6, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Bangladeshi counterpart Sheikh Hasina signed the historic deal. The government has now signed contracts for laying roads, drainage systems, and building hospitals and schools. An initial investment of Rs. 174.98 crore has been charted out. In addition, existing government schemes for housing, sanitation and agriculture are set to be implemented shortly.

And this is where politics comes into play, Mr. Sengupta worries. As the enclaves will be run by the Panchayats close to them, he thinks their unity is likely to be challenged. “The politicians may divide the people on the basis of religion and caste while misappropriating funds,” he said. When asked if the Mosaldanga violence had anything to do with local politics, Mr. Sengupta said: “I don’t think so. I think it’s too early to jump to any conclusion. I would say some miscreants(corrupt,बदमाश) did it.”

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