A lesson in hidden agendas

The public education system (PES) has for long been under fire. It is being painted as non-functioning, wasteful and un-improvable. The Right to Education Act (RTE) was designed to improve this system. Therefore, it is natural that the RTE will also come under fire from the same quarters that have been attacking the PES. The PES and RTE do have problems, and they need to be fixed; we need to find a way to make the system deliver in terms of better learning outcomes.

However, all the attacks which arise from private schools, their supporters and the privatisation lobby are unjustified; and the solutions that are being aggressively pushed will lead us further into the morass[mu'ras(mire,दलदल)].

The original fiction

A lie is being perpetrated[pur-pu,treyt(perform,करना)] through sheer[sheer(absolute,पूरा)] force of repetition that learning is better in so-called low-cost private schools. There are some studies that claim that private schools outperform public schools; while others claim that after adjusting for family and socio-economic background of the children, the difference is not statistically significant. Amita Chudgar and Elizabeth Quin claim that they “find insufficient evidence to claim that children in private schools outperform those in public schools in India… better data are needed” (“Relationship between Private Schooling and Achievement: Results from Rural and Urban India”, Economics of Education Review, 2012). In spite of many studies conducted more or less with the express purpose of establishing that low-fee private schools do better, there is no reliable evidence to support that claim. However, there is evidence that students in private “schools are less likely to belong to low caste groups” (Sangeeta Goyal and Priyanka Pandey, “How do Government and Private Schools Differ”, EPW, 2012), which means that they are less inclusive. Therefore, the repeated claims of better learning in private schools are unfounded.

When it became difficult to empirically[em'pi-ri-k(u-)lee(experimental,अनुभवजन्य)] prove that children learn better in private schools, the attack invented a new weapon: per unit cost of learning outcomes. Most of the learning outcome researches almost always fail to understand the entire purport of education in any depth and reduce it to learning of so-called 3Rs for economic purposes. The new claim that emerged out of misplaced confidence that all that is in education can be quantified is that the ‘per unit cost of outcome’ is lower in private schools. Meaning that even if the learning outcomes of private schools are not better than the public schools, the cost of running private schools is much lower.

This argument is completely spurious[spyûr-ee-us(false,गलत)] and shows very little understanding of education. The costs quoted for private schools, one, have no reliable source of data and, two, they discount two kinds of hidden costs — to the family and to the nation. Often the cost of education in private schools is equated with the fee per child. This is obviously wrong as the cost of school uniform, books and stationery, and transport, which all are under the monopoly of the school, are not included. Occasionally private schools want additional money for special occasions like festivals, picnics, excursions[ik'skur-zhun(outing,सैर)] and projects. And they often recommend tuition for the children. None of this is counted in this cost calculation. However, the family bears this burden and these items add significantly to the revenue of private schools.

Teacher status

Second, the low-cost private schools often run in grossly inadequate[in'a-di-kwut(insufficient,अपर्याप्त)] infrastructure. The teachers are paid less than minimum unskilled labour wages legislated by various State governments. This has a devastating[de-vu,stey-ting(disrespectful,अनादर)] effect on teacher status in the society, on teacher knowledge in the education system and schools become dens of exploitation. The children see all this and imbibe[im'bIb(absorb,सोखना)] attitudes that are self-centred, competition-oriented, and start thinking that ethics is a hindrance[hin-drun(t)s(problem,बाधा)] in the success of a business. Therefore, the nation pays in terms of lowered teacher status and professional knowledge, abandoning[u'ban-dun(leave,छोड़ना)] a section of its citizens to exploitation, and possibly unhealthy attitudes in its future citizens.

Of course, one can argue that the PES is no better in transmitting attitudes to the children. But PES conceptually can be better if managed well; while the private system has it in its DNA as it has to make profit on fees. For low-end private schools to do better on this count is impossible even in theory. Therefore, lower comparative cost of learning is also a bogus claim.

Associated fiction: school closure

To add to the force of two spurious argument mentioned above a new falsehood is being spread: that the low-cost private schools are closing due to implementation of the RTE. The RTE norms of infrastructure, children per teacher, teacher qualifications and teacher remunerations, all are just minimum to run a decent school. Stipulation of a room for every class, toilets and a boundary wall for safety can hardly be called unnecessary demands. Nor can stipulation of trained teachers and minimum salary stipulated by the state be called unreasonable. If schools which do not have classroom, do not have trained teachers, do not have toilets and drinking water and do not pay even the minimum wages to their teachers close down, why should it be blamed on the RTE? Actually, they have no right to run. Would we justify closure of primary health centres for inefficient functioning and allow quack[kwak(unqualified,अशिक्षित)] doctors? If no, why should we accept these schools? Further, the claim that private schools are being closed down due to RTE is false. Recently the Azim Premji Foundation conducted a study in 69 districts across seven States and one Union Territory and found that across these districts only five schools were closed due to non-compliance of the RTE and notices for compliance had been served to 7,156 schools. It seems the data being used to propagate[pró-pu,geyt(spread,फैलाना)] this canard[ka,naad(misleading information,अफवाह)] of closure are unreliable, or worse.

Pushing false remedies

The remedy suggested for the low learning levels in the PES is to encourage the private sector. Simply put, that means provide public money to the private profiteer either though the vouchers or by facilitating their compliance with the RTE norms. The vouchers are seen as the ticket to quality education as the parents can decide to take their children to any private school they like. There is no evidence the world over of vouchers improving learning of children. In reality it is a demand for letting the market regulate schools. The market is not a just god, it favours big money; and competition raising quality is a myth. Teacher education in our country is almost entirely in the hands of the private colleges. And we all know that it has completely ruined teacher education and all attempts to improve it so far have failed.

The proponents of the voucher system forget that freedom of choice requires informed decision-making. And that is possible only when the system is fair and provides space for it. The system is not fair. Poor parents do not have adequate information about schools, and that information cannot be reliably and systematically provided. Their judgment can be easily swayed by false propaganda, as is being done right now across the country.

The strength of these canards is not their truth, but the underperformance of and resultant dissatisfaction with the system. The RTE is not being implemented either efficiently or fairly, efforts are half-hearted at best. Governments have diluted it and are uninterested in making the private schools comply with it. It was constructed to provide better schools to the poor. But they have made provisions to spare themselves. Similar treatment is meted out[meetd awt(give,देना)] to almost every legislation in our country. The laws against dowry, domestic violence and atrocities[u'tró-si-tee(inhumanity,अत्याचार)] on Dalits are also not being implemented efficiently and fairly. That does not constitute an argument either to repeal or to dilute those laws. The issue of quality of education can be easily fixed in the RTE. It was assumed that since the States are responsible for curriculum details beyond the National Curriculum Framework, and administration and financing of education is under their purview, they would be better placed to make guidelines on these issues. They failed to meet the challenge. Therefore, perhaps there is a case to introduce some clauses on ensuring learning standards.

However, this is the fault of implementation and not of the Act. Dr. Ambedkar made a telling comment at the time of adopting the Constitution that “however good a Constitution may be, it is sure to turn out bad because those who are called to work it, happen to be a bad lot.” What applies to a Constitution applies to laws made under it. Changing the law will not improve the bad lot that is implementing it. It requires a proactive civil society to take them to court and get public support to implement it properly — not to, as advised, junk it.

The tirade[tI'reyd(condemn,निंदा)] against the PES and RTE is a classic case of giving the dog a bad name with intention to kill it, so that a wolf of their choice could replace it in the name of guarding the house.

Courtesy:the hindu

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Be bold at the Nuclear Summit

Next week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be in Washington, DC for the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), the fourth and the last in a series that was launched by U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington in 2010. Follow-on summits have been held in Seoul and The Hague in 2012 and 2014, respectively. India has played an active role in the process with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attending the first two summits. A voluntary contribution of a million dollars to the Nuclear Security Fund has been made. More significant has been the initiative for establishment of a Global Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Energy Partnership, which has already conducted more than a dozen national and international courses in relevant fields.

A natural role

India’s profile in the NSS process is natural given our concerns about global terrorism and the growing threat posed by terrorists seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Since 2002, India has been introducing a resolution on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the United Nations General Assembly, adopted by consensus[kun'sen-sus(agreement,सहमति)] every year. It laid the groundwork for the legally binding Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in 2005. Therefore when President Obama highlighted this threat in his famous Prague speech in 2009 and called upon the international community to ensure the securing of all vulnerable[vúl-nu-ru-bul(weak,कमज़ोर)] nuclear materials within four years, a positive Indian response was natural.

There is another reason too. Nuclear power today constitutes a small part in India’s electricity generation, but this is due to change. Currently, the twenty nuclear power plants in operation have a capacity of 4.8 GW, out of a total installed power generation capacity of 240 GW. A quarter of India’s population does not have access to electricity and energy poverty has been identified as a major obstacle to economic growth. The Integrated Energy Policy visualises the installed capacity rising to 1200 GW by 2035, with nuclear power contributing 60 GW. This will be 5 per cent, but it is critical in terms of reducing fossil fuel dependence and mitigating[mi-ti,geyt(lessen,कमी)] the carbon footprint. Any breach in nuclear safety or security that could undermine public confidence in nuclear energy would have grave repercussions[ree-pu'kú-shun(indirect result,अप्रत्यक्ष परिणाम)] on India’s long-term energy planning. For India, therefore, nuclear security is not a new objective, but has always been a priority along with nuclear safety.

Threat of nuclear terrorism

With the emergence of global jihadi threats like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, nuclear security has taken on additional urgency. Three potential nuclear terrorist threats have been identified. First is the threat of terrorists making or acquiring a nuclear bomb and exploding it; second is the possibility of sabotaging[sa-bu,taazh(destroy,नष्ट)] an existing nuclear facility to create an accident; and finally, third is the possibility of use of radioactive material to create a ‘dirty bomb’ or a radiological dispersal device.

The last is often considered the easiest for a suicide squad, given the fact that there are millions of medical devices and other equipment that contain small amounts of radioactive substances (cobalt-60, americium-241, caesium-137) which are widely distributed and do not have the kind of security normally associated with nuclear reactor facilities. Irrespective of the number of fatalities, a dirty bomb can create widespread panic and cost billions in cleaning-up operations. Insider support by a radicalised sympathiser could render[ren-du(give,देना)] a nuclear facility vulnerable to sabotage. It is well established that in the past al-Qaeda has not only considered and pursued all the three options, but also had access to nuclear expertise. Al-Qaeda may have been weakened today but the IS is also known to harbour similar ambitions.

Often there is some confusion in India about our role because nuclear security is neither nuclear disarmament nor non-proliferation, nor is it nuclear safety. This leads some to downplay its significance or suspect that it is a ploy to constrain India’s nuclear programme. Neither perception is correct; in fact, as a responsible nuclear weapon state, it is incumbent[in'kúm-bunt(duty,कर्तव्य)] on India to ensure that all nuclear materials and facilities (both civilian and military) are subjected to the highest levels of security. Simply put, it would cover preventing unauthorised access to nuclear materials, facilities and technologies; timely detection, were a breach to take place; and finally, effective responses to such acts of terror and sabotage.

Barack Obama’s initiative

President Obama’s initiative relied heavily on his personal outreach to other leaders. Next week, leaders from over fifty countries will be in Washington. Two countries not invited are Iran and DPRK, and this time President Putin will also stay away though this has more to do with differences over Ukraine than over nuclear security. Rather than attempt to negotiate a new treaty, the NSS process has focussed on urging[ur-jing(encourage,उकसाना)] states to tighten national laws, rules and capabilities by using best practices and international cooperation. Establishing global centres of excellence (like the one in India), launching the Nuclear Security Fund, and expanding the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres are some of the outcomes.

In concrete terms, about 15 MT of highly enriched uranium (HEU) have been down- blended to low-enriched uranium, a number of reactors using HEU have either been shut down or switched their fuel, 12 countries have given up all HEU, and fuel repatriation to source countries has been accelerated. The biggest achievement has been that the somewhat technical subject of nuclear security has received sustained high-level political attention. However the major drawback of this process is that there is no legally binding outcome at the end of six years.

The big subject for discussion in Washington will be about sustaining the process and political engagement. Since there is no new organisation being set up, three existing institutions are expected to adopt specific action plans. The UN will sustain the political momentum and continue to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1540; the IAEA will strengthen its database of cases of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and a Contact Group will be set up in Vienna for follow-up which would include a ministerial-level conference, possibly every two years; and Interpol will act as the nodal agency to deter nuclear smuggling. In addition, the U.S. and Russia will continue to co-chair the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which is a voluntary grouping of 86 states with working groups on nuclear detection, forensics and mitigation. A G-8 Global Partnership to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction has been another initiative but clearly what G-8 or GICNT can achieve will depend on political ups and downs between major powers.

An innovative diplomatic practice was the use of ‘house gifts’; in 2010, leaders were encouraged to announce measures to address nuclear security threats at a national or wider level. The concept evolved further to ‘gift baskets’, or joint undertakings by a group of like-minded countries that others were invited to join. Some gifts involved new commitments but some were recycled pledges.

Prime Minister Modi has carried forward the nuclear diplomatic agenda that was begun in 1998: to establish India as a responsible weapon state and ensure its participation in civilian international nuclear trade and cooperation. Shortly after the NDA came to power in 2014, India completed its procedures for adherence[ad'heer-un(t)s(following,समर्थन)] to IAEA’s Amended Protocol, and last month announced ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage which had been part of the understanding reached on nuclear liability issues during President Obama’s visit in January 2015.

Mr. Modi’s ‘house gift’

Given that Prime Minister Modi will be attending the NSS for the first time, it is likely that he will carry a ‘house gift’ for his ‘good friend Barack’s farewell diplomatic banquet. There is merit in adhering to undertakings relating to the ‘Centres of Excellence’ and tightening measures to prevent nuclear smuggling. An additional financial contribution to the Fund to be disbursed over a period of time, subject to defined benchmarks being met, is worth considering. Since nuclear weapons and nuclear technology are here to stay, we should call for shifting the focus from insecure materials and facilities to research in proliferation- resistant technologies. The Indian Centre of Excellence could take the lead in this and encourage work on new reactor designs and use of the closed fuel cycle. Before 1998, when India would be seeking to safeguard its ‘nuclear option’, India’s nuclear diplomacy had to be more complicated and cautious; today, given the distance travelled, Prime Minister Modi is well placed to pursue his nuclear diplomacy with a far greater sense of confidence and purpose.

Courtesy:the hindu

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On paper, electrified villages — in reality, darkness

Haldu Khata, a village in Bijnor district of Uttar Pradesh, is one of the 7,008 villages that the government claims to have “electrified” in the last year, under the Modi government’s flagship scheme of rural electrification, Deendayal Upadhyaya Gram Jyoti Yojana. However, according to the government’s own field engineers, there is no electrical infrastructure in the village. Similarly, Dimatala in Assam, Kadam Jheriya in Chhattisgarh, Buknari in Bihar and Sunwara in Madhya Pradesh are misclassified as electrified villages in government books. These are not exceptional cases. The Hindu’s analysis of rural electrification data shows that the number of villages said to be electrified in the last year is exaggerated[ig'za-ju,rey-tid(overstated,बढ़ा चढा कर कहना)].

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his Independence Day speech of 2015, had announced that all remaining villages would be electrified within 1,000 days. As of April 1, 2015, according to government numbers, 18,452 Indian villages were still un-electrified. Note that a village is considered electrified if public places in the village and 10 per cent of its households have access to electricity.

To make the process pellucid[pu'loo-sid(transparent,पारदर्शी)], real-time data on villages being electrified has been made available to the public through a mobile app and a Web dashboard called GARV. The platform was launched in October 2015. Alongside, 309 Gram Vidyut Abhiyantas (GVAs) were deployed by the government to monitor the electrification process and enter the data on the GARV application.

Discrepancies galore

One major source of discrepancy[di'skre-pun-see(difference,असंगति)] is regarding those villages where the GVA has noted that the village is un-electrified, yet it is counted as electrified on the app. The Hindu was able to spot over 30 such villages on the app after scanning through GVAs’ comments. When this discrepancy was pointed out, a senior official of the Rural Electrification Corporation (REC), the nodal agency for rural electrification which functions under the aegis of the Ministry of Power, said: “We put a lot of emphasis on photos. If there is a pole and distribution line visible in the photos, we call it electrified.” This perhaps could be one of the reasons leading to the inflated number, as the presence of electrical infrastructure doesn’t automatically translate into electrification.

A GVA from Pagara Buzurg village in Neemuch district of Madhya Pradesh told The Hindu that the contractor did set up power lines in the village but they were stolen before they could be charged, and now there is no electricity in the village. Neither does a conductor exist there. For Birni village in Giridih, Jharkhand, the GVA remarks: “Work not started. Village located in remote location. No roads to reach. Situated on mountains..naxalite affected area (sic).” Both villages are counted as electrified villages.

Conversations with GVAs reflect the gap between official data and ground realities. The Hindu found 342 villages where the status marked by the GVA was ‘e0’, which means un-electrified (‘ee’ and ‘en’ mean electrified). And yet, in the ‘overall’ category, all of these villages have been marked as electrified.

Further, as of March 10, 2016, for around 300 villages, the status said: “Village declared electrified by discom [power distribution company]. GVA yet to visit the village for verification.” This indicates that villages have been declared as electrified without waiting for the government’s own representative’s verification, rendering[ren-d(u-)ring(interpretation,व्याख्या)] the monitoring system redundant[ri'dún-dunt(unnecessary,अनावश्यक)] . For many others, a pattern is observed where the date of electrification is way before the first visit made by GVA. And further, if the GVA marks it as un-electrified after visiting, the status is not updated from ‘electrified’ to ‘un-electrified’.

Another concern is that uninhabited[ún-in'ha-bi-tid(unpopulated,निर्जन)] villages have been marked as electrified. The villages Panalomali, Kusadangar, Patyetapali in Odisha and Sunwara in Madhya Pradesh — all counted as electrified villages — have no people residing there. Reading comments in the application, more such villages were found by The Hindu, such as Akbarpur in Muzaffarnagar district of Uttar Pradesh, which is a forest area.

Statistical jugglery

Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley in his Budget speech of 2016 said that the number of villages electrified in the last year was more than the combined number in the past three years. This claim may not be true, as The Hindu found that of the 7,000-plus villages said to be electrified last year, 3,604 villages were assigned the status, “Village found electrified during the survey.” This means that these villages were found electrified when GVAs first visited there. The REC official explained, “It is difficult to say when the work was done as the GVA visits started in October 2015. It could have happened after April 2015 (when the list of un-electrified villages was prepared in consultation with State governments), maybe two years ago or even earlier.” Conversations with GVAs and comments from the dashboard indicate that perhaps even the list of un-electrified villages was an overestimate. For instance, Changlang (Arunachal Pradesh) was electrified in 2001, Farbandhia Kahar (Assam) in 2012 and Mahdaili (Bihar) in 2013. But they were shown as un-electrified on the April 2015 list. It is also worth noting that work is ongoing even in villages declared as electrified; called “intensive electrification”, this aims to cover all households and not just 10 per cent.

A detailed questionnaire mailed to the REC on March 19 seeking its official response went unanswered.

The count of villages being electrified, ticking upward every day in the GARV application — extensively shared by Union Power Minister Piyush Goyal on social media and cited by Prime Minister Modi in his speeches — is thus not a guarantee that all villages being claimed as electrified are actually so.

Courtesy:the hindu

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Milestones on Beijing’s OBOR plan

In tune with its economic rise, China has taken a conscious decision to cement its place as a “great power” on the global stage. Chinese aspirations have followed the careful crafting of a “grand strategy” designed to best ensure Beijing’s peaceful rise. The core of this strategy is Eurasia and its instrumentality is the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative. With an economically dynamic China as its nucleus and in partnership with resource-rich Russia, Beijing has decided to knit the rest of Eurasia with roads, railways, cyber-connected hubs, smart cities, and industrial parks. With the financial reins of the initiative firmly in grasp through the $40-billion Silk Road fund and the 57-nation Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), China has begun the journey to generate “new growth engines” along all the flanks of the new Silk Road. So far, the European, Central Asian, and African integration with China is on a fast track.

Obstacles in Asia-Pacific
But the initiative is facing serious obstacles in the Asia-Pacific. The crises in the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, where the interests of China and the U.S. collide, are emblematic[em-blu'ma-tik(symbolic,प्रतीकात्मक)] of a tense geopolitical tug of war[túg-uv'wor(hard struggle,खींचातानी)] in the Pacific.

The Chinese are not the first to recognise Eurasia as the gateway to achieve global influence. In his 1904 seminal article to the Royal Geographical Society titled “The geographical pivot of history”, Halford John Mackinder zeroed in on the area from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic as the heartland of what he called the “World Island”. Those who ruled the heartland commanded the “World Island” comprising Asia, Europe and Africa.

Mackinder’s thesis has been forcefully amplified[amp-lu,fI(expand,बढ़ाना)] by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a powerful advocate of a globalist America and an influential figure in the Obama White House. In his book The Grand Chessboard, Mr. Brzezinski described Eurasia as “the centre of world power”, which the U.S. must not neglect despite the Soviet Union’s collapse.

While recognising the connection between Eurasia and global eminence, the Chinese are nevertheless scripting a differentiated, if not a unique, discourse. Instead of pursuing the blood and iron path of former colonial powers, they are trying to achieve a great power status through a cooperative and collegiate approach by combining financial and economic heft with eastern soft power attributes.

At a media conference marathon held earlier in March, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi laid bare Beijing’s approach to acquire pole position among modern nation states. “China has the confidence to find a path to great power status, different from the one followed by traditional powers,” he said. “How? It is different in that China will not play the bully. Rather, we will abide by[u'bIdby(follow,पालन)] the purposes and principles of the UN charter; and China will not engage in zero sum games. Rather we will pursue win-win cooperation with all the countries of the world.” Referring to the OBOR initiative, Mr. Wang stressed that President Xi Jinping’s pet project was an “open initiative” and not a form of “Monroe Doctrine” to expand Beijing’s dominance.

Growing ties with Europe

The OBOR initiative has provided China significant manoeuvring[mu'noo-vu(guide,संचालन)] space to permeate[spread,व्याप्त)] and shake up Europe’s post-war architecture premised on the U.S.-led Atlantic Alliance. The Chinese managed to draw Europe, which has been unable to extricate['ek-stru,keyt(untangle,सुलझाना)] itself from the pitfalls of the 2008 financial crisis, into the OBOR paradigm through the formation of the AIIB. Britain, defying exhortations[eg,zor'tey-shun(incitement,प्रोत्साहन)] from Washington, jumped onto the AIIB bandwagon, and others including Germany and France followed soon after. Cracks in the post-war alliance system, led by Washington, only widened after Australia, New Zealand and South Korea also signed up to the AIIB. It was therefore hardly surprising when Mr. Wang described China’s growing ties with Europe, amplified by Beijing’s membership of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as “the highlight of Chinese diplomacy in 2015” as well as a symbol of an emerging multipolar world.

As China begins its assertion in Eurasia, it is the Asian flank that remains the weakest link. It is in the Asia-Pacific that China confronts the U.S., which is reinforcing[ree-in'fors(strengthen,मजबूती)] six decades of “Pax Pacifica” through President Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” doctrine.

Consequently[kón-si-kwunt-lee(resultant,परिणामी)], the Chinese are engaged in feverish[fee-vu-rish(agitated,उत्तेजित)] diplomacy to undermine the Pivot, which is being reinforced by two vectors: the nuclear tensions in the Korean peninsula and the crisis in the South China Sea. On the Korean Peninsula, the Chinese are unequivocal in advocating denuclearisation, but also insist that Pyongyang’s nuclear disarmament must be tied up with the signing of a formal peace treaty between North and South Korea. If this happens, it would remove a major rationale for the U.S. Pivot. Simultaneously, a formal peace treaty could premise the rapid integration of the Korean peninsula in the OBOR initiative.

Significantly, the Chinese focus on denuclearisation follows two major outcomes of international diplomacy that have benefited Beijing. China fully backed Russia in disarming Syria of chemical weapons. This proved critical in averting a likely “regime change” in Damascus. The nuclear deal with Iran, in which both Russia and China played a major part, not only removed the chances of a military attack but also opened the door for Iran’s integration with the Eurasian core through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the OBOR initiative.

While competition for energy sources may play a small part, the South China Sea has become an open contest for the exercise of hegemony[hi'je-mu-nee(dominance,प्रभुत्व)] in the Asia-Pacific between the U.S. and China. Many fear that growing tensions will open the door of the Thucydides trap — a state of open war following a contest between an established and an emerging power.

In any case, as it reinforces its European flank through the powerful attraction of the OBOR initiative, China’s grand strategy of cooperative dominance over Eurasia faces its toughest test in Asia.

Courtesy:the hindu

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Building new alliances with BRICS

India’s assumption of the presidency of BRICS (the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping) last month comes at a time when many are questioning the group’s raison d’être[raisonsd'être(purpose,उद्देश्य)]. The economic health of the group is patchy[pa-chee(uneven,अपूर्ण)] and the contemporary political trajectories of its members are, to put it mildly, pulling in different directions.

The decision to form BRICS was based neither on the attractiveness of the economies of these countries nor on a cozy[kow-zee(comfortable,सुखद)] ideological confluence[kón-floo-un(t)s(meeting,संगम)]. To understand the need for this group to exist is to understand the need for flexibility mechanisms to achieve larger geo-economic goals. There is a need for New Delhi to take a long view on the purpose of BRICS and the space it creates for India within the contemporary international order.

Three expansive experiments

This order, as it exists today, is the result of three expansive post-World War II experiments. One was Pax Americana. It was built around the Washington Consensus[kun'sen-sus(agreement,सहमति)], the simultaneous expansion of U.S. military might and of military alliances like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation); the creation of institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, serving an Atlantic economic order; and finally the consequent[kón-si-kwunt(resultant,परिणामी)] expansion and consolidation[kun,só-li'dey-shun(integration,सुदृढ़ीकरण)] of markets and market-led globalisation that undermined and crushed the alternatives.

The second experiment was the creation of the European Union (EU). With a collective desire to avoid the war and destruction witnessed in the first half of the 20th century, Europe's leaders quickly realised that deeper economic integration and mutual interdependence was the best guarantor of regional stability. The European project was different from the American one. It saw no need to expand its military might, having already closely integrated its security interests with that of the U.S. It became a collective that was — as European leaders are wont to remind us in moments of crisis — primarily a convergence of shared values. Arguably, the greatest successes of the EU were its ability to be able to softly prise out Ukraine and other former satellites of the Soviet behemoth[bi'hee-muth(large,बड़ा)] from the Russian sphere of influence, and a renewed vision for Europe that went beyond “Mitteleuropa”. However, with the ongoing refugee crisis, growing entente[aan'taant(friendly alliance,स्नेहपूर्ण समझोता)] with China, and the inevitable[i'ne-vi-tu-bul(necessary,आवश्यक)] policy confusion that comes with being a monetary union without being a fiscal union, the European liberal project is seeking better days.

The third and most recent experiment is the emergence of the Chinese global play and the efforts to put together a new world order defined by state control and underwritten by state capitalism. China is also expanding its military might as it seeks to be a Pacific and Asian power. Through initiatives like the “One Belt, One Road”, it is vastly expanding its market access, and selectively drawing in countries that would simultaneously serve China’s strategic as well as economic interests. China is also creating new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), where India has significant stakes. However, the Chinese creation of new institutions is offset by its seemingly unyielding[ún'yeel-ding(stubborn,ज़िद्दी)] belief that the current rules-based global order is neither fair nor sacrosanct[sa-krow,sangkt(holy,अतिपवित्र)], and a new rule-framing moment is upon the world.

How BRICS lends heft

One may argue that India’s strategic interest must be in the continued existence of an open economic order and, as a rising power, liberal internationalism serves its interests best. Put differently, India could potentially (as its gross domestic product rises in the decades ahead) be the inheritor of the liberal international project for the very same realpolitik reasons as the U.S., and must seek to contribute to it through supporting institutions that serve it even as they cater to India’s national interests. But for this, it needs space within the old order to respond to its unique development and specific needs. It also needs to acquire weight within these institutions that would allow it to reshape the old establishment to work for new stakeholders and respond to contemporary realities. India cannot do this by itself. Given its fiscal and geopolitical constraints, it must engage with all stakeholders who could aid in this endeavour. India’s involvement with BRICS — and the NDB — should be read in this context.

Here, it is important to clarify what BRICS ultimately is: it is not a trading bloc or an economic union per se. Nor is it a political coalition — given the divergent geopolitical trajectories of each country. Brazil, India and South Africa broadly orient themselves towards the liberal end of the political spectrum, China pursues a trajectory that will, sooner than later, put it on a collision course with the U.S., even as it leverages the Atlantic economies in the medium term for its economic growth. And finally, Russia has once again begun to be perceived by NATO as an all-out threat, and not just a “frenemy”. From an Indian perspective, BRICS is a strategic geo-economic alliance that seeks to move the narrative emerging from the Bretton Woods institutions towards alternative models of development and governance — through the sheer[sheer(complete,नीरा)] weight of the incongruent collective. BRICS helps create new instruments for global relevance and influence for each of its members, and is itself one. Viewed through this prism, the development of BRICS institutions and the effectiveness of the NDB is what will define the success of the coalition in the coming years. For India, the success of the NDB and the AIIB may also ironically allow it a greater role in the institutions established in the middle of the last century.

BRICS should be an integral part of India’s grand strategy, and a vehicle in India’s journey from being a norm taker to a norm shaper. The bloc offers New Delhi greater bargaining space as India seeks to gain more prominence in institutions of global governance, and shape them in the liberal international tradition with a southern ethos. For instance, India trades more with the global South than the global North. It is the only member of BRICS that is likely to foster[fós-tu(nurture,बढ़ावा)] an open and rule-based economic architecture with the global South. It is uniquely poised to do so, thanks to New Delhi’s leadership role among the G77 and G33 groupings at the World Trade Organisation and the UN. Actions taken by India in its own developmental interests have the unintended consequence of strengthening the plurilateral economic agenda because it has scrupulously[skroop-yu-lus-lee(honestly,ईमानदारी से)] (on most occasions) adhered[ad'heer(follow,पालन)] to the norms of the Washington Consensus. BRICS gives India the room to continue being an important player in the liberal international order while being part of a group which, for the old guard, could potentially emerge as the single most important reason for its dramatic reform.

As with the AIIB, India should not hesitate to join or create other BRICS initiatives that may have strategic implications for global trade, finance, cyberspace, and the larger economic system. Indeed, the U.S. and other European powers should encourage it. Since it does not strive to create disruptive norms, India is the best bet that the international community has to “slingshot” past the illiberal impulses[im,púls(cheer,उमंग)] in geopolitics. The Atlantic powers need to recognise that India’s role within BRICS is a bulwark against such impulses, and encourage its leadership in similar plurilateral forums.

courtesy:the hindu

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