The big military challenge

The Pathankot attack revealed weaknesses in our intelligence, police and security procedures. While all of these need to be addressed, there are larger issues, which can have far more disastrous consequences[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)] for national security, needing attention.

The issue is defence reforms, initiated in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil War, ignored by the two UPA administrations and again brought to life by the current government. In an important speech at the combined commanders conference last month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi challenged his defence minister and senior military commanders to reform their “beliefs, doctrines, objectives and strategies”. This is nothing less than appealing for a paradigm shift, echoing[e-kow-ing(repeat,दोहराना)] the sentiments of generations of military reformers. The defence minister, who has publicly supported defence reform, has his task cut out for him. Unfortunately, he shouldn’t count on support from civilian bureaucrats in his ministry. It’s also far from assured if the current generation of senior military officers is up to this task. In short, while the PM’s vision is bold, its implementation faces formidable[for-mi-du-bul(alarming,विकट)] obstacles[ób-sti-kul(problem,बाधा)] . Pathankot should remind him and his security managers that India lives in a insidious[in'si-dee-us(dangerous,खतरनाक)] neighbourhood and should focus on strengthening its military.

It’s an open secret that former PM Manmohan Singh was keen to undertake some defence reform. His office was the driving force behind the Naresh Chandra Committee, established in 2011. It recommended the creation of a perpetual[pu'pe-ch(oo-)ul(permanent,स्थायी)] chairman, chiefs of staff committee — a less than perfect nomenclature[now'meyn-klu,chu(language,शब्दावली)] for the chief of defence staff (CDS). For the first time, all three service chiefs had supported creating such a post. However, then Defence Minister A.K. Antony was not evangelistic[i,van-ju'li-stik(enthusiastic,उत्साही)]. Civilian bureaucrats in his ministry also shared his scepticism['skep-ti,si-zum(disbelief,अविश्वास)] .

Modi identified six broad areas for reform — defence planning, enhancing jointness (the ability of the army, navy and air force to operate together), manpower rationalisation (smaller tooth to tail ratio), professional military education, restructuring higher defence management and the defence procurement process. The PM’s analysis of problems in each sector challenged the assumptions of India’s senior military commanders. India is probably the only country in the world expanding its military manpower which, by definition, curtails[kur'teyl(restrict,नियंत्रण)] resources for military modernisation (China recently announced cuts of up to 3,00,000 troops). The Indian military is among the least “joint” major militaries and its professional military education emphasises training over education. However, the most important issue is implementation. Left to the bureaucracy, civilian or military, reforms are unlikely to succeed.

Conventional wisdom would have the government announce reform and leave it to the military and defence ministry to implement. Doing so will likely subvert the reforms, as happened in the past. For instance, in 1986, Arun Singh was instrumental in creating a tri-services and joint civil-military institution called the Defence Planning Staff to rationalise defence planning. It quickly lost its relevance as the services opposed the initiative. Reforms will not succeed if its implementation is not closely monitored.

There are three significant obstacles. First, it’s not clear if and how the three chiefs will give up powers for the proposed CDS. If restructuring higher defence management results in a enervated['e-nu,vey-tid(weak,कमज़ोर)] CDS, it defeats the purpose. Second, it’s not clear how the government will create more joint commands, especially since it’s opposed by the military. Their opposition is primarily because it curtails posts available for upward mobility. They will advocate for more joint commands but will be grudging[grú-jing(unwilling,अनिच्छुक)] to integrate existing commands. Effectiveness and efficiency are thus sacrificed to bureaucratic expansion. Third, there’s opposition from civilian bureaucrats who don’t want to change the status quo[stey-tus kwow(the existing state of affairs,यथापूर्व स्थिति)] . The existing arrangement gives them considerable powers with little accountability.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar claims he has read the Goldwater Nichols Act that transformed the US military. However, that didn’t occur overnight and was preceded by a public debate and, more importantly, required a civil-military partnership. As he faces obstacles from his own officials, perhaps Parrikar should consider forming a defence reforms unit comprising politicians, former officials and technocrats, all sharing the vision for defence reforms. This unit could monitor the progress of reforms. It would be India’s loss if, after a year, defence reform remained an aspiration.

Courtesy : indian express

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