.
.For the last few years, the Technical
Advisory Committee (TAC) has provided advice to the RBI on the setting of policy
(repo) rates. Very soon, perhaps as soon as the October 4 meeting of the RBI,
the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) will be formed, and rather than an advisory
role, it will make policy. In other words, rather than the governor taking in
inputs from the TAC, and others, he will now be part of a six-member committee
that takes decisions on policy rates.
Three of the six members of the MPC are to
be chosen from outside the RBI. By definition, the five external members of the
TAC are strong contenders for the three available slots in the MPC. But does
the record of the TAC suggest that they are fit to take on MPC membership?
Possibly not. (An important caveat(warning,चेतावनी): This is a summary
conclusion. It might well be the case that some members of the TAC were not as
thoughtless as the majority, the minutes of the TAC do not mention names.)
Monetary policy, with or without the MPC,
is meant to be forward-looking and anticipatory. Unfortunately, the record of
the TAC, as gleaned from their latest — and last — August 9 recommendation, is
anything but forward-looking. What has also been noteworthy about the TAC is
that it most likely echoed what it thought were the “wishes” of the RBI. To be
sure, individual members may have differed from the majority, but the majority
has been nothing but “His Masters Voice” (youngsters, look up what HMV was).
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A perusal(study,अध्ययन) of the TAC
“recommendations” emphasises the fact that it has been broadly clueless about
the determinants of inflation in India, and therefore, not well informed about
the determinants of policy rates. Their summary statement for the August 9
policy meeting is informative (TAC Report on the RBI website, August 30, para
3, page 1). For example, the TAC concluded that:
“The monsoon has also been normal so far,
although the targeted pulses production — pulses being a major driver of food
inflation — will also likely be driven by higher minimum support prices in this
sector.” (emphasis added).
The TAC contention(dispute,विवाद) that minimum support
prices (MSP) for pulses will influence higher production is somewhat
ill-informed. The MSP for pulses has been set approximately eight per cent
higher for the 2016-17 agricultural season than the previous year — at a level
of around Rs 55 per kg. The prevailing(popular,प्रचलित) retail market price for
pulses, so far in 2016, has averaged almost four times this level (at Rs.
200/kg).
However, a good monsoon this year is likely
to send the retail price tumbling to close this huge “hoarders” gap between the
farm-gate and retail price. What should be of concern to the TAC is retail
(CPI) inflation for pulses — and this is likely to be significantly lower than
last year, that is, pulse prices will help reduce inflation in 2016, contrary
to the belief of TAC that MSPs for pulses will be inflationary. In other words,
the TAC is looking at the “wrong” side of the elephant.
TAC again: “Members felt that increased
upside risks to the five per cent CPI inflation target in Q4 of 2016-17 remain,
specifically, from rising consumption demand — both private (because of a
consumption-led recovery) and public (one rank one pension, seventh CPC
(Central Pay Commission ) — and cost-push shocks in the form of a steady rise
in crude prices.”
This quote provides us with some clue to
the thinking in the TAC. Worldwide, disinflation is the new phenomenon, and has
been so for at least the last decade. Many economists and policymakers have
realised that output gaps no longer explain inflation. If they did, then why
did India have double digit inflation from 2008 to 2013 with ever slowing
demand? So “rising consumption demand” will not be an important factor in
future (or current) inflation. Just look at the lowest two years — there was
accelerating GDP growth and declining inflation rates.
What about the contention of the TAC that the pay
commission will lead to higher inflation? In the last decade we had the pay
commission, and observed high inflation; in the previous decade, we had the pay
commission and obtained low inflation. So? It would have been more honest if
the TAC had said that we don’t know much about the determinants of inflation,
and are too lazy to find out, rather than arrive at wrong conclusions from
models that do not make sense now (if they ever did).
Undeterred, the TAC moves from one wrong
conclusion to another. “Cost push shocks in the form of steady rise in crude
prices”. One had hoped for a little bit of humility here — whoever the TAC
might be, they are not oil price experts. On August 8, 2016, the oil price was
around $44. A month later, it is exactly the same. More importantly, what
evidence is there that a rise in crude prices leads to cost push inflation?
Perhaps the memory of TAC experts goes back
to October 1973, when a quadrupling of oil prices ushered in worldwide
inflation. But their memory stops at 1980. In the 1990s, the average price of
crude was $20/barrel. In 1998, the average price was a low $14.4. Since then,
oil prices went up ten-fold, reaching a peak level of $ 140 barrel in June
2008.
What happened to world inflation post-1998?
It continuously fell. The new near 40-year-old reality of crude oil and world
inflation is that there is virtually no relationship between the two. So can
the TAC oil experts stop looking for one?
The TAC noise continues. Sample this — four
of the five TAC members were of the view that “CPI and CPI-food inflation have
seen a recent uptick and certain other price indicators continue to be sticky;
elevated food inflation has second round effects on headline inflation if it is
persistently(continuously,लगातार) above double digits”.
When was food inflation last above double digits — how many months ago? In the last two years, the highest food inflation level was eight per cent (July 2016); the average (sustained) food price level has been nearly half the double-digit level (5.5 per cent). So can the TAC not confuse itself with second round effects if it can’t even observe the bare facts pertaining to the first round?
When was food inflation last above double digits — how many months ago? In the last two years, the highest food inflation level was eight per cent (July 2016); the average (sustained) food price level has been nearly half the double-digit level (5.5 per cent). So can the TAC not confuse itself with second round effects if it can’t even observe the bare facts pertaining to the first round?
We all make mistakes, but so many mistakes
in one TAC report is noteworthy and perturbing(worrisome,चिंताजनक). It is to be hoped that when the
MPC is constituted, and meets, the new members are unlikely to lazily assess
and forecast inflation as the TAC seems to have done.
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