NGOs: the good, bad and the ugly

With Greenpeace and various non-profits under the scanner, it is time to revive the idea of an accreditation agency for the sector.
“In Sheraton hotels in scattered(disorder ,अस्त व्यस्त) nations, We damn(blamed,आलोचना करना) multinational corporations; Injustice seems so easy to protest,

The newest remix of Ross Coggins’ poem has come from none other than Prime Minister Narendra Modi, when he commented about “five-star activists” in an address early this month to the judiciary. The difference is, Ross Coggins was an insider who wrote a scathing(critical,आलोचनापूर्ण) satire on social service workers who travel from rich countries to save the developing world — “although we move with the better classes, / Our thoughts are always with the masses.” Mr. Modi, far from having any intention of guiding India’s non-profits or holding a mirror up to them, seems to have simply anointed himself as a rating agency for the voluntary sector. However, in the background of the heightened scrutiny(examine,जाँच) of NGOs, coming in the wake of the protests against nuclear power plants and mining operations, Mr. Modi’s jibe is more than just an outlier.

The uproar around NGOs today is an opportune moment for the government and the voluntary sector to work together to clean up their act. It is time to again broach the idea of a national accreditation agency for non-profits.  The erstwhile(past,पहले का) Planning Commission had built the groundwork for this in the National Policy on the Voluntary Sector 2007 and had come up with a set of guidelines set forth in the Eleventh and Twelfth Five Year Plans for the sector. Although the policies were not ultimately adopted, the directions were arrived at after extensive consultations with multiple stakeholders and they reflected a positive and collaborative spirit. Most importantly, they were founded in recognition of the nuances underlying the sector and the evolving dynamics of its relationship with society and with government.

The first move was to shelve the idea of importing rankings because the Indian voluntary sector is neither as single-purposed as erstwhile hotel industry nor as amenable to hierarchical gradation as the military, two spheres where ratings are dominant. The voluntary sector in India is diverse in purpose, nature and approach. As rating agencies would admit, standardised measurement methodologies for social sector organisations are still an emerging field and comparisons across sub-sectors would be bananas and limes, far less apples and oranges.

However, intermediary organisations such as rating agencies could definitely be beneficial in building a robust voluntary sector, where the link between performance and incentives is not always holy.

The experience of rating agencies across the world reveals that ratings (alphabets or stars) are helpful, especially to donors, in reducing transaction costs, while making investment decisions based on financial health, to check compliance of statutory norms, etc. This has been found to work especially well with certain sub-sectors such as commercial microfinance but not as well for agencies with multiple bottom-lines, intangible(which can not be touched,अस्पष्ठ) results, or whose primary purpose is to hold the state accountable. These are exactly the non-profit organisations about whom self-serving perceptions are formed and which are exploited, when needed, with a political vendetta. It was, therefore, rightly decided that ratings could not be a stand-alone solution to build credibility or assess non-profits.

Accreditation could work
The second move was to acknowledge that accreditation could be a win-win starting point and that mainstreaming this would be a logical step to take. Accreditation is the process of certifying voluntary organisations based on a set of agreed and codified norms, principles, standards and practices. Credibility Alliance, a network of voluntary organisations in India, has been a pioneer of this in India. There have been similar experiments nurtured by donors and consultancy agencies. Yet, accreditation of the NGO sector has not yet blossomed to its full potential, for it has remained outside the state’s engagement. All attempts have been voluntary and were born out of a self-regulatory spirit or donor interest, although the benefits in terms of public perception, investor confidence, and donor guidance are well documented.

It is in this context that a consensus(agreement,मतैक्य) was reached to set up an autonomous accreditation authority — National Accreditation Council of India or NACI — in 2012. However, it only progressed to the extent that a document was prepared by the Council for Advancement of People’s Action and Rural Technology (CAPART), a government body, whose existence itself was under the scanner.

During the multiple engagements between 2007 and 2014 between the Indian government and the voluntary sector on institutionalising accreditation, it was decided that NACI will need to be autonomous(free,स्वतन्त्र), have equal representation of both government and voluntary organisations, develop a methodology in consultation with the sector and, most importantly, respect the diversity of the sector in terms of size, location, nature and theme.

A certificate from NACI will still not be sufficient to avoid broad-brushing or selective marking of non-profits or activists. Yet, if the Prime Minister truly believes in building a credible voluntary sector, it is imperative to move ahead and revive the NACI idea. Without that, “five-star” will only mark the level of trust deficit between the present government and the voluntary sector.

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No frisson in talks over fission

The 2015 Review turban the Non Proliferation(The prevention of something increasing or spreading (especially the prevention of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons),परमाणु प्रसार निरोध) they protested that the Treaty is a process expected to be stormy and contentious(controversial,विवादपूर्ण) due to a new set of geopolitical drivers. Yet again, it could leave the dream of nuclear disarmament unattained and the purpose of preventing proliferation defeated
The 2015 Review of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will take place in New York from April 27 to May 22 and the process is expected to be stormy and contentious. The event marks some significant anniversaries of conflict(battle,विवाद): the 100th — of the use of chemical weapons in Ypres, Belgium; the 70th — of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; and the 20th — of the indefinite extension of the NPT. A new set of geopolitical drivers will work the agendas of nuclear and non-nuclear members of the Treaty.

Coming into force in 1970, the Treaty has been subjected to numerous(may,बहुत से) pulls and pressures which have left the dream of nuclear disarmament unattained and the purpose of preventing proliferation defeated. The last review, in 2010, followed the complete failure of the 2005 Review conference, as a consequence(result,परिणाम) of serious disagreements which had emerged over a decade. The desire of non-nuclear states to see better progress on disarmament by the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) will figure as before. The discourse on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons has given a new shape to the NPT debate.

Humanitarian impact

The NWS have not been enthused by either of these two concepts. Relations among the NWS after Russian actions in Ukraine will have a substantial impact on the conference. Moscow’s rhetoric(loud and confuse talk,अस्पष्ठ बातचीत) and responses have led to a rethink on the role and relevance of nuclear deterrence, even among the non-nuclear states of eastern Europe. As if this is not enough, the situation in West Asia will loom large since it involves the uncertainties of Iran, Israel, Syria and the Islamic State (IS) in particular and the rest of the Arab world in general. In comparison, the nuclear shenanigans of North Korea which were once viewed as a major global danger, would remain a marginal issue.

The NPT Review Conference in 2010 built a hard-fought consensus based on more than 60 action points spread over three broad areas. These three “pillars” were nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. West Asia figured large, which primarily meant finding a way to a nuclear-free zone, which in turn meant addressing the issue of Israel’s nuclear weapons. This has now been much muddied by Iran’s own nuclear programme which in turn could now be resolved if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between the P5+1 (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, and China, facilitated by the European Union) and Iran comes to fruition. Three preparatory committee (Prepcom) meetings have been held so far to prepare an agenda or work plan for the 2015 Review Conference next week. Reconciling the wide range of views of 190-member states has never been easy. Consequently, various consensus drafts have been attempted and what emerges as the agreed agenda for the conference remains to be seen. The three pillars are in themselves complex and intractable as examined hereon.

Discussing disarmament

Nuclear disarmament is possibly the easiest issue on the table, more so because there is no solution possible or even conceivable(thinkable,सोचनीय). As a result, a formulaic approach is likely to get used in which non-nuclear weapon states deplore the NWS’s lack of progress on reducing their arsenals and making good on promises made in the past. On their part, the NWS will reaffirm their commitment to disarmament, but point to the strategic security scenario to justify the incremental(additive,वृद्धि) and slow progress so far. This will be contested strongly at the conference. The discourse on the humanitarian dangers, from the use, deliberate or accidental, of nuclear weapons either by states or non-state actors, has gathered strength. This requires, from the NWS, greater transparency and tangible(sociable,real,छुने योग्य) steps on nuclear security. U.S. President Barack Obama has led the initiative on nuclear security through international conferences, which have yielded(give,स्वीकृत) more statements of intentions than specific actions. This will coalesce(mix,मिलाना) the non-nuclear states into a large bloc demanding tangible action from the NWS. They would seek time bound progress on the long promised consultative process among the NWS.

Shifts in West Asia

West Asia has undergone significant shifts of power and capabilities since the 2010 conference. Mixed outcomes of the Arab Spring, the ongoing struggle for power within and among the states of the region, and the emergence of the IS have made West Asia a region of uncertainties. Progress on the Middle East Conference, agreed upon in 2010, has been at a glacial pace. Israel has shown no inclination(tendency,रूचि,इच्छा) to either join the conference or otherwise. Iranian obduracy — or strategic skill — in holding out against sanctions and other pressures had led to a situation where the U.S. turned towards a solution which favoured a postponed Iranian nuclear weapons capability, instead of an immediate cessation of weapons capacity building.

An agreement flowing from the JCPOA that provides for the lifting of sanctions on Iran (which has agreed to a stringent regime(rule,government,शासन)of nuclear regulation) will change altogether the balance of strategic strength in the region. Israel has serious objections to this plan and its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent statements suggest no lowering in its hard stance on the issue. The Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in West Asia will have to be worked on wholly new parameters, whose shape and content remain unclear. The conference next week will thus provide a platform for a lively, if not hostile(unfriendly,विरोधी), conglomeration of protagonists and antagonists. Whether it leads to clarity or confusion on West Asia remains to be seen.

Developments in Ukraine

Events in the Ukraine have had a far-reaching impact in many fields, all of which have a bearing on the imminent NPT Review. Russian-U.S. strategic arms control equations have reached their nadir(lowest,सबसे निम्न स्तर). Russia is unwilling to engage in negotiations on bilateral arms reductions. Its annexation(acquire,कब्ज़े में करना) of Crimea, its continuing support to dissidents in Ukraine, and the reactions to it in Europe and from the U.S., will make it more difficult than ever for the Obama administration to even contemplate(think over,सोचना) unilateral reductions. It is useful to remember that Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons from its territory after the Soviet Union collapsed, only to face a Russian-directed conflict threatening to dismember it. On its part, Russia is witnessing a narrative of resurgence in the face of containment and sanctions by the West. A “reset” of U.S.-Russia relations does not seem likely in the foreseeable future. The first casualty in this stand-off will be nuclear proliferation and disarmament.

South Asia’s two states with nuclear weapons are also steadily improving their strategic capabilities of nuclear warheads, missiles and submarines. Pakistan continues to assert its new found capability in tactical nuclear weapons, as a counter to Indian conventional military capabilities. This is viewed as another form of proliferation by Western nuclear mandarins, whose best solution is confined to advising New Delhi on restraint in dealing with Pakistan.

The NPT Review 2015 will be held in a strategic scenario not very dissimilar to the Cold War antagonism of the 1980s. The glue of a globalised world economy and the prospect of a world without conflicts among developed states have been replaced by seemingly implacable positions. The situation is made explosive by the arrival on the scene of new forces of terror and coercion(force,जोर जबरदस्ती करना) in and around states whose efforts had led to the signing and sustaining of the NPT over the decades. An idea of the straitjacket of ideas which drives the NPT can be had from the resolution passed in the UN last year. This had demanded that India and other non-signatories to the NPT join the Treaty as Non Nuclear Weapons States. India had rightly rejected the resolution which ignores the ground realities. Therefore, expectations are not high for the Review Conference and there are competing definitions about what will constitute success in New York. The future of the NPT seems uncertain, and the best outcome of the Review Conference may be another extension to the agreed action plans of the past, even as the Treaty has failed to either stop nuclear proliferation or encourage disarmament

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Eye on capital, loss in vision

I have been an unabashed(not embarrassed,बेपरवाह) admirer of Mr. N. Chandrababu Naidu especially with his accomplishments as Chief Minister of undivided Andhra Pradesh (AP) previously. Why? He succeeded in establishing AP as a progressive, information and technology-oriented, modern educational hub. He was motivated in his endeavours(effort,प्रयास), perhaps prompted(inspire,प्रेरित) by the prominence Bengaluru was getting in this regard. In this connection, he had travelled far and wide to summits and meetings to attract powerful entrepreneurs and companies. The GDP which was Rs.1,700 billion at that time during his tenure(period,कार्यकाल) in the undivided AP, around 1999 (data from the EPW Research Foundation) is about Rs.4,574 billion now, from 2014. It cannot be denied that much of this was due to Mr. Naidu’s exertions(effort,प्रयास). Above all, he had instilled in the people of AP a sense of belonging and pride in the State; he made them believe that AP was and is destined to great heights. Unfortunately, his present preoccupation with the subject of capital development in present day Andhra Pradesh, to be called Amaravathi, in the region between Vijayawada and Guntur, appears to be dragging him down.

Farmer dispossession

The expert committee appointed by the Home Ministry under the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, and which I had the honour to chair, stated in its terms of reference that fertile, agricultural lands should not be touched as far as possible. Let me explain this. The entire Vijayawada-Guntur-Tenali-Mangalagiri (VGTM) area is regarded as the rice bowl of AP; for that matter, it is, without doubt, one of India’s important granaries. Now, to take away 30,000 acres of land from the Thullur, Tadepalli and Mangalagiri mandals which are double crop and triple crop yielding(generate,स्वीकृत) areas and which will result in the dispossession of farmers there for temporary financial gains is an example of short-sighted policy. Some farmers may of course see this as a windfall, spending the monetary compensation on material goods, fancy automobiles and houses. Separately, commercial outlets are dependent on consumer support. In such a situation, it is unlikely that this scale of consumer support will be available in the short run, of five to 10 years, to support the kind of development that one is seeking. The northern part of Thullur is reported to being earmarked to play a key role in the functioning of the capital city. Yet, the fact is that there is no master plan available for the so-called capital city. Nothing is available online — for example even on the AP website — making it impossible to have an idea of what is being planned where.

Infrastructure development

Another point I wish to highlight is the subject of soil preparation work especially in an area which has a high water table. In a related way, consolidation(solid mass,दृढ), road infrastructure and various other items of infrastructure will take a long time to develop and build, even assuming that some land is made available. In the 100 or more new towns India built since Independence, and this includes Chandigarh, Bhubaneshwar, Gandhi Nagar and the ‘steel towns’ of Bokaro, Durgapur and Rourkela, it took nearly seven to eight years to have the basic infrastructure in place and this was just for the setting up of one or two major industries and entrepreneurial needs! Therefore, the claim that in AP, all these can be done within a span(duration,अवधि) of five years is a gross exaggeration(overstatement,अतिशयोक्ति).

The expert committee had pointed out repeatedly that the most serious challenge before AP is to create more than three lakh jobs a year and with significantly higher productivity. These jobs do not seem to be in sight. Towns which have been battered(damaged,ध्वस्त) by the recent cyclone need to be rebuilt. Important facilities such as the High Court, and as suggested by the expert committee, have to be located there. These will give some boost to AP.

It is welcome that in Chittoor and Tirupati, medical and some educational facilities are beginning to be set up, mainly with the help of private sector enterprise. But we should not forget that Chittoor and Tirupati draw their strengths from being near the border with Tamil Nadu rather than Hyderabad. Also, in all the talk about Tirupati and Chittoor having the potential to be major educational and health centres, there has been no mention of the potential of Rayalaseema. This is unfortunate. Also, when talk around the subject of the capital appears to recognise a shift of financial capital as well to the VGTM area, one can be quite certain that protests will erupt(Break out,फूटना). The committee has repeatedly said that the most important challenge facing Mr. Naidu, and which he should resolve with his political acumen(skill,कुशाग्रता) as soon as possible, is the need for him to look at balanced development as the Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and not just of the VGTM area.

The Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014 gave both AP and Telangana a time frame of 10 years to share Hyderabad as a common capital. The committee made a number of recommendations on how this time could be utilised. I am not holding an alibi(excuse,बहाना) for the committee; committees have been set up in the country before; some of their recommendations have been accepted while some have been rejected. So, it does not matter whether the recommendations of this committee are accepted or not; what matters is the future of Andhra. There is still time for Mr. Naidu to retrace his steps.

Land pooling

The Act gives ample(more than enough,plenty,बहुत सारा,काफी) time for Mr. Naidu to concentrate on the larger issues that confront AP rather than be bogged down(get stuck,उलझना) by the issue of land for the capital. The companies based in Singapore and which are working on the master plan for the new capital are reported to be seeking 3,000 acres outside the capital territory but inside the VGTM area.

Singapore-based entrepreneurs are said to be holding or trying to get hold of significant land parcels in several parts including China. That may well be their policy, but in this case, in AP, the point I wish to make is that whatever goes to Singapore’s land quota comes from agricultural land parcels. Apart from those directly affected by the capital project, there are millions of households that have no direct and indirect independent agricultural land or income in this area. Given the volatilities in the global economy, it is practically impossible to guarantee the security and the well-being of these families. Funding for the construction of the State capital and its maintenance will have to be mobilised through international financing; the Central government has already indicated the limitations of what it can extend to AP towards this.

It is reported that land holders who account for an area of about 32,000 acres have agreed to surrender their land and accept land pooling. At the same time, there are also reports of growing resistance to the plan in some areas alongside the right bank of the Krishna river. What AP is trying to do is very different to land pooling attempted elsewhere in the country and with varying success. It should be recognised that the success of the Gujarat land pooling plan, which is often mentioned in this context, took place in dense urban areas where the negotiations had a touch of realism. Plans were published repeatedly in a bid to seek consent(agree,सहमति) and it was clear what the authorities intended and what the land holders would be getting.

Infrastructure promotion

AP will become a better-knit geographic and economic entity if Mr. Naidu spends the next few years concentrating on some of the very important projects including those in which the Central Government’s support has been assured such as the coastal corridor, a gas pipeline and its transmission to Rayalaseema, the Nadikudi-Kalahasti railway line, and development of some of the railway lines east to west. This will also build up the political strength of Mr. Naidu across the State.

Every political capital requires political support. But in this case, the fact is that that kind of political support is not available for the capital city project in the State as a whole. AP has a history of being guided for years with the help of a number of able and experienced administrative officers. If only Mr. Naidu can utilise their talent to reorganise some of the priorities before the State at least for the next few years! The point is not about some landmark capital city which may come about later. What is important right now is the nearly suicidal move to mortgage AP’s political energy and financial resources to this capital project.

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Time to forge a post-Gujarat reality

Narendra Modi will soon complete a idolatryyear in office. Is it time for Indian Muslims to let go of the past and give pragmatism(realism,व्यवहारिकता) a chance?

Generally, whenever Muslim “leaders” go to meet the Prime Minister of the day, they carry a thick dossier of complaints and a charter of demands, most of which have little to do with the community’s real interests.

But when a group of maulvis met Prime Minister Narendra Modi last week, they had a rather unusual request. Rather than cribbing about Hindutva loudmouths or demanding job reservations, they wanted the government’s help in rescuing Indian Islam from Wahabbis seeking to subvert its gentler Sufi tradition and replace it with the harsh Saudi brand.

They were concerned that the Wahabbi influence — a principal source of radicalisation — was growing among Indian Muslims, with foreign-funded groups attempting to infiltrate their institutions. This included attempts to take over Sufi shrines (dargahs,पुण्य स्थान), which Wahabbis regard as symbols of idolatry(devotion,प्राथना,प्यार), as well as mosques and madrassas.

It was Mr. Modi’s first such interaction with Muslims since he became Prime Minister and he was clearly keen to tom-tom it. His tweet that he “had a good meeting with leaders of the Muslim community” was accompanied by a photo of the meeting with a link to an official statement.

This was duly followed by a cheery press release from the Prime Minister’s Office highlighting how “Muslim leaders reiterated full support of the community to the prime minister in meeting his objectives of ensuring speedy economic growth, promoting communal harmony and peace, and strengthening national security”. Mr. Modi, in turn, “specifically assured the leaders that he will look into their grievances(Complaint,शिकायत) regarding issues concerning shrines, masjids and madrassas”. He shared their concern about “the trend of increased radicalisation and the emerging threat of terrorism”.

Who represents Muslims?

So far, so good. But then conservative Muslims swung into action calling the whole thing a “farce”; a “PR stunt” by the Bharatiya Janata Party and “sarkari” Muslims to burnish Mr. Modi’s image. The show, they said, was staged to claim that Mr. Modi was “engaging” with Muslims. The maulvis in question were sought to be dismissed as “nonentities”, keen to advance their personal ambitions.

At this point, it is important to stress that those who met Mr. Modi were all from the relatively moderate Barelvi sect, which doesn’t share the fatwa-spewing, hang-‘em-flog-‘em zeal of the Deobandi school, many of whose leading lights are behind the attack. Some independent Muslim commentators, too, have questioned claims about the representative character of the delegation.

“It is not clear who organised the meeting… but it was clear that having failed to woo the ‘usual suspects’ of Muslim leadership, [the] Modi team had to settle for people that most Indian Muslims have never heard of… most of them are unknown or very marginal players even in the Barelvi movement,’’ wrote Kashif-ul-Huda, editor of the centrist Muslim blogsite, TwoCircles.net.

He may be right. But here’s the question: who truly represents all of the Muslim community? Mr. Huda’s “usual suspects”? Deobandi mullahs? Muslim politicians of the Congress/ Samajwadi Party variety? Over the past 60 years, we have tried them all. And look where they have landed the community.

So, rubbishing Barelvi mullahs for not being sufficiently representative is a bit of a red herring. What this row really exposes is the deep intra-community divide over the issue of engaging with the Prime Minister. Even among liberal Muslims who favour engagement, there are divisions. One set suggests that it should not become a prestige issue about who makes the first move. The other insists that Mr. Modi must first show some sign of reaching out to them, indicating regret over his alleged role in the Gujarat violence.

“I think Mr. Modi will have to make the first move. Congress apologised for anti-Sikh riots. If not [an] apology, then Mr. Modi will at least have to show some indication that he is willing to join hands. This is clearly not there in the present situation,” said Arshad Alam, assistant professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, to a TV journalist, echoing(repeat,दोहराना) the popular Muslim sentiment.

Head over heart

In a few weeks’ time, the Modi government will complete a year in office, but Muslims still remain torn(injured,चोटिल) between their mind, which tells them to be more pragmatic, and their heart, which doesn’t let them forget Gujarat. Anyone who favours engagement is dubbed a “sarkari” Muslim. Wipro chairman Azim Premji has been accused of giving ‘legitimacy’ to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh agenda by attending an RSS event despite his protestations that he wasn’t doing any such thing. The sharp Muslim reaction underlines the depth of their opposition to doing business with the Sangh Parivar.

Given the RSS’s majoritarian agenda and its deep-seated antipathy towards Muslims, the community’s reluctance(unwillingness,अनिच्छा) to shake hands with it or its political proxies such as the BJP is understandable. It will require a huge leap of faith for them to embrace groups that routinely question their nationalism.

But while it is easy to see where Muslims are coming from and sympathise with the position they have taken, the problem is that it is an emotional response. And the difficulty with emotional responses is that they ignore practical commonsense — that a permanent state of hostility ultimately hurts the weaker side. And whether they like it or not, Muslims are the weaker side in this case and a compromise is in their interest.

Moreover, a compromise is not such a bad thing; it is a means to an end. Having allowed the heart to rule them for so long (and it has done them little good), how about giving hard-headed realism a chance? To be blunt(straight,मुँह फट), they have no other option: not only is Mr. Modi here to stay but, given the prevailing public mood, RSS remote-controlled governments are likely to become a more frequent feature of our political landscape.

And here’s another hard reality: the collapse of the Congress plus the fragmented state of other so-called secular forces means that there seems to be no such thing as a viable secular alternative any more. Nobody is coming to their rescue. Muslims are on their own now. How they handle this new situation will be a test of their political maturity and survival instincts.

Meanwhile, the leadership vacuum among Muslims has never been as serious as it is today. If the liberal class continues to be coy(shy,शर्मीला) about soiling its hands, it will lose the moral right to crib that mullahs and their political proxies have hijacked the agenda.

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No more carrots, only sticks

Pakistan continues to support terror across borders. It is time for the U.S. and India to unleash economic sanctions and coercive(powerful) diplomacy.
The release from detention of Lashkar-e-Taiba operations chief Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and Pakistan’s failure to prosecute him for masterminding the 2008 Mumbai attacks is a travesty(mockery,parody) of justice. It is particularly galling(annoying) when contrasted(compare with difference) with the rapid proceedings against Shakil Afridi, the physician who helped U.S. intelligence agencies find Osama bin Laden.

But what is an even bigger scandal was the comfortable state of Lakhvi’s “incarceration”(imprisonment). In prison, Lakhvi had access to television, mobile phones, and the Internet. He had dozens of visitors a day; he held meetings unsupervised by prison guards. He was behind bars, but continued to direct LeT operations. All this and the clear lack of seriousness in prosecuting or imprisoning Lakhvi highlights the continuing cosy(friendly) relations between Pakistan’s military and the terrorists that its generals find useful in pursuing strategic goals against India and Afghanistan.

The U.S. reaction

India has taken umbrage(offence,anger) at Lakhvi’s release, but the U.S. should be equally appalled(shocked). Just a couple of days before Lakhvi’s release, the U.S. State Department had approved Pakistan’s request for $952 million in military equipment, ostensibly(apparently) to be used to fight terrorism. In the Mumbai attacks, more than 160 civilians, including six Americans, were killed. The Americans were specifically targeted because they were Westerners. In this context, Pakistan’s decision to release a man who has American blood on his hands, just days after the U.S. agreed to provide the aid it had asked for, can be seen as a grave insult. Some Indians might even see it as proof of a double-faced U.S. attitude towards terrorism.

Besides this grant, the U.S. has given over $20 billion as military aid since 2002 and over $10 billion for development work. The aid was the carrot extended by the U.S. to encourage Pakistan to fight terrorism.

Instead, Pakistan has continued to be a leading source of terrorism worldwide. Besides the 2008 Mumbai attacks, terrorists linked to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have sponsored multiple attacks across India. Further, it effectively revived the Taliban insurgency with safe havens and equipment, furthering the instability in Afghanistan and costing the lives of over 2,000 U.S. military personnel.

Clearly, the carrots have not worked. It is now time for the U.S. to seriously consider wielding(handle) sticks. The U.S. has an enormous(many) arsenal of sanctions that has been effective, for instance, against Iran. It is time for Pakistan to learn that there is a heavy price to be paid for misbehaving on the international stage. Terrorists are used to moving money illicitly(illegally) but sanctions could prove painful to Pakistan’s generals and intelligence staff, who usually become quite wealthy in the service of their country.

If placing crippling trade restrictions on Pakistan and prohibiting all aid, except humanitarian, is too bold a step to be taken, there is a range of more targeted options that can be used.

Tools of restraint

The University of Maryland’s Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics has developed a programme titled STONE or Shaping Terrorist Organizational Network Efficacy. The programme uses a combination of network analysis tools, unique properties of individuals in the network, and “big data” analytics to identify the most critical nodes in a network. It also finds out how networks adjust to the removal of a node or nodes. STONE has so far been applied to open-source data on Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and LeT. Using past instances when leaders of terrorist organisations were replaced, one of STONE’s top three predictions has been to accurately pinpoint the successor to a removed terrorist in over 80 per cent of the cases.

What was most intriguing(challenging) about the findings on LeT was the prominent role played by former and present ISI officers. This confirmed long-standing suspicions about the important role of ISI sponsorship in LeT operations. The U.S. has been aggressive in placing financial sanctions on Pakistani terrorist groups and their leaders by declaring them Specially Designated Global Terrorists but it has refrained from placing ISI backers on the sanctions list. It is high time this restraint was ended. We don’t know who was responsible for granting bail to Lakhvi, but the ISI could be a serious candidate.

Besides STONE, there are other tools — denying travel visas to the West and student visas to the children of senior ISI personnel could be one. ISI agents identified (with open source data collected about five years ago) as significant players in the LeT network could be candidates for such sanctions. Intelligence agencies can undoubtedly pinpoint the figures entrenched(fix firmly) in Pakistan’s military-terrorism complex. Financial sanctions on them will send Pakistan an unambiguous(clear) message that business as usual is over.

Reducing aid

There are other options that don’t target specific individuals, but include covert(secret) action and a reduction in U.S. military and development aid to Pakistan. Research carried out by the authors shows that LeT carries out almost no attacks during times of internal conflict. Running intelligence campaigns that sow dissension(disagree) within LeT is an immediate option; the tactic was reportedly used successfully against Palestinian arch-terrorist group Abu Nidal.

Game theory models of LeT attack behaviour developed by the authors suggest that only a combination of two factors — reduction in aid by the U.S. and either covert action or coercive diplomacy by India — would have a chance of reducing LeT attacks.

Insanity, they say, is to repeat the same action over and over but expect different results. So far, this has been U.S. policy towards Pakistan. Hopefully, American policymakers will finally learn something from Lakhvi’s premature release.

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