Rethinking reservations and ‘development’

In Gujarat, the Patels or Patidars, who constitute about 15 per cent of the State’s population, are an economically and politically dominant upper caste. As successful farmers, as small and big industrialists, as traders as well as non-resident Gujaratis, spread practically all over the world, they should be the last to demand reservation. The Patel agitation(excitement,not calm,उत्तेजना,आंदोलन) at present, however, seems to be demanding precisely(exactly,शुद्ध रूप से) this. Or, if read carefully, the protesters are demanding the removal of caste-based reservation and its replacement with income-based reservation.

The Patel rallies for reservation have been widespread across the State and significantly large in many towns and cities. Though it appears to be an urban movement, rural areas are not totally excluded(except,leave out,छोड़ना). The rallies have also spurred other caste rallies and resulted in inter-caste conflicts(battle,विवाद) and tensions. Though there seem to be many weaknesses in the leadership of the agitation and lack of clarity in its objectives, the agitation needs to be taken seriously because it is a warning of the shape of things to come — not only in Gujarat but also other parts of the country.

The agitation has emerged out of the frustrations of the youth on two major counts. First, the existing reservation policy that has failed to assimilate(absorb,अपनाना) lowest castes/tribes within the mainstream economy and society, has created a sense of dissatisfaction and injustice among those who are denied the benefits of reservation. And second, the much-discussed Gujarat model of development has failed miserably in creating adequate(enough,पर्याप्त) employment opportunities for the growing labour force in the State. This lacuna(gap,अंतराल) has particularly affected the educated youth who are unable to find suitable work in spite of the rapid growth of the economy.

The reservation policy which was initiated as a temporary provision (for 10 years) for Scheduled Castes(SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in our Constitution in 1950, has expanded its coverage and contents multifold over the past six to seven decades. It has now become an almost a permanent feature of the national policies. The reservation policy however, has been used in the State (as elsewhere) mainly in vote bank politics played around the castes and has failed in including the people at the bottom in the mainstream economy and society.

As the creamy layer of the lowest castes and tribes have cornered these benefits to a considerable extent, the policy has ended up as a tool that discriminates(unfair treatment,भेदभाव) against the high caste youths in favour of the low caste youths, sometimes coming from the same economic background. Not only Hardik Patel, the leader of the movement, but large number of participants in the rallies complained of this unfair discrimination. Placards like “I could not get into an engineering college because of low marks though many OBC [other backward classes] students with lower marks got in” or “why should SC/ST/OBC get a job when with better marks and qualifications I cannot?” or “Do away with caste-based reservations” seen in the rallies reflect this frustration. This frustration of the youth, even if the statements in the placards are not accurate, is understandable because it is not the poorest but frequently the non-poor, middle income groups of SC/ST/OBC who are seen to be the beneficiaries of reservations. The tool of reservation has failed miserably in removing caste differences and has promoted the caste divide and caste conflicts.

Clearly, the time has come to rethink our reservation policies, that have ended up giving preference to more or less the same class of SC/ST/OBC in school/college admission, in jobs and in promotions as well as subsidies in innumerable programmes and schemes, leaving out the poorer sections among them at the bottom. Our recent study in Gujarat has shown that the SC, OBC and ST households at the bottom are still left out of the benefits of the rapid growth of the State.

Radical rethink

The radical rethinking on reservation should aim at (i) excluding the entire creamy layer from reservation; (ii) developing the capabilities of the deprived and excluded beyond offering them admission to higher education or jobs on a platter. The underlying principle should be that all the poorest at the bottom get support and all the poorest — excluded socially and economically — get a preference.

Secondly, the failure of development model in Gujarat (and for that matter India as a whole) to create massive, productive employment for the youth is another reason for frustration of the youth. The labour market in Gujarat has behaved in a peculiar(strange,अजीब) manner in the recent decades. On the one hand, large-scale in-migration of unskilled and low-skilled workers is observed in a wide range of sectors such as agriculture, construction, brick kilns, power looms, small engineering, garments etc. At the other end, the posts of highly-skilled professionals in the fast-growing, technology sector have also been largely filled by professionals and high-skilled workers from outside the State. A significant number of the educated youth in the State does not find suitable employment in the State because i. the growth of the modern sector has been highly capital intensive, where jobs generated are relatively few and local youth frequently do not qualify and ii. other employment opportunities for the educated youth are fewer and not remunerative(beneficial,लाभकारी). As per the official data, the number of educated unemployed i.e. the number of educated job seekers above the Senior Secondary Certificate (SSC) level has increased from 6.7 lakhs in 1995 to about seven lakhs in 2014 while the number of graduate job seekers has increased from 12,184 to 40,781 in the same period— an increase of 3.6 times. Clearly the educated youth is left high and dry, and excluded from the benefits of the rapid growth of the State. The reservation policy in government jobs has added to this frustration.

The danger of the demographic dividend turning into a demographic disaster is looming over the State. And similarly across the country, unless adequate jobs are created for the large labour force , the frustration of the youth is not likely to be contained.

In short, the Gujarat protests should be treated as a warning against the reservation policy and the State’s growth model. It is also a warning to other States.

The best that the Gujarat government can do immediately is to hold meaningful discussions with the Patels to understand their concerns. For the medium and long term however, the State has no choice but to redesign its development model to create large scale productive employment for the youth with what the International Labour Organisation (ILO) calls “decent work conditions” and to radically revise the reservation policy.

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Know your English

What is the meaning and origin of ‘hang fire’?

(PV Jagannathan, Chennai)

This is an expression that has been part of the English language since the 17th century. It is mostly used to mean to keep something pending; when something ‘hangs fire’, you delay taking action on it even though it is rather important. In other words, you procrastinate. In 1981, thanks to the song ‘Hang Fire’ by the British rock group, the Rolling Stones, the expression acquired a slightly different meaning — to relax or chill. Here are a few lines from the song from their album ‘Tattoo You’: “In the sweet old country where I come from/ Nobody ever works/ Yeah, nothing gets done/ We hang fire, we hang fire.”

*Don’t be in a hurry. Let’s hang fire till the court gives its verdict.

*What do you want to do this evening? Study for next week’s test or hang fire?

In the past, the gunpowder that was used in canons and guns was rather unpredictable. When it was wet, it would not ignite at all. Even when it was dry, sometimes the powder inside the gun, instead of exploding, only smouldered — it burned slowly, resulting in a lot of smoke coming out of the gun. This made the weapon dangerous for one didn’t really know when the remaining portion of the powder would catch fire leading to an explosion. This delay in the explosion when the powder was smouldering was referred to as ‘hang fire’. Sir Walter Scott popularised the use of this expression in everyday contexts.

How is the word ‘soporific’ pronounced?

(KP George, Cochin)

The first syllable ‘sop’ rhymes with ‘hop’, ‘top’ and ‘pop’, while the ‘o’ in the second, sounds like the ‘a’ in ‘china’. The ‘I’ in the third syllable is pronounced like the ‘I’ in ‘hit’, ‘pit’ and ‘bit’, and the final ‘fic’ rhymes with ‘pick’, ‘sick’ and ‘kick’. The word is pronounced ‘sop-e-RIF-ic’ with the stress on the third syllable. It is ultimately derived from the Latin ‘sopor’ meaning ‘deep sleep or lethargy’. Nowadays, the word is mostly used to refer to things that induce sleep or drowsiness in people — it could be a medicine or drug, the motion of a train, etc.

*The summer heat was making Sunita feel soporific.

The word can also be used to mean ‘tediously boring or monotonous’.

*Pity the officials who have to listen to the Minister’s soporific speeches.

What is the difference between ‘The Principal gave a pen to each student’ and ‘The Principal gave a pen to every student’?

(S. Mythili, Coimbatore)

In most contexts, people generally use ‘each’ and ‘every’ interchangeably. Careful users of the language, however, maintain a distinction between the two. The word ‘each’ is normally used when you are thinking of the students as individuals; the focus here is on the individual members of the group. The word ‘every’, on the other hand, suggests that you are thinking of the students as a group; you are not thinking of them individually, but collectively. ‘Every’, in certain contexts, has the same meaning as ‘all’.

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Decision delayed is defence denied

Each day the government delays the implementation of the One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme, a demand that is 42 years old, it risks playing with fire. It is safe to assume that the serving service Chiefs have conveyed as much to the government. The public manifestation of the rapidly spreading and quickly deepening levels of disenchantment(disillusion,विरक्ति) came when the daughter of Gen. V.K. Singh, former Army Chief of Staff and a serving Minister of State, sat with the Jantar Mantar agitators(political troublemaker,अन्दोलनकर्ता) in an open show of support. Mrinalini Singh’s husband is a serving Army officer. This is a categorical indication that both Gen. Singh and Col. Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore, another Minister, would no doubt have pointed out to the government the consequences(result,परिणाम) of not being able to deliver on a promise already made several times over.

Uncertain future

Roughly 60,000 people retire from the armed forces every year. Some retire before they are 35, and as many as 87 per cent of servicemen retire between the ages of 34 and 48. Soldiers, sailors, airmen at the lowest level are the hardest hit because after a near nomadic(unsettled,घुमन्तु) life in the armed forces, they most likely do not own too many assets, a home nor have an alternative income stream. They have no clear prospect of a second lease of working life either.

Soldiers retire early because they need to be fighting fit to be in the forces and hence, the armed forces need young blood. The retirement policy affects an estimated 25 lakh ex-servicemen. Counted along with their dependents, the number swells to roughly three times that or 70 lakh people.

Also, a large section of the armed forces has family members who are either still serving or have retired from the forces. In normal conversations, the situation is bound to occupy their mindspace. Those in service know that sooner or later, they will become veterans and inherit the same situation their fathers did before them, an inheritance of loss.

The problem has been exacerbated(worsen,बुरी) because of the way in which the then BJP prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, appropriated and espoused(follow,समर्थन) the cause at the 2014 hustings(political activity before election,चुनाव प्रचार) and his subsequent repeated assurance, both on the floor of Parliament and elsewhere, that OROP was a settled matter and the solution had his imprimatur(approval,अनुमति). Consider also Mr. Modi’s unparalleled political heft(heavy,भारी) in the Lok Sabha and the fact that the Supreme Court has, as long ago as December 1982, underlined the need for OROP. If the agitators feel let down, it is because the delivery of the promise has so far been in inverse proportion to the articulation(voice,अभिव्यक्ति) of the promise itself.

Deliberately tangled

As many as ten retired service Chiefs have deliberately used the word ‘imbroglio(disorder,अव्यवस्था)’, a word of Italian origin that has elements of confusion, entanglement, bitterness, and complication all rolled into one. It accounts for the growing feeling that in the real OROP narrative, Narendra Modi, whom none other than the Vishwa Hindu Parishad’s Ashok Singhal acknowledged as BJP’s Iron Man, is helpless. His inability to deliver stems from his being a victim of either intra-party politics or from him having been ensnared(entrape,फ़साना) in a web made by intransigent(inflexible,कट्टर) bureaucrats.

The discourse in New Delhi circles suggests that a section of the bureaucracy wants to dovetail(fit together,मेल खाना) the OROP with the Seventh Pay Commission. This would effectively scupper(put at risk,खतरे में) the plan because it would postpone the resolution and rework the rationale and framework of the OROP as well. Lt. Gen. Syed Ata Hasnain, who retired as Military Secretary of the Army, writes in the July issue of Fauji India that the “bureaucracy is living up to its promise to complicate the issue to such an extent that it [OROP] is once again shelved without decision.”

The procrastination(delaying for latter,टालना) has escalated the situation to a standoff between the veterans and the government. Mr. Modi’s inability to act quickly and effectively has allowed other political parties space where none need have been conceded. The issue is now open to political hijack. There has been a steady stream of contradictory noises emanating(give out,निकलना) from the government, most notably from the Finance Ministry, asking ex-servicemen to “lower expectations”.

The implication is that the government is having trouble coming up with the money. It has not gone unnoticed among the veterans that Mr. Modi, the politician, had no difficultly promising Rs. 1.25 lakh crore for Bihar in what amounts, scandalously(in shameful manner,शर्मनाक ढंग से), to pre-election sops. For OROP, the figure being talked about is roughly Rs. 8,300 crore, a fraction of the Bihar pledge(promise,वादा).

Soldiers cannot go on strike like bank employees do, but patience now seems in short supply. Since June, the veterans have resorted to black armband protests, bike rallies, candle-light vigils, petitions, the return of service medals, and hunger strikes in an attempt to force the government to focus on the implications. They know more than others that all it requires is a small spark to set off a blaze. If something has been building up for a long time and is looking for release, even something as inconsequential as a slap can have an enormous(many,बहुत) ripple(wave,लहर) effect.

We need to remember the mutiny(rebellion,बगावत) witnessed after Operation Blue Star. Given that the veterans are already on hunger-strike and writing petitions in blood, all it needs is a momentary provocation to set off that dreaded spark.

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When Hamid Gul offered India peace

Former head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Gen. Hamid Gul, who died recently, has been described in the Indian media as a monster, the originator and perpetrator(criminal,अपराधी) of terrorism against India. Yet, there is another side to his personality which needs to be disclosed.

In early 1988, Pakistan President, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, expressed concern that the Pakistan Army, by consuming almost 48 per cent of the nation’s budget, was unfairly depriving citizens of funds which could raise their standards of living. He was particularly concerned about the expenditure on the operations in Siachen and was convinced that an agreement with India was possible to cut down on these expenses.

Gen. Zia was anxious for a meeting between the Intelligence Chiefs of the two countries to explore possibilities and approached the then Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan to speak to the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and facilitate(make easier,सरल बनाना) a move forward.

Intelligence chiefs’ meet

Prince Hassan conveyed the proposal to Gandhi, who promptly(quickly,तुरंत) agreed. The two Intelligence Chiefs then met at Amman under the aegis of Prince Hassan. What could be done was broadly discussed. They met again at Geneva after political endorsement of their confabulations
(Informal conversation,बातचीत) at Amman from their Chiefs. The Foreign Offices and other elements of government on both sides were kept out of the loop though it must be assumed that Gen. Zia would not have embarked(start,शुरू करना) on this initiative without sounding out his Corps Commanders.

The final agreement between the two Intelligence Chiefs envisaged(imagine,सोचना): a) withdrawal of the Pakistani forces to the west to the ground level of the Saltoro mountains; b) giving up of Pakistani claims to territory from NJ9842 to the Karakoram pass; c) the Line of Control to run North from NJ9842 along the western ground level of Saltoro exactly North till the Chinese border; and d) reduction of Pakistani troop strength by two divisions with some corresponding adjustments on the Indian side.

In confirmation of this understanding, Gen. Hamid Gul sent a GHQ Survey of Pakistan map where the new line of LoC north of NJ9842 and the western foot of Saltoro was clearly demarcated(separate,अलग). After the receipt of this map, steps were undertaken on the Indian side to convert the covert operation to an overt(open,खुल्ला) process. First, the Director of Military Intelligence was asked whether a new Line of Control on the western foothills of Saltoro would be agreeable to the Army to bring about a solution to the Siachen question. He was sceptical(doubt,संदेह) of the Pakistani military accepting such a line but said that an effort could be made. Thereafter, the proposal was made into a Government of India proposition with the Ministry of Defence also giving their assent. No one was, of course, told about the ground work done earlier by the Intelligence Chiefs of the two countries.

The two Chiefs had also agreed to remain in close contact with each other over the public telephone, using code words and names. One rewarding development of this relationship was that Gen. Hamid Gul decided, on his own, to return the four Sikh soldiers who had defected to Pakistan, angered over the Army assault on the Golden Temple. Over the telephone, he conveyed to his Indian counterpart that four soldiers would be released in a specific geographical area on a certain date.

The information was immediately passed on to the Border Security Force (BSF). The four were taken into custody by the BSF from the specified location on the date agreed. The BSF was given no inkling about how the release had been made possible .

Sudden end

A meeting of the Defence Secretaries of the two countries was already scheduled. It was decided that India would put forth the proposal for demilitarisation of Siachen from its side and await Pakistani reactions. The Defence Ministry had no idea that the proposal already had been agreed to by the Pakistani top authority at the covert(secret,गुप्त) level.

On the designated day, the Indian defence delegation left for Pakistan but a supreme tragedy occurred simultaneously. It was announced that Gen. Zia-ul-Haq had been killed in a plane crash. Thereafter, Pakistan turned down the Indian formulation. It has not been heard of since.

On the Pakistani side, the secret operation, as it moved forward, was known only to the Pakistani High Commissioner, Niaz Naik. Sometime later, he also died in mysterious circumstances. After Gen. Zia’s death, a civilian government took office in Pakistan. Gen. Hamid Gul was removed from the post of Director General of ISI.

When the Indian authorities made efforts to pick up the threads of the covert operation, they were told that no such operation was ever carried out and there was not a single paper in the Pakistani records which would testify to its existence.

Gen. Zia’s was a major effort to break out of the psyche prevailing in Pakistan at the time but apparently his Corps Commanders had not realised the extent of compromise he would be ready to make to start a new beginning with India. Once they were informed about the exact terms, they became uneasy and wanted to stop the progress of these developments at any cost.

Could it be reasonable to speculate that Gen. Zia’s death in the air crash was actually a planned assassination, planned at the highest levels of the military hierarchy(classified,वर्गीकरण) by those who were opposed to a policy of reconciliation with India? The new Zia line, of which Gen. Gul was the principal architect in Pakistan, was never consummated.

Rajiv’s regret

Barbara Crossette, correspondent of New York Times in the early 1990s, following an interview with Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, hours before he was assassinated, quoted him as saying that during Gen. Zia’s tenure(period,काल), India and Pakistan “were close to finishing agreement on Kashmir. We had the maps and everything ready to sign”.

It is thus clear that Pakistani generals will go any extent to prevent a new page opening up in Indo-Pakistan relations. This was evident also from the recent collapse of the National Security Advisor (NSA)-level talks. Two generals like Gen. Zia and Gen. Hamid Gul, who believe in taking unorthodox steps to solve disputes with India, are unlikely to emerge in Pakistan easily.

A charitable view could be taken that Gen. Hamid Gul’s subsequently donning on a mantle(cover,आवरण) of extreme hostility(enmity,शत्रुता) towards India was just to save his skin and whitewash his role in the secret talks between the two countries.

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Owning Ambedkar sans his views sans his views

Earlier this month, on August 12, several media outlets reported that the Gujarat government’s Department of Social Justice and Empowerment withdrew four lakh copies of a Gujarati textbook meant for students of classes VI to VIII, titled Rashtriya Mahapurush Bharat Ratna Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. The book, authored by Dalit scholar P.A. Parmar and published by Surya Prakashan, Ahmedabad, was selected and assigned by the same government department to mark the 125th anniversary of Dr. Ambedkar (1891-1956), starting from his birthday on April 14, 2015 and continuing for one year.

According to a statement given to members of the press by K.D. Kapadia, the Director of Scheduled Caste Welfare, “The publisher added some things in the book that were seen as sending a wrong message to the impressionable mind of primary school students… Some matters pertaining(related,सम्बंधित) to religious conversion that are there in the 22 vows(promise,प्रतिज्ञा) of Dr. Ambedkar were added by the publisher, which were seen as going against the message of national integration. Government’s action will be in the interest of the public.”

The withdrawal of this book — which had been printed in huge numbers and had arrived at various district headquarters for further distribution — raises the obvious issue of the necessity and propriety of book bans in a democratic culture. It also reminds us of the unwarranted interference by government bodies that are, strictly speaking, not meant to be dealing with education policy or implementation, in matters of syllabus creation, textbook content and socio-political “messaging” that targets young students, to use Mr. Kapadia’s language.

Conflict over textbooks

The banning of books and the continuous conflict(dispute,विवाद) over school and college textbooks are problems that have come up repeatedly in Indian public life, across States, and political parties, from the Left through the Centre to the Right. These actions are not “in the interest of the public”, although they are invariably sought to be justified on these grounds.

More worrying in this case is the stated reason for the withdrawal of the book. Dr. Ambedkar announced his decision to convert to Buddhism, took a formal diksha from Buddhist monks and, in turn, led the conversion of close to half a million people on October 14, 1956, in Nagpur.

He called the faith Navayana or the New Way, a protestant Buddhism based on his reinterpretation of classical Buddhism, his re-reading of its canonical texts, as well as his reorganisation of its central doctrines(belief,सिद्धान्त),practices and institutions. In the last year of his life, he wrote a massive work titled The Buddha and His Dhamma, to make the teachings of the Buddha accessible to modern readers. As part of the public ceremony of joining this new religion, followers collectively took 22 vows, written by Babasaheb himself.

In the weeks following the Nagpur initiation, and the months following Dr. Ambedkar’s death on December 6, 1956, close to four million people, mostly Dalits, (predominantly Mahars from Maharashtra), adopted this faith.

The purpose of Ambedkarite Buddhism is to liberate Dalits from untouchability and other forms of social exclusion and humiliation, all of which flow from the low status assigned to them in the orthodox Hindu caste system. Dr. Ambedkar’s vows are meant to both induct converts into a genuinely egalitarian(equality,समानतावादी) society and enable them to leave behind modes of living, thinking and believing that were hierarchical(classified,वर्गीकृत), violent and humiliating.

It is clear that the vows serve the dual purpose of discarding the old and adopting the new. They help Neo-Buddhists reject the Hindu way of life that had oppressed(burdened,दबाना) them for centuries, and, at the same time, assert their adherence(support,faith,समर्थन) to an emancipatory creed(religious belief,सिद्धान्त).

Dr. Ambedkar’s Buddhism was as much an indictment of Hindu varna dharma as it was a modern statement of equality, intended to deepen the vision of the Constitution while also recalling the original critique of the Buddha against Vedic orthodoxy. When the laws and promises contained in the liberal statute books proved inadequate(not enough,अपर्याप्त), he tried to place vulnerable(weak,कमजोर) communities on an equal footing by endowing them with a positive identity and a separate programme of action.

Left to himself, Dr. Ambedkar might have preferred a “civic religion”. For him, Buddhism supplemented the new republic’s guarantees of equal citizenship, universal adult franchise, fundamental rights, reservations, freedom of religion and a secular state that he had struggled to establish. But the main difficulties of Dalits stemmed from the very structure of Hindu society, which did not change much despite Independence and the Constitution. As he said in a speech to the Constituent Assembly, the political revolution was not accompanied by a social revolution. He also recognised that ordinary people in India, across castes and communities, drew strength from traditional religious faiths of various kinds. Babasaheb hoped that the Navayana would have the two-pronged effect of addressing both the problem of inequality and the desire for a religion — one that generated self-respect and a distinct identity — among his followers.

Distinct purpose

In arranging the vows in a particular order, Dr. Ambedkar seems to have wanted to first clear the ground, ensuring that ample(big,abundant,काफी) distance is created between the Hindu faith (and along with it, the outcaste status) that the seeker was born into and the new Dhamma that is going to be embraced. The condemnation of Hinduism is unequivocal, and takes precedence over the utterance(verbalize,कथन) of Buddhist vows.

The break amounts to a “rebirth”, as is stated in no uncertain terms in the vow (Vow 21: “I believe that I am having a re-birth”). The Gujarat government official’s words call this “going against the message of national integration”, but obviously, it’s the rather more forceful refusal of the Ambedkarite Buddhist to remain integrated within the Hindu fold that has caused the discomfort and led to a withdrawal of the textbook in question.

The government in Gujarat and the Centre want to appropriate the legacies of modern historical figures like Sardar Patel and Dr. Ambedkar even though this makes little ideological sense, given the values these stalwarts(loyalists,वफादार) espoused(follow,समर्थन) and their lack of congruence(suitable,सामजंस्य) with Hindutva politics. The BJP also has cynical(distrustful,दोषदर्षि) designs on Dr. Ambedkar with the aim of capturing a share of Dalit votes. The government-sponsored celebration of his 125th anniversary — but the inability to actually stomach his critical views on the caste system or on Hindu deities, rituals and beliefs — is an excellent illustration of the hollowness of the Hindu Right’s claims to speak in favour of Dalit rights, national integration or the public interest.

Mr. Parmar, the book’s author, went on to tell journalists that he would rather that the textbook have a few blank pages or contain more photographs of Dr. Ambedkar, than that the publisher, one Dharmesh Kothari, include the vows of his own accord, without consulting with him. Withdrawing the book seems like a defensive ploy on the part of an implicitly Hindu — and Hindu majoritarian — government to shield what Mr. Kapadia called “the impressionable mind” of the student reader just as it is about to encounter the radical force and fiercely anti-assimilationist tendency of the Navayana doctrine.

This is unacceptable. Students in Gujarat and elsewhere must be allowed to learn how Babasaheb sought to make a better, more equitable India. If to achieve this goal, he had to attack the worst aspects of society, religion and politics, whether “Hindu” or Indian, so be it. Our young, the future citizens of this country, have to be made aware of the courage it took Dr. Ambedkar to seek to annihilate(wipe out,मिटा देना) caste.

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Missing the bigger picture on OROP

The Indian armed forces are fighting their toughest battle ever. For an Army that has fought on every terrain and in every operation imaginable, this battle is confounding(unsupportive,मुश्किल). Because this time, they don’t know which side the enemy is on.

As the national discussion about the plight(bad situation,दुर्दशा) of ex-servicemen reaches a crescendo(increase at high,चरम सीमा), the toughest battle is being fought not at Jantar Mantar between the khaki and the olive green, nor is it being fought between South and North Block that house the mandarins(high government official,उच्च अधिकारी) of the Defence and Finance ministries respectively. The battle is definitely not about the blame game between political parties, none of whom solved the problem when they could. Neither is it being fought on primetime channels where screaming ‘experts’ misconstrue(misunderstand,गलत समझना) volume for value.

The toughest battle is being fought by the young leaders of our armed forces – the Lieutenants, Captains, and Majors. It is they who have to lead troops into battle with no material incentives to assist them. Consider their situation.

Acute shortage of officers

It is well-known that the Indian armed forces are facing a grave shortage when it comes to junior leaders. Many active combat(battle,लड़ाई) units are facing an acute(sharp,तीक्ष्ण) shortage of officers. Young officers, barely out of their teens, are handling bigger responsibilities than ever before and stepping up to discharge additional duties.

It is these young leaders who have to answer disconcerting questions from their troops, picketed in the heights of Siachen or the heat of the Thar, on why their own government is manhandling them. They have to justify the perceived perfidy(betrayal,विश्वासघात) of former Generals who seem to have forgotten their troops and the promises made to them. It is time we started thinking about our frontline troops and junior leaders who are getting disillusioned with their role models.

All stakeholders in this game, by definition, are on the same side. So, whether it is the ‘treacherous(dangerous,unstable,जोखिम भरा)’ politicians; the ‘Machiavellian’ bureaucrats; the ‘arrogant’ policemen; the ‘indifferent’ bean counters or the ‘unreasonable’ ex-servicemen — they are all citizens of this country who will pay a heavy price if the fibre of our apolitical armed forces unravels. And it is unravelling.

Social media is rife(full off,व्याप्त) with serious dissent(disagree,असहमति) among ex-servicemen and, more alarmingly, serving soldiers and officers. Conversations bordering on sedition are creeping(move slowly,रेंगना) into discussion threads. Junior officers are openly questioning the spine and integrity of their seniors. Soldiers from serving units are contributing monies to fund the One Rank One Pension (OROP) agitation, albeit(even though,यद्यपि) in their personal capacities.

Sane voices who dissuade(discourage,टालना) such collection are countered by those who challenge the basis on which Chiefs regularly contribute a day’s salary of the entire Army to the Prime Minister’s Relief Fund without the consent(agree,सहमति) of their soldiers. Such open discussions — which just a decade ago would have amounted to heresy(unorthodoxy,अप्रामाणिकता) — constitute a grave development and provide a fertile ground for elements inimical(unfriendly,विद्वेषपूर्ण) to India.

It is critical to step back and look at the big picture. The fact that the OROP issue had been relegated to files for far too long is obvious from the critical mass of the problem and the indignation(anger,गुस्सा) of the aggrieved(unhappy,नाखुश). The fact that a former Chief chose to withdraw as an interlocutor(middle man,वार्तालापि) underscores the divide and truculence(aggressive,उग्रता) of both sides. But it behoves the leaders of our Government, bureaucracy and most importantly the Defence Forces, both serving and retired, to realise that this impasse cannot be resolved in a combative manner. This is because, on one side you have the Indian armed forces, who have never learnt to take defeat regardless of the casualties suffered, and we should be thankful for that. Any result short of a victory will demoralise one of the finest armies of the world.

However, on the other hand, if the demands of OROP are achieved through bellicose(battleful,combating,लड़ाकू) means, what kind of armed forces would we leave as a legacy? One that fights its own government to get its due? Where does the story end? What prevents this pyrrhic victory(A victory that is won by incurring terrible losses,नाशकारी विजय) from becoming a new of ‘doctrine(belief,सिद्धान्त) belligerence(aggressiveness,झगदालुपन)’ that the armed forces use to press their demands in future? And what example will they set for their junior officers, struggling to keep their troops motivated?

The resolution to OROP doesn’t have to consist of a single silver bullet. Solutions can be a combination of the private sector stepping in with post-retirement options; the clustering(group,समूह) of ex-servicemen into categories and re-skilling and funding them for entrepreneurship; and a slew of other measures to ensure the dignity and livelihood of our ex-servicemen.

We can achieve this outcome provided we comprehend that this is not just a dispute between ex-servicemen and the government. It is a national security issue where every citizen needs to pitch in. Because, if war is too serious a business to be left to generals, nation-building is too serious a process to be left to the politicians and bureaucrats.

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A Pacific Beyond Fiji

Nine months after the first Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation in Fiji, India hosted leaders from 14 Pacific island countries last week. India’s relationship with them is usually cast in terms of their natural resources, strategic location and countering China’s growing influence in the region. But the Pacific is a lot more than mineral resources or strategic locations, and China merely one of several players competing for influence there. As it steps up its engagement, India would do well to remember the complexity and diversity of the Pacific, and learn from the experience of other major countries that have done business with it.

While Australia has for long been the largest donor to the region, other major powers have recently expanded their presence. In 2012, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) leaders’ meeting and asked them to “not count the US out”. While Prime Minister Narendra Modi was meeting the leaders in Jaipur last week, the US held talks with Pacific officials to explore the contours of a trade agreement. Immediately after Modi’s visit last year, Fiji hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping with equal, if not greater, enthusiasm.

Though often grouped together, the Pacific countries belong to three ethnically distinct subregions: Micronesia, Melanesia and Polynesia. Micronesia, spanning(cover,फैलाव) the north Pacific, consists of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Nauru. After World War II, Palau, the FSM and the Marshall Islands became US territories, and even today, the US exerts(put to use,जोर लगाना) a lot of influence on their economy and foreign policy. Polynesia includes the independent countries of Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu, and New Zealand associates Niue and the Cook Islands. Having been its colonies, these countries are closer to New Zealand and depend on liberal access to its labour market. Melanesia — covering Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu — has made more progress than others in subregional cooperation, through the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

With this diversity, it is not surprising that efforts to promote regional cooperation have rarely borne fruit. Even at the UN, these countries seldom vote together. The PIF, established in 1971 to promote regional cooperation, has a sprawling(spreading in different direction,बेतरतीबी से फैला हुआ) bureaucracy that manages everything from regional ICT to trade negotiations and donor coordination. Largely financed by Australia and New Zealand, it has sometimes been accused of promoting their agenda.

Headquartered in Fiji, its relationship with the host country has been complicated. Fiji has often used its status as the “hub of the Pacific” to shape the regional agenda. Some members, particularly Samoa, have resisted these efforts.

Following its last coup, Fiji was suspended from the PIF in 2009. Fiji’s leader, Frank Bainimarama, responded by questioning the PIF’s legitimacy, and in 2013 launched the alternative Pacific Island Development Forum. Even though Fiji’s suspension was revoked following elections last year, Bainimarama refuses to attend meetings until Australia and New Zealand leave the group. Others, notably Samoa and PNG, have emphasised more gradual regional reform. Membership is also divided over the status of West Papua, which has been part of Indonesia since its annexation(incorporation by joining,समामेलन) in 1969. Members have to weigh(consider,विचार करना) their economic interests with Indonesia against solidarity with Pacific brothers.

Fiji’s suspension was perhaps the most extreme action taken in Pacific diplomacy, which normally functions through consensus(agree,सहमति). Avoiding conflict(battle,विवाद) and respecting “kastom” are the hallmarks of Pacific cultures. This has not been sufficiently understood by developed country partners, which have often mistaken polite silence for consent, only to be disappointed later. Domestically, several countries have experienced frequent and abrupt(sudden,अचानक) political change; agreements signed by a PM are sometimes forgotten by successors.

In this environment, the importance of continued engagement with all stakeholders cannot be overstated. It is understable that India has a special friendship with Fiji, but it also needs to proactively develop close relations with other island countries and expand its engagement beyond the current political leadership. This will safeguard its interests in a region with fleeting political stability. Establishing diplomatic presence in each country would be a welcome first step. Following up on initiatives announced last week would be another. For example, Modi announced several scholarships for the countries last week; he should ensure that they are taken up. Ultimately, diplomacy and politics in the Pacific are personality driven. Anything less than close engagement is no engagement at all.

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Risk and opportunity

French Emperor Louis Bonaparte’s prophetic statement, “Let China sleep, for when it awakes it will move the world” appears to be coming true. China is on the move and what happens in China will not remain in China.

The sudden devaluation of the yuan to make it more market-determined and facilitate its inclusion in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket has conveniently come at a time when China’s exports have sharply slowed. It signals that China is struggling to rebalance its economy as it tries to internationalise its currency. The initial 2 per cent devaluation has amounted to almost 4 per cent against the dollar. It has roiled(annoyed,उत्तेजित) global markets — US equities and the Sensex have crashed. More turmoil(violent disturbance,खलबली) could come, given its high debt and weak financial systems. The IMF has deferred the yuan’s inclusion in the SDR.

The rupee has fallen almost 4 per cent against the dollar in the last two weeks, which ensures that the rupee-yuan exchange rate remains more or less unchanged. But other BRICS currencies — the real, rouble and rand — have depreciated much more. A currency war, especially as growth in global trade has fallen, is not in anyone’s interest. If the yuan were to weaken, India would need to protect itself, as many think that the rupee is overvalued at Rs 66 to the dollar and should be at around Rs 70.

The devaluation and ensuing global turmoil has shifted attention from China’s “one belt, one road” (OBOR) strategy unveiled in the fall of 2013. That policy is a sign that China is intending an ambitious outward-oriented investment strategy to encourage new trade and connectivity throughout Asia, with road and maritime links through the Indian Ocean to Africa, the Middle East and on towards Europe. It is a revival of the ancient silk road, but even broader in scope and scale, and will help China invest abroad and relieve some of its excess capacity.

New financial institutions linked to this strategy, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Silk Road Fund, have been established in Beijing. The New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) have been set up in Shanghai. China has also recapitalised three banks — the China Development Bank, the China Exim Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank of China — to help finance projects linked to the new silk road strategy.

Many problems could arise in executing this strategy. Asean countries involved in the South China Sea dispute are wary of China’s intentions. The US is creating the Trans-Pacific Partnership with 12 Pacific Rim countries, which so far excludes China. Japan has increased its aid programmes and is pursuing a Japan-EU free trade deal. Concerns on past Chinese investments have surfaced in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and many parts of Africa. Russia is wary of China’s moves in Central Asia. India has not yet signed on to OBOR, as it has concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and believes that the maritime silk road will create a “string of pearls” to encircle India. China is not happy with India’s involvement in the South China Sea. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s trips to reignite relationships in Mongolia, Central Asia and the Pacific must have been noted in Beijing. India has countered China’s rising engagements in the Indian Ocean with its own spice route or “mausam” project.

Nevertheless, Asia’s two giants(big,बड़ा) continue to engage on several fronts. Trade relations have increased substantially though India faces a huge and growing trade imbalance with China that the Chinese devaluation could further increase. Chinese investments in India remain quite small, at less than 0.5 per cent of all FDI in the country — less than even Poland, Malaysia and Canada. India needs to reduce its trade imbalance with China by attracting more FDI from China to get Chinese companies to “Make in India”. India has joined the NDB and CRA (with an Indian president) and the AIIB (as its second-largest shareholder after China). These new banks are a potential, although small, source of long-term infrastructure finance for India, and they represent a visible and tangible(touchable,सुनिश्चित) symbol of cooperation between India and China that can fructify and grow.

As China takes over the chairmanship of the G20 in 2016, expect more risk as well, perhaps, as more opportunity — in Chinese both mean the same. The yuan may weaken further and China may pursue more aggressive external policies to distract attention from domestic problems. But

if China becomes a riskier prospect, India could emerge as a more stable investment opportunity if it is able to pursue economic reforms and improve its business climate. India must also remain proactive on the economic and diplomatic fronts and ensure that China sees that competition with India will be costly, and cooperation will benefit both.

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No proof required: Why inflation fell

While it is generally accepted that CPI inflation has come down in India, there is still considerable debate as to the causes of this decline and whether this decline is sustainable. The answer to these two questions is extremely important for gauging(estimate,आंकना) the future course of monetary policy. Governor Raghuram Rajan approvingly cited(mentioned,उल्लेख) a recent RBI study on the two questions. This study, he stated, had three important conclusions: “First, that the good inflation news follows from a combination of good food management by the government, good luck because of external factors such as lower crude prices, and monetary policy, including the new framework. We believe this is a fair view of the disinflation so far, entirely uninfluenced by the fact that two of the three authors are from the RBI.” (‘Inflation fears still high, says Rajan’, Business Standard, August 25).

Chinoy in a article (‘Making sense of Inflation in India’, August 24) discounted the efficacy of good food management by concluding that “the variation in MSPs is largely mimicking(mimicry,नक़ल करना) world food prices” and that “a secular decline of global food inflation over the last year has likely had an important impact on India’s food inflation”. So what brought inflation down, if not MSPs, according to Chinoy? Why, oil and international food inflation, of course.

As readers of this column know, I have talked (since July 2011) about the importance of government-administered MSPs for food as being almost the determinant of CPI inflation in India. No other variable (money supply growth, fiscal deficits, output gap, etc) has any explanatory power in explaining Indian inflation from the late 1970s to the present. However, there is an additional important determinant — the effect of international inflation as proxied by the median inflation rate in emerging economies. But this ceased to be relevant to the Sonia Gandhi-inspired MSP explosion during 2004-13, that is, international inflation effects were swamped(fill quickly,भर जाना) (eliminated!) by the extraordinarily high MSPs engineered by Gandhi’s government (no doubt in the mistaken belief that such increases would yield(return,देना) a majority of seats in Parliament).

What effect did the oil price decline have on inflation, as suggested by both Rajan and Chinoy? Recent history provides for a “natural” experiment about policy choices and determinants. In June 2008, oil prices reached $134 per barrel and year-on-year CPI inflation was 8.3 per cent. A year later, in June 2009, oil collapsed to $70 and CPI inflation increased by 2.2 percentage points (ppt) to 10.5 per cent. Compare and contrast this with what happened in the recent one-year period, June 2014-15. Oil prices declined from $105 to $60. But, in contrast to 2008-09, CPI inflation fell by 1.4 ppt from 6.8 to 5.4 per cent (and by 3 ppt to 3.8 per cent in July). So if oil prices are responsible for the decline in inflation in India in 2014-15, why did inflation decline not happen in 2008-09? One major explanation: (lagged) MSP increased by 15.9 per cent in 2008 and 20.9 per cent in 2009; in contrast, (lagged) MSP increased by 5 per cent in 2013 and 1.8 per cent in 2014.

What about international food prices and CPI inflation? Ditto the same story as oil. In 2008-09, international food prices fell by 23 per cent, but domestic food price inflation increased from 10.5 to 12.2 per cent. In contrast, in 2014-15, international prices fell by 24 per cent, and food inflation declined from 7.3 to 5.7 per cent.

These data do not lend much support to Chinoy’s contention that the real influence on CPI inflation is international food inflation. When several explanatory variables are contenders for being a determinant, the standard procedure is to run a “horse race” between them. In such a race, (lagged) international food or cereal inflation lags far behind as a determinant — indeed, it is completely insignificant and, to add insult to injury, of very low magnitude. However, lagged MSP inflation remains a star determinant and with a healthy magnitude — each 1 per cent increase in lagged MSP leads to 0.4 per cent increase in CPI.

Of the three “determinants” mentioned by Rajan, one remains to be evaluated: The monetary policy framework as being (partly) responsible for the decline in inflation. The inflation targeting framework is not yet in place, though the tabling of the Urjit Patel report is coincidental to the beginning of the decline in inflation. It is hard to believe that this correlation is anything but that; in addition, the MSP increase of only 5 per cent in 2013 may have been an important contributor to the decline in inflation, which started in 2014.

So what has determined Indian inflation to date? Mostly MSPs. Going forward, it is likely that MSP inflation will cease to play an important role in Indian inflation. Why? Because the country has learnt from the inherent dangers of populist policies engineered by Gandhi and her UPA government. It will be a case of never-again. So what will determine domestic inflation? The RBI’s interest rate policy?

When was the last time the RBI’s rate policy determined inflation in India? This is not a rhetorical(fancy,भाषणगत) question; it deserves an answer. Growth, jobs, poverty reduction and human welfare are at stake, so a glib(tricky,superficial,सतही) answer is not desirable. The simple fact is that the world has changed, and radically so, from when most of us studied monetary economics. Just look at what has happened in the rest of the world for the last 20 years and continuing. Most major economies have reduced policy rates to zero and inflation has declined. It is high time the monetarists woke up and smelt the cheap coffee or anything else they are fond of.

Deflation is likely to soon become a major concern in India. My preliminary estimates suggest that y-o-y GDP deflator inflation in India, for the April-June quarter, will be in negative territory. By the way, there is a flipside of negative or low deflator inflation to GDP growth as well — don’t be surprised if y-o-y growth is closer to 9 per cent than the 7 per cent widely being predicted.

Soon the search process for the monetary policy committee (MPC) will begin. I suggest that the RBI screen each contender for the MPC with this question: How do you explain the past determinants of inflation in India, and how do you explain the future trend?

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Hollow promise of 'special status'

A number of States have staked(put at risk,खतरे में) their claim for the ‘Special Category’ status in recent years. The issue has again taken centre stage following the Union Planning Minister Rao Inderjit Singh’s reply to a pointer in the Lok Sabha on July 31, 2015 that the question of granting such status to any State does not arise. The reason given by the Minister was that the Fourteenth Finance Commission (FFC) had increased the tax devolution to States from 32 per cent to 42 per cent of the divisible pool of central taxes obviating(ignore,टालना) the need for specific categorising. Given the emotive discourse around the demand, understanding the issues involved in it will facilitate(make easier,सरल बनाना) a dispassionate(impartial,निष्पक्ष) stand on the subject both by the Union government and the States.

Under the ‘D.R. Gadgil formula’ for the distribution of central plan assistance, which became operational during the fourth Five Year Plan, the requirements of Assam, Jammu and Kashmir and Nagaland were to be met first and the balance of central assistance distributed to the remaining States based on certain criteria.

At the time of the formulation of the fifth Five Year Plan, it was decided to include Himachal Pradesh, other Northeastern States and Sikkim in the above category. For the first time, these 10 States were categorised as ‘Special Category States’ to distinguish(differentiate,अलग करना) them from others. Later on, Uttarakhand was accorded(agree,सहमति) the ‘Special Category’.

Traits for categorisation

‘Special Category’ status had been granted in the past by the Union government to States having certain characteristics based on the recommendations of the National Development Council. These included i) hilly terrain; ii) low population density and/or sizeable share of tribal population; iii) strategic location along borders with neighbouring countries; iv) economic and infrastructure backwardness; and v) non-viable(dead,मृत) nature of State finances.

Under the revised Gadgil-Mukherjee formula, which was in operation till 2014-15, 30 per cent of the normal central assistance was earmarked(reserve,अलग रखना) for ‘Special Category States’ and the remaining 70 per cent to General Category States. ‘Special Category States’ were entitled to get such assistance in the grant-loan ratio of 90:10 as compared with 30:70 ratio for other States.

In addition to their earmarked share in normal central assistance, special plan assistance for projects (90 per cent grant) and untied special central assistance (100 per cent grant) were being given only to ‘Special Category States’. Other benefits to ‘Special Category States’ include assistance for externally-aided projects in the grant-loan ratio of 90:10, whereas such assistance to other States is on back-to-back basis.

Under the Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Programme (AIBP), ‘Special Category States’ get 90 per cent of the project cost as grant as compared with 25 per cent grant for others. The matching contribution in respect of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) is usually lower for ‘Special Category States’, more particularly, for those in the Northeastern region.

Though all the ‘Special Category States’ are provided with central incentives for the promotion of industries, there is no explicit(clear,सुस्पष्ठ) linkage between the incentives and the special status. The package of incentives is different for the States of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttrakhand and the States located in the Northeastern region. These packages have more to do with their backwardness than the status.

Progressive dilution

Several changes over the years, more particularly those introduced in the Union Budget 2015-16, have resulted in considerable dilution(weakening,कमजोर) of benefits to the ‘Special Category States’. The loan component of normal plan assistance was dispensed with in 2005-06 and since then such assistance is being given only in the form of grants to all States, including those in the general category. Following this, the share of ‘Special Category States’ in total normal central assistance has been around 56 per cent from 2005-06 onwards. But the share of normal central assistance in total plan assistance, which was the predominant channel of central plan assistance to States, had come down to about 15 per cent with the proliferation of Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), with resultant dilution of the benefit of untied grants to States. Following the increase in tax devolution to States from 32 to 42 per cent of divisible pool of central taxes, the Centre has dispensed with normal plan assistance, special central assistance and special plan assistance from 2015-16 onwards.

There are very few externally aided projects in the ‘Special Category States’. The Union Budget 2015-16 has drastically reduced the allocations under AIBP from Rs.8,992 crore in 2014-15 to just Rs.1,000 crore. AIBP is now included in the list of schemes to be run with higher matching contribution by States.

The ‘Special Category’ status is not so special anymore following the above changes. The only attraction that remains is the benefit of assistance for externally aided projects (90 per cent grant). But even this will be of limited benefit if any new state is accorded special category for a limited period of five years or so as disbursal(spending,लागत) of external assistance cannot be substantial in such a limited period. The benefit of lower matching contribution for ‘Special Category States’ for CSS is unlikely to be substantial with the reduction of assistance to State plans by over 40 per cent to Rs.1,96,743 crore in 2015-16.

New criteria

Following the demand for Special Status by Bihar, a committee was appointed under Dr. Raghuram Rajan in 2013. This committee suggested that States classified as ‘Special Category States’ and those seeking inclusion in that category, would find that their need for funds and special attention more than adequately(enough,पर्याप्तता) met by a basic allocation to each State and the categorisation of some as ‘least developed’.

Furthermore, it is not politically feasible(possible,संभव) to consider special status to any new State as any such decision will result in demands from other States and dilute the benefits further. It is also not economically beneficial for States to seek special status as the benefits under the current dispensation are minimal. States facing special problems will be better off seeking a special package.

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Of contamination and cover-ups

Thirty years after the Bhopal disaster, the recent upsurge(flow,लहर) of interest in the Kodaikanal mercury pollution case has made one thing clear. Neither the central government nor any State government has done anything towards putting in place a policy for environmental remediation of contaminated(pollution,प्रदुषण) sites or rehabilitation of affected people. On the contrary(opposite,प्रतिकूल), the authorities have actively colluded(conspiracy,साठगाँठ) with the polluters to dilute(weak,कमज़ोर) environmental standards and frustrate efforts by communities to seek compensation.

Every time a factory pollutes a neighbourhood or exposes people to poisons, people have to fight a hostile(unfriendly,विरोधी) system that requires victims — mostly, indigent(poor,गरीब) people — to conclusively prove that they and the environment have been harmed. Arrayed against those affected by pollution stands a veritable army of scientific institutions, State and Central Pollution Control Boards, the Environment Ministry and the wealthy polluters with huge budgets to hire lawyers, and buy science and media space.

Toxic hotspots and affected people can be found across the country alongside polluting factories — be it the cancer corridor between Vapi and Bharuch in Gujarat, Jeedimetla in Andhra Pradesh, Udyogamandal near Kochi, the industrial estates in Mettur, Thoothukudi or Cuddalore in Tamil Nadu, or Singrauli and Bhopal in Madhya Pradesh. Successive governments have worked out elaborate policies to promote industrialisation, but none to address the inevitable(necessary,जरुरी) fallout of unregulated industrial activity.

Fourteen years after the 1984 gas leak, Union Carbide in 1998 dusted off a few shelves in its Bhopal factory, moved some toxic waste from the floor to sacks and drums, and handed over the site to the State government, claiming to have cleaned it up. But the factory site remains dangerously contaminated and continues to claim lives and maim(wound seriously,घायल) children. Now, activists are trying hard to uphold the ‘polluter pays’ principle to ask for a thorough clean-up of the site.

Lower standards

The case of Kodaikanal seems to be no different. Where public participation, good science and ‘polluter pays’ ought to be the legs on which any policy for remediation stands, in Kodaikanal, the Central and Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Boards (CPCB and TNPCB) have opted for secrecy, paid science and ‘public pays’ as the principles for environmental remediation following severe mercury contamination around Hindustan Unilever’s thermometer manufacturing factory.

Emboldened by the cooperation extended by state regulators, Unilever is insisting on a lower clean-up standard. In the U.K., Unilever’s home country, the site would have to be cleaned up to 1 mg/kg to be fit for residential purposes. In India, Unilever’s proposal is 20 mg/kg, a number that is 20 times more lax(loose,ढीला) than British standards, and 200 times more than naturally occurring background levels.

If the company’s numbers are to be believed, such a clean-up will leave more than a third of the mercury behind in the soil after the company hands over the ‘cleaned up’ site. But even these numbers are not credible.

After Unilever’s thermometer factory was shut down in March 2001, the company prepared a report that claimed to account for every kilogram of mercury used in 18 years of operation. The report explained that of the 125,676 kg of mercury imported, all but 559 kg could be accounted for, and that the latter figure was the loss to the environment. As per this figure, only 170 kg of mercury remained on site, mixed with soil and vegetation and subject to the proposed cleanup.

On the face of it, the mercury balance was perfect. But as ex-workers pointed out, Unilever had forgotten to include 10,810 kg of mercury purchased from Mumbai. Unfazed, Unilever’s consultant subsequently redid the report to account for the additional mercury.

Supreme Court ignored

Before environmental remediation, a detailed and independent assessment of the depth and spread of contamination is required. Despite requests from the public and directions by the Supreme Court Monitoring Committee (SCMC) urging(forcing,मजबूर करना) the TNPCB to independently assess contamination, the regulator has taken not a single soil sample in the last 14 years and Unilever’s report remains the basis for the clean-up.

A Local Area Committee formed by the TNPCB in 2004, with residents and ex-workers as members, had questioned this report as well as Unilever’s proposal to clean up the contaminated areas based on a Dutch residential standard of 10 mg mercury per kilogram of soil. They pointed out that as the site was located atop a forest, it should be cleaned up for targeted future use as a watershed and not merely as a residential area. In response, the TNPCB sidelined this ‘troublesome’ local committee. It has not been convened since 2005.

Instead of commissioning a study by itself, as directed by the SCMC, TNPCB allowed Unilever to engage the National Environment Engineering Institute (NEERI) directly to set the standards. Ironically(satirical,विडंबनापूर्वक), NEERI head and SCMC member Dr. Tapan Chakraborti, who had insisted on a clean-up standard of 2 mg/kg in May 2005, in a report submitted in 2007, backed Unilever’s case for a relaxed standard.

NEERI’s argument for diluting the standard is candid(blunt,clear,direct,स्पष्ठ): “The benefits likely to accrue(collect,जमा) out of stricter norms are to be compared against the additional cost [to Unilever] that may be incurred while undertaking such projects.” The proposed standards were geared to protect the financial health of Unilever.

If the writ of experts such as these is allowed to prevail, the Kodaikanal site will remain a significant reservoir(large supplier,भंडार) of mercury even after the clean-up, leaking deadly neuro and nephrotoxin into Kodaikanal’s lakes and the Pambar Shola watershed forests. These forests form the catchment area for southern Tamil Nadu’s lifeline, the river Vaigai.

Any policy for remediation of contaminated sites should be based on sound science. And science is sound only when scientists and their work are subject to public scrutiny(examine,जाँच). That is why activists and residents are calling for transparency and public participation as the only way to keep government bodies and experts from toeing the corporate line.

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The new Great Game in Asia

Two strategic agreements currently being negotiated by the world’s trading giants(big,बड़ा) will likely determine the global balance of economic power for years to come: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The TPP and RCEP are not radically different instruments — they are both free trade agreements (FTAs) designed to lower tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade between countries that conduct the bulk of global commerce.

The TPP negotiations are led by the U.S. and involve 11 other nations that share a Pacific Ocean coastline. Seven of those countries — Australia, Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Vietnam — are also party to RCEP negotiations. RCEP comprises the ASEAN nations and six others: India, China, Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand. In addition to trade in goods and services, both agreements cover the critical area of intellectual property rights. RCEP is the more modest of the two, seeking to implement and build on World Trade Organization (WTO) commitments incrementally.

Committing beyond WTO

TPP seeks to frame a new agenda for global trade, requiring countries to commit beyond their existing multilateral obligations under the WTO as well as the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TPP negotiations broke down earlier this month, after countries were unable to find common ground over IPR protections the U.S. sought to introduce, especially in cyberspace.

In contrast, RCEP negotiations have seen progress, albeit(even though,यद्यपि) haltingly(crippled,लड़खड़ाते हुए). The Press Trust of India reported last week that ministerial delegations from RCEP member countries will meet in Malaysia in August to “finalise modalities”. RCEP is an important agreement for India, as it involves many, if not all, of the country’s major trading partners.

Their basic nature aside, both agreements reflect a competing political dynamic. The Trans-Pacific Partnership has become the centrepiece of U.S.’s Asia policy, with the Barack Obama-led administration investing considerable political and diplomatic capital in it.

Revealingly, Singapore’s Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam, in his visit to the U.S. in June, also agreed that the TPP had little to do with economics and Singapore was pushing it — although it had a free trade agreement with the U.S. — for strategic reasons.

RCEP is not a China-led process, but involves Beijing as a key player. China is acutely(sharply,तेज़ी से) conscious of RCEP’s political significance — earlier this year, Commerce Minister Gao Hucheng suggested China will “continue to unswervingly(direct,सीधे) push forward and quicken the pace of China’s free-trade agreement strategy”. If such a comprehensive regional agreement were to be inked ahead of the TPP regime(rule,शाशन), it would be a shot in the arm for China.

The RCEP story would underline three crucial conclusions: first, that China is willing to engage actors within a pluri-lateral setting, and set aside competing political interests, especially around South China Sea concerns, for overall economic gain. Second, that Beijing leadership is capable of absorbing multilateral instruments into domestic law to secure regional interests even if it goes against established economic policies, especially on IPRs; third, and most important, China is comfortable with conceiving(look upon,सोचना) and implementing international norms while it emerges as a hegemon in the Asia-Pacific. These conclusions, if affirmed, would signal a decisive(crucial,निर्णायक) shift in the regional locus of power from the U.S. to China.

What does this political narrative mean for India, with its renewed ambition to ‘Act East’? Regrettably, the discussion around FTAs and mega-regional agreements in India has focused solely on their economic aspects, with scant(less,कम) attention paid to the underlying strategic dimensions. The TPP has invited reflexive criticism for ‘rewriting’ rules of global trade.

As highlighted in the infographic, the RCEP is different, but no smooth ride either. Keen to protect their digital economies, Japan and South Korea have sought strong IPR protection measures. India, meanwhile, has dug its heels in, suggesting it would not budge from the bare minimum that is required for TRIPS compliance. This is a commendable position to take but does not serve any strategic purpose. Indian government is yet to articulate(express clearly,सुस्पष्ठ कहना) a strategic vision for the Asia-Pacific region that combines economic and political interests.

On the foreign policy front, it has moved closer to the U.S., but wants to remain invested in RCEP. At the same time, it does not want to be seen as being too close to China, whose IPR and cyber policies leave a lot to be desired. If this reflected a “multi-alignment” policy, India’s negotiating line in RCEP would have been calibrated(fine tune,नापा हुआ) to respond to specific concerns from across the table, but the draft text does not seriously evaluate whether domestic IPR policy can accommodate RCEP provisions.

IPR protection in cyberspace, as highlighted through the infographic, is one of the most important themes — and a major source of disagreement — in both TPP and RCEP. TPP provisions would require a major restructuring of India’s IP enforcement framework, and may not be immediately feasible(possible,संभव). But Japan’s prescriptions suggest that it is possible for India to find a middle ground in RCEP. Many of Japan’s concerns relate to legal standards — how Internet applications should be classified, the nature of procedural guidelines on intermediary liability, the scope of technology protection measures, and the range of penalties imposed.

Case-by-case interpretation

These concerns are already accounted for in Indian law. With some creative diplomacy, New Delhi could propose treaty language that resonates(understand,समझना) strongly with the Indian position. Enforcement of IPR claims is anyway conducted bilaterally, which allows the Indian government to interpret RCEP provisions on a case-to-case basis.

To be sure, Indian negotiators have acknowledged the strategic importance of RCEP. Last year, the Commerce Minister Nirmala Sitharaman rightly suggested RCEP negotiations must move from a “narrow, bilateral benefit” paradigm to a “balanced, regional benefit” model. India’s negotiating position, which currently speaks to no one in particular, must reflect this reality.

Even if India were to successfully navigate its way through RCEP, larger questions remain. By hitching its wagon to RCEP, is India tipping its hat to China’s primacy in the region? Why is India not part of TPP negotiations, even if as an observer? Joining the TPP club may be political anathema(curse,अभिशाप), but India’s policymakers would do well to learn from Chile, a TPP negotiator, which has successfully resisted several U.S. changes to the draft treaty text. Chile’s IPR laws in particular are in sharp contrast with the U.S. position, but that has not deterred its leadership from actively pursuing negotiations. After all, if you’re not on the table, then you’re on the menu.

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A reductive reading of Santhara

Courts, as institutions of interpretation, intrigue(plot something harmful,षड्यंत्र) citizens, and often awe(surprise,विस्मय) them. The dignity of their ritual, the imprimatur(formal approval,अनुमति) of the official, the detailed litany of textual interpretations before a judgment is arrived at, are often impressive. Judgments often have the moral gravitas and the narrative power of a novel. Yet, a badly done judgment, even if it appeals to the secular mind, lacks conviction. One felt that about the judgments around nuclear energy; equally, one senses these limits in the judicial reading of Santhara.

I refer to the Rajasthan High Court’s verdict against Santhara, or the centuries-old Jain practice of voluntarily starving to death. On August 10, 2015, the court’s Jaipur Bench ruled on a public-interest litigation (PIL) filed in May 2006 against the practice. It held that Santhara would henceforth be treated as “suicide” and accordingly made punishable under the relevant sections — Section 309 (attempt to commit suicide) and Section 306 (abetment(दुरुत्साहन) of suicide) — of the Indian Penal Code. It made its absolute rejection of the Jain philosophy underlying the practice unequivocally clear. An appeal challenging the order has now been filed in the Supreme Court.

A way of life

The word Santhara means a way of life and encompasses a way of dying as well. In Jainism, the body is seen as a temporary residence for the soul which is reborn. One must remember that a word can embrace a multiplicity of worlds and meanings. As a result, translation is one of the most difficult of acts. It demands a delicacy(slightness,बारीकी) of understanding about words which, in their consequences(result,परिणाम), can be lethal(deadly,घातक). Equivalences are welcome when we seek unity but we need a unity that can sustain the multiple senses of difference.

The critical word here is suicide. One is almost tempted to be facetious(joke,मजाकिया). I remember that moment of epiphany in the film Sholay when actor Dharmendra, as the character Veeru, standing up on a water tower, tells Basanti (played by Hema Malini) that he will commit suicide. An old man in the crowd asks: “what is suicide?” The answer is profoundly wise. It says when Englishmen kill themselves, the act is called ‘suicide’.

I was struck by this scene as I read the High Court judgment on suicide in the case of Nikhil Soni vs. Union of India. There was an element of irony(satire,विडम्बना) to it. The scene in Sholay is straight from the 1969 classic, “The Secret of Santa Vittoria” and yet, in the very moment of mimicry, the movie emphasises the essential drama of difference. The court judgment, while playing with the cultures of difference, eventually succumbs(give up,झुक जाना) to a reductive act which is textually disappointing.

There are critical nuggets(piece of info,अंश) of information in the initial pages. It claims that the Jain attitude to the body is different from the Christian attitude to the body and that Santhara is a ritual farewell to the body; it is an act of non-violence performed as an ethical act. The court hints that for the petitioners, Santhara cannot be suicide. The etymology(history of a word,शब्द उत्पत्ति) and the cosmologies are radically different.

The English word ‘suicide’ means a deliberate killing of oneself. The Etymology Dictionary cites(mentioned,उल्लेख) W.E.H. Lecky, in a History of European Morals where he writes of the stigma(symbol of disgrace,कलंक) attached to suicide. He claims that even in 1749, “a suicide named Portier was dragged through the streets of Paris with his face to the ground, hung from the gallows by his feet and then thrown into the sewers.” Right from its origins up to the French Revolution, suicide was a mark of stigma of criminality and pollution.

Different narrative

Santhara encapsulates a different narrative. It is a ritual act of purification, done in consultation with a guru, and follows the most detailed of procedures. It cannot be an impulsive act or an egoistic one. It bears the imprimatur of theology and the approval of society.

As India became colonised, many Indian rituals came under the critical Anglo-Saxon lens, and translation and interpretation became a critical part of legal exegesis(explanation,व्याख्या). Is Santhara a giving up of life or of taking death in one’s stride? For a culture that believes in rebirth, is Santhara philosophically or ethically suicide? The frame widens as the drama becomes sociological because then there will have to be a differentiation made between sati, suicide and Santara.

French sociologist Emile Durkheim, in his Suicide, a groundbreaking book in the field of sociology, basically made a differentiation between three forms of suicide — the anomique, the egoistic and the altruistic(kind,उदार) genres of suicide (based on the personalities of people). Anomie is a state of normlessness of rootlessness where an individual commits suicide because nothing binds him. It is associated with social disorganisation and imbalance and Durkheim has tried to illustrate this by giving examples from economic life. Egoistic suicide occurs when the individual feels full of himself. These are suicides committed by persons who are self-centred and to whom self-regard is the highest regard. In altruistic suicide, a person sacrifices himself. It is a form of sacrifice in which a person puts an end to his life by some heroic means in order to promote or further the interest of the cause or idea dear to him. In a sociological sense, altruistic suicide comes closest to Santhara. It is a ritual of giving up the body in times of old age, famine or catastrophe(disaster,प्रलय) or when an individual feels the need to be closer to cosmic cycles.

As one looks at the colonial interpretation, the critique of sati, where a woman sacrifices herself for her husband, brought condemnation. Santhara was read in a different way as an act of non-violence tuned to the deepest norms of Jain culture.

Language and interpretation

Experts cited indicate that it adds a dignity to dying, where death is in continuum with rebirth. Shekhar Hattangadi, a Mumbai-based professor of constitutional law, has sought to outline some of these conflicts(battle,विवाद) in his award-winning documentary, Santhara: A Challenge to Indian Secularism? But one cannot reduce it to an encounter with colonialism. To place it in the alleged opposition of religion and secularism fails to read it as a failure of language. There is a flatness, a narrowness to the English language which even the presence of James Joyce, William Blake, Gerard Manley Hopkins and Shakespeare could not contain. For example, the word ‘corruption’ lacks the multiple senses and the flair of society which invents words like upari, dakshina, seva for a bribe. Santhara is a multivalent term which cannot be reduced to the dreariness of suicide as closure or a termination. The English term cannot comprehend Santhara in terms of being a ritual exit and a rite of passage to a different world. Santhara, performed correctly, is ritual non-violence. In fact, I would feel that the court’s judgment misinterprets both the word and world.

There are doubts about Santhara. Witnesses claim that families whose reputations are at stake often refuse to let a person change his mind. There is an aspirational aspect as families of the individual who wishes to observe Santhara get respect and status, so they often tend to advertise the act. Here, Santara is often presented as sati. Its voluntariness is forgotten.

The court had to make a differentiation between Santhara and euthanasia(mercy killing,इच्छा मृत्यु), sati and suicide. It has made brief and superficial attempts to do so. And in this abortive(unsuccessful,असफल) act of comparative sociology, the ritual dignity of Santara has been lost. In the confusion between the literal and the symbol, between a construction of fact and celebration, the meaning is lost.

A narrow view

The court — after its abbreviated move through philosophy, ethics, language and law — has reduced the whole to one narrow issue, namely the test of essentiality. It asks where Santhara is an essential tenet(religious belief,सिद्धान्त) of Jainism and declares that it is not. Such a litmus test might work in textbook chemistry but it fails to work in the contextuality and polysemy of culture. The court could have been strict about aberrations or deviations from Santhara but to reduce the ritual act to suicide amounts to an exhibition of illiteracy. The court seems more worried about the debates on euthanasia and sati than about looking at Santhara as a cultural practice with its own repertoire of meanings.

The court claims that some rights can encompass their opposite. The freedom of speech does not compel one to speak. Yet, a right to life does not include the right to die under certain circumstances. Ethics and religion loose out to the wooden definitions of Santhara, which, as a ritual, has qualities of a controlled experiment. The court has held that extinguishing life, sacrificing it or effacing it cannot be considered as acts of dignity. A right to die cannot be a part of a right to life. In constructing such a judgment, the court’s ethno-centricity becomes obvious. It enshrines a piece of Christian theology and Anglo-Saxon law in its response to the logic of Santhara. Eventually, the judgment creates a monologic sense of life and a standardised sense of what death and dying is. In fact, it has missed an opportunity to look at life and death and the ethics of dignity and dying in a creative way. In creating such a standardised theology, the fact of justice becomes secondary. This has wider implications because words in one culture cannot lose their meaning in translation. Language and justice die or are diminished(Lessen,कम) when language is deprived of its right to polysemy and to a multiplicity of meaning. When language is rendered(provide,प्रस्तुत) captive, justice loses out in the long run.

The aridity(dry,सुखा) of a reductive secularism often comes out in displays of language. In fact, translation becomes a test of justice. This is the epic tragedy of the Santhara judgment. It conveys the fact that nation states that can inflict and adjudicate(judge,निर्णय) death, often feel lost in the complexity of the phenomenon.

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