As public servants get ready to enjoy the New Year’s blessing that the Seventh Pay Commission is expected to bestow[bi'stow(provide,प्रदान)]. The Fourteenth Finance Commission estimates the cost of the Sixth Pay Commission at over Rs. 90,000 crore annually, since pay and allowances of Union government employees more than doubled between 2007-08 and 2011-12. Compare this to the estimates in the economic survey for the year 2011-12, about Rs. 70,000 crore each for food subsidy, fertilizer and petroleum subsidy and less than Rs. 40,000 crore for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Simply put, the additional Central government expenditure due to the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission was over 40 per cent of the major subsidies. If we take into account the costs to the State governments, the tab for Sixth Pay Commission largesse is probably equivalent to all the subsidies provided by the Central government.
Sonalde Desai
As we brace[breys(prepare,तैयार)] for another Pay Commission-mandated salary hike, the question to ask is not whether the government can afford it but if it is the best use of government resources. Government employees receive Dearness Allowance (DA) annually to compensate for inflation; they also receive an annual performance appraisal for promotions, which brings with it salary increases. So the decadal salary increases under the Central Pay Commission (CPC) are meant to address inequities in salaries across different parts of the government, across ranks as well as between the public sector and private sector. It is the latter that has provided the greatest justification for salary increases granted under CPC in the past.
False premise
salary packages reported for new Indian Institute of Management graduates or Indian Institute of Technology graduates funnel a sense of discontent among public sector employees since it is hard to imagine any 25-year-old government servant receiving a package of Rs. 40 lakh per annum. This smoke and mirrors strategy masks several observations made by the Sixth Pay Commission. First, it noted that the contention of vast disparities between private sector and government employees was not borne out by data. The CPC found that compensation to Group C and D employees in government was higher than that in the private sector; for Group B it was similar and only for Group A was it lower. Group A employees form less than 5 per cent of the total Central government workforce; Group C and D are about 90 per cent. Second, it noted that a government job offers many other benefits not available in the private sector and the fear of flight away from public service towards the private sector is overblown.
In spite of these observations, the ultimate recommendations of the Sixth CPC led to substantial increases in the salary and allowance of all public servants, first in the Central service and later on in State governments. A comparison of incomes between private sector employees and government employees using data from India Human Development Surveys (IHDS) of 2004-05 and 2011-12 is instructive in understanding the consequences[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)] of the last CPC. These surveys of over 40,000 households were jointly organised by the National Council of Applied Economic Research and the University of Maryland. The graphic shows monthly salaries for men aged 25-59 in 2011-12. Many women work part time as anganwadi workers and ASHA workers and hence are excluded[iks'klood(leave out,छोड़ना)] from this comparison, but their inclusion will not change the fundamental results.
The results show that at every single level of education, government workers are paid more than private sector workers and more importantly, the public service advantage has increased rather than decreased after the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission recommendations. A driver in government service earns far more than one in private service, but so does an engineer. This comparison does not include the other benefits government service provides including PF contributions, housing benefits, health insurance and, frequently, admission of children to coveted[kú-vu-tid(desirable,आकांक्षित)] Kendriya Vidyalayas.
One might say that the problem is not global but is concentrated in highly skilled positions. Individuals who are highly skilled may be more likely to choose the private sector. Here only the Union Public Service Commission can tell us if the qualification of the entering cohort['kow,hort(group,दल)] of the Indian Administrative Service officers is declining, but at a slightly lower stratospheric[,stra-tu'sfe-rik(high,उच्च)] level, we see no such evidence. The IHDS shows that among college graduates with a first class degree, government service still seems to be preferred. In 2004-05, among the male college graduates employed in public service, 37 per cent had a first division; this proportion had increased to 39 per cent by 2011-12. This is not to say that skill upgradation is not taking place in the private sector, where the proportion of first class degree holders among graduates has increased from 28 per cent to 35 per cent, but these figures do not suggest that government services are suffering on an average; just that the more qualified individuals are seeking salaried work and moving away from farming and small businesses benefitting both government service and the private sector.
That salary increases will be bestowed by the Seventh CPC is a given. Whether it will address the real challenge, lower wages for Group A officers compared to the private sector, and recognise the public service advantage for the rest of the employees remains questionable. Let us hope that the Seventh CPC will address the challenge of government salaries with a scalpel[skal-pu(thin knife,छुरी)] rather than an axe.
(Sonalde Desai is senior fellow at the National Council of Applied Economic Research and Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland. Views are personal.)
For decades, mature economies have seen their jobs being off-shored[óf'shor(move,स्थान्तरित)] to newly industrialising countries. To stop the bleeding, they are working hard to unleash the digital and renewable energy revolutions. The aggressive push to regain competitiveness by digital automation has been widely noted. What is less understood is the logic behind the energy transformation. In manufacturing economies, the cost of energy has long surpassed the cost of labour. Decoupling[dee'kú-pu(separate,अलग)] productivity from the use of energy and resources is therefore a crucial step to regain competitiveness.
To understand this dramatic turnaround, one needs to look at a couple of game-changers. First, in many markets, the cost of electricity generation from solar has fallen below that from fossil fuels. Second, new technologies finally make it possible to store intermittent energies like solar and wind. Third, a growing number of governments have started to legislate their gradual exit from the carbon economy.
No matter how serious these announcements, they are enough to raise questions about the political viability of the $5.3 trillion in annual subsidies for fossil fuels. Consequently[kón-si-kwunt-lee(resultant,परिणामस्वरूप)], the Bank of England and the German government recently issued a public warning about the “carbon bubble”. The overvaluation of fossil assets by an estimated $28 trillion could trigger another financial crisis. Many institutional investors like pension funds are bound by law to only invest in secure assets. Given the sheer[sheer(absolute,पूरा)] amount of capital represented, this could mean that in financial terms, “peak oil” has already happened.
In its ambitious Energiewende, Germany targets to cover 45 per cent of its energy demand from renewables by 2025, and 55-60 per cent by 2035. Major industry players have begun to overhaul[ow-vu'ho(repair,सुधारना)] their business models. The biggest utilities of Germany and Italy have decided to sell off their entire fleet of conventional power plants. Naturally, there has been a political backlash against energy price hikes. The German model, however, was always based on the disciplinary incentives of hard currency and high wages, catapulting its manufacturing base into the export powerhouse it is today. Shifting the tax burden from labour to energy is seen as the right incentive to accelerate the decoupling of mobility, housing and manufacturing from the use of resources.
In the long run, technological innovation and higher efficiency are set to bring down energy costs. In addition to these economic considerations, the political crises in eastern Europe, northern Africa and the Middle East fuelled concerns over energy security. Greening the economy is thus seen as the best way to curb[kurb(control,नियंत्रण)] geopolitical risks and improve energy security.
Germany is not the only country striking a green new deal between the needs to mitigate[mi-ti,geyt(lessen,कमी)] climate change, improve energy security and competitiveness, and create new, green jobs. Together with the disruptive innovations of the digital transformation, all advanced economies hope to unleash the third Industrial Revolution.
What does this mean for India? Many in India hope to finally cash in on the demographic dividend when manufacturing jobs start to leave China. Out-competing Southeast Asia, which just got an additional boost through the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, will not be easy. In the short run, India will enjoy a sweet spot between cheap labour and modest energy and commodity costs. Skyrocketing FDI numbers show investors are betting on an Indian economic miracle.
In the long run, India’s comparative advantages are under pressure. In many emerging economies, manufacturing costs have almost reached US levels, shifting investors’ focus to factors like quality, supply chains, shipping times and local governance. Digital automation will further erode the comparative advantage of cheap labour. Consequently, manufacturers are starting to re-shore — shifting production back to the old industrial centres. If giants[jI-unt(big,बड़ा)] like India and China fuel their growth with resources, rising commodity costs might price them out of the market. Stuck in the fossil regime[rey'zheem(authority,शाशन)] , volatile['vó-lu,tI(-u)(unstable,अस्थायी)] commodity markets, geopolitical risks and insufficient energy efficiency are bound to become a major liability to sustainable development. This means the window of opportunity for export-led manufacturing growth is closing, turning industrialisation into a gigantic[jI'gan-tik(giant)] race against time. If India hopes to prevail in this race, it must not miss the bus of green growth.
The writer is resident representative of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in New Delhi and coordinator of the Asia-Europe Economy of Tomorrow project
The responses from different parts of the country to recent incidents of child sexual abuse have been identical in their demand for higher and more stringent[strin-junt(Strict,सख्त)] punishment. While the Delhi chief minister wants to consider legal reforms to enhance the punishment for the rape of minors and treat juveniles['joo-vu,nI(-u)l(young,किशोर)] over 15 involved in rape and murder as adults, the Madras High Court recommended castration[kas'trey-shun(impotent,नपुंसक)] of offenders found guilty of child sexual abuse. These hasty[hey-stee(hurried,तीव्र)] responses, however, completely overlook and distract public attention from the utter[ú-tu(complete,पूरा)] failure of the executive and judicial machinery to ensure justice for child victims.
It has been nearly three years since the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (Pocso Act) was passed in an effort to address growing rates of child sexual abuse and poor rates of conviction. The act provides for the establishment of a special court, appointment of special public prosecutors (SPPs) and compensation, and specifies timelines for recording evidence and completing trial as well as child-friendly procedures to be followed during investigation, evidence-recording and medical examination. It also provides for several care and protection measures for victims. In a marked departure from established principles of criminal law, the Pocso Act prescribes a presumption[pri'zúmp-shun(assumption,अनुमान)] of guilt in serious offences. The act also enhances the punishment for such crimes, stringently imposes long minimum sentences and affords no discretion[di'skre-shun(free will,आजादी)] to the special court to impose lesser punishment in cases of serious crimes such as penetrative[pe-nu-tru-tiv(sharp,पक्का)] sexual assault, aggravated penetrative sexual assault, sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault. The law further clarifies that in cases where an act is a sexual offence under the Indian Penal Code and the Pocso Act, the higher punishment must be imposed.
Despite such dramatic reforms, “Crime in India 2014” reveals that the conviction rate under the Pocso Act is a measly 24.6 per cent and the pendency rate is an alarming 95.1 per cent. This barely inspires confidence in the criminal justice system that is projected as the panacea[pa-nu'see-u(remedy for all ill,रामबाण दवा)] for crimes against children. While the Delhi chief minister proposes law reform to further enhance the punishment for such crimes, the data shows that this strategy has not worked. Rather than resorting to drastic legislative measures, this issue clearly calls for a reassessment of the working of the justice system.
The Centre for Child and the Law at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore is currently studying the functioning of special courts established under the Pocso Act in five states, including Delhi. While the findings are being processed, the qualitative data reveals several problems in the implementation of the act that negatively impact the outcomes in these cases.
First, the special courts for trying these cases are seldom “special”. Instead, they are regular sessions courts that also try offences under anti-terror laws, narcotics laws, etc. The judges assigned to these special courts in Delhi are expected to maintain a child-friendly atmosphere within the courtrooms — while simultaneously dealing with alleged hardened criminals charged under draconian[dru'kow-nee-un(stringent)] laws. At a practical level, judges find it difficult to switch from one mindset to another.
According to most NGOs and private lawyers representing children, the atmosphere in court is far from child-friendly. Though the act prohibits the prosecutor and defence lawyer from questioning children directly — only the judge is allowed to ask the child questions — this is rarely followed. There is virtually no training on child psychology, appropriate methods of questioning children, or maintaining a child-friendly atmosphere.
Preliminary data from the analysis of trials in Delhi reveals that, in a majority of cases, the victims and witnesses turn hostile['hós,tI(-u)l(opponent,विरोधी)] due to the sensitive nature of these cases, and threats and intimidation[in,ti-mu'dey-shun(afraid,भयभीत)]. In one case, the examination of the child was conducted on two different dates one month apart (State vs Mohd Azeem Khan). While the victim supported the prosecution’s case in her first deposition, she turned hostile on the second date. The court did not examine whether any threats or pressure had been applied by the accused, and promptly acquitted[discharge,free from guilty,रिहाई)] him.
According to Section 32(1), the state government should appoint an SPP to exclusively handle Pocso cases. The directorate of prosecution, Delhi, has, however, assigned an additional public prosecutor (APP) for each of the 11 special courts that deal with all criminal matters. Hearings are often rescheduled because of the unavailability of the APPs. The Delhi government should consider making funds available for the appointment of SPPs and organise trainings for them.
The Pocso Act also requires the courts to deploy translators, interpreters and special educators wherever necessary, and it is the duty of the executive to make this list available to courts and ensure adequate[a-di-kwut(enough,पर्याप्त)] funding. In one case in the Saket court in Delhi, the accused was made to stand right behind the victim and translate for her because a translator had not been arranged. It was the presence of the support person that gave the 14-year-old victim the courage to testify confidently. These incidents give rise to concern about the damaging psychological effects they could have on child victims. It is no wonder that a majority of victims and key witnesses turn hostile and don’t testify against the accused.
Special courts discourage compensation applications and ask representatives of victims to approach the Delhi State Legal Services Authority, which in turn directs them back to the court. In several cases, courts have waited till the evidence is recorded to see if the child supports the prosecution even though the child may be in need of money for urgent medical procedures.
Proponents of stricter penalties should bear in mind that higher sentences have invariably resulted in more acquittals. The minimum sentences under the Pocso Act are considered prohibitively high. For instance, some within the legal fraternity feel that a three-year sentence for a 22-year-old boy for forcibly kissing a 17-year-old girl is disproportionate, and would rather acquit the accused. Since the accused is invariably known to them, children and their families often buckle[bú-ku(give up,झुकना)] under the burden of putting someone away in prison for a lengthy period of time.
The J.S. Verma Committee consciously rejected the death penalty for sexual offences as well as the lowering of the age of the juvenile, given the credible research that showed the poor deterrent[di'te-runt(preventive,निवारक)] effect and counterproductive outcomes of these measures. While the legislature has done its bit, the executive and the judiciary have to join hands to ensure the effective implementation of the Pocso Act. The Delhi government should consult with stakeholders, particularly children and their families, instead of proposing draconian measures that contradict the Indian Constitution, international standards and the parliamentary standing committee report on the Juvenile Justice Bill, 2014, and make justice more elusive for our children. The higher judiciary should also identify the root causes of acquittals and ways in which the child-friendliness of special courts can be enhanced.
The writers are legal researchers with the Centre for Child and the Law, NLSIU, Bangalore
Land titling is sometimes controversial, unnecessarily so. It is also often associated with the name and work of Hernando de Soto, no less controversial. Stated simply, land titling allows individuals and/ or households to get clear formal titles to land. This cleans up land markets, establishes security of tenure[ten-yu(right of property,पट्टा)] and allows land to be used as collateral[ku'la-t(u-)rul(secondary,द्वितीयक)]. (Those are the kinds of benefits catalogued in de Soto’s 2000 book, The Mystery of Capital). For land titling, we had our own advocate in D.C. Wadhwa, then at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, and known more for his fight against the re-promulgation[pró-mul'gey-shun(announcement,घोषणा)] of ordinances. Most of us know the essence[e-sun(t)s(core,सार)] of the problem.
As a mark of respect towards Professor Wadhwa, I am going to quote not from what he originally wrote in 1989, but from a subsequent piece (written in some anguish[ang-gwish(pain,व्यथा)], because nothing had happened) in 2002: “The person shown in the record as responsible for paying land revenue for a particular piece of land is presumed to be the proprietor of that piece of land unless it is proved otherwise... But the entries in such records are not conclusive. Whatever be the entry in the record-of-rights in land, it is permissible to challenge it in an appropriate court or tribunal. Therefore, the revenue laws of the states lay down that no suit shall lie against the state government or any officer of the state government in respect of a claim to have an entry made in any record or register that is maintained by the government or to have any entry omitted[ow'mit(leave,छोड़ना)] or amended. Similarly, the law relating to registration of documents (deeds) also lays down that while accepting a document for registration, the registering authority need not concern itself about the validity of the document.”
Some cross-country controversy around land titling and de Soto is about whether it really led to presumed benefits, in the instances where it was tried. Other controversies are about the difficult transition from customary and common law systems to what is called Torrens, after Robert Richard Torrens, who drove it in parts of Australia in the second half of the 19th century.
Many common law jurisdictions do have Torrens systems now. Since 2008, there has been a National Land Records Modernisation Programme (NLRMP) and titling/ Torrens is the avowed[u'vawd(declared,घोषित)] terminal goal, with states like Andhra Pradesh, Delhi and Rajasthan even having experimented with preliminary legislation. In 2011, the department of land resources had a draft bill, with the intention of introducing titling in Union territories. Here is a quote from the 2008 NLRMP statement: “Puducherry is an example of the system of conclusive titles from within India itself. The French introduced the Torrens system there. However, after Independence, Pondicherry had to regress from conclusive titles to the presumptive[pri'zúmp-tiv(probable,संभावित)] titles system prevalent[pre-vu-lunt(common,प्रचलित)] in India due to the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. The system of conclusive titles is based on four basic principles: One, a single agency to handle land records (including the maintenance and updating of the textual records, maps, survey and settlement operations, registration of immovable property mutations, etc); second, the “mirror” principle, which states that, at any given moment, the land records mirror the ground reality; three, the “curtain” principle, which refers to the fact that the record of title is a true depiction[di'pik-shun(characterization,वर्णन)] of the ownership status, mutation is automatic following registration, there is no need of probing into past title transactions, and title is a conclusive proof of ownership; and four, title insurance, which refers to the fact that the title is guaranteed for its correctness and the party concerned is indemnified[in'dem-nu,fI(compensate,insured,क्षतिपूर्ति,सुरक्षित)] against any loss arising because of inaccuracy in this regard. At the moment, land records in India don’t reflect any of these principles.”
To get to the terminal goal and implement these principles, there was a government-appointed committee, and it submitted a report in February 2014. This sets out a land titling roadmap. (You will find the report on the internet.) The way I think about it, it is like every plot of land getting something like an Aadhaar number. However, a prerequisite[pree're-kwi-zit(advance required,पूर्वापेक्षा)] is reliable (and not dated) cadastral surveys. De Soto is a great speaker too, and I once heard him dismiss this problem in the context of rural Indonesia: “Whenever I walked to a different farm, a different dog began to bark. Dogs know when titles change and humans don’t.”
Cadastral surveys/ resurveys are indeed a problem, though not as much as they used to be. But as a roadmap towards the terminal goal, the 2014 committee report is worth reading. It proposes systematic selective titling, not across the board. In the committee’s words, “Given the state of land records and cadastral surveys in our country, this model can be applied to the properties when new virgin titles are created, for example, when a builder/ developer of multi-storied apartment blocks hands over the ownership of an apartment (flat) to the first owner. Here the property has no past history and as such there is no worry about defects in the title. Of course, the title over land on which the property stands needs to be verified.” The committee estimated that 40-50 per cent of urban properties could be covered in the next 20 years.
One should probably not use the word “pilot”. These are instances where one can demonstrate the benefits of titling and perhaps even charge additional fees from owners. It’s an idea worth pushing.
The writer is member, Niti Aayog. Views are personal
Reforms are on everyone’s lips. Whenever growth slows down, it is blamed on the slowdown in the implementation of reforms. Despite the enormous[i'nor-mus(large,बड़ा)] noise made about reforms, there is no pellucidity[pe-loo'si-du-tee(clarity,स्पष्ठता)] on what constitutes reforms and what the impact of reforms is on growth and social sector spending.
Looking back, 1991 is an important landmark in the post-Independence economic history of our country. The country then faced an acute[u'kyoot(intense,तीक्ष्ण)] economic crisis, triggered by a severe balance of payments problem. But the crisis was converted into an opportunity to bring about fundamental changes in the content and approach to economic policy.
C. Rangarajan
Until the end of the 1970s, and to a gargantuan[gaa'gan-choo-un(large,बड़ा)] extent even in the 1980s, development was state-directed and state-driven. The government subscribed to the theory of ‘commanding heights’ which meant that key sectors of the economy were to be under state control. The private sector was kept in check through an elaborate scheme of licences and controls. In foreign trade, ‘import substitution’ was the guiding principle and this meant quantitative controls on imports and high import tariffs.
Efficiency and equity
A fundamental shift from this perception to one supporting a liberalised economy occurred in the early 1990s. There is a common thread running through the various measures introduced since July 1991 — the objective of improving the productivity and efficiency of the economy by injecting a greater element of competition. This is sought to be achieved by removing the barriers to entry and growth. This has led to the dismantling[dis'man-tu-ling(break,तोडना)] of various controls and licences. Many areas which were exclusively reserved for the state are now open to the private sector. As a consequence[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)], the role of the state as a producer of marketable goods and services has gone down.
However, simultaneously, its role as a regulator and as a provider for public goods and services has increased, even though with respect to the provision of public goods, several mixed models are available. The touchstone of reforms is, therefore, improved efficiency which comes from improved competition. The emphasis on efficiency, however, does not exclude[iks'klood(leave,छोड़ना)] considerations of equity. If improved efficiency can lead to faster growth, that itself can generate larger surpluses in the hands of the government which can be utilised to increase social sector expenditures and provide better social safety nets. Much, therefore, depends on the rate of growth and how the surpluses generated are utilised.
What has been the record of India in terms of economic growth and social development in the post-liberalisation period? In the post reform period beginning 1992-93, the economy has grown at an average rate of 6.8 per cent. In the more recent period, the growth rate has been even higher. Over the decade beginning 2004-05, the average annual growth rate has been 7.6 per cent. Between 2005-06 and 2010-11, the growth rate was 8.7 per cent. Contrast this with the annual growth rate of 3.5 per cent between 1952 and 1980.
Poverty reduction
It is true that the Indian economy grew between 1980 and 1990 at 5.6 per cent. But the economy faced its worst crisis in 1991-92 and the growth rate fell to 1.0 per cent. It is extremely doubtful if, without a change in the strategy of development, growth would have picked up again.
“Liberalisation is premised on the need to create competitive markets and should be extended to all sectors. Much remains to be done in regulating the pricing of natural resources and improving the agricultural productivity ”
Social development has many dimensions. One composite indicator is the behaviour of the poverty ratio. However, over years, there have been some changes in the methodology for measuring poverty. That growth has a favourable impact on the poverty ratio is seen even from recent data. The annual rate of growth of per capita income in the period between 1993-94 and 2004-05 was 4.3 per cent and the growth rate for the period between 2004-05 and 2011-12 was 6.7 per cent. The annual decline in the poverty ratio in percentage points (according to the Suresh Tendulkar committee’s methodology) was 0.74 in the first period and 2.18 in the second period. In fact, the finding that the decline in poverty was much faster in the latter period is valid irrespective of where the poverty line is drawn. Between 2009-10 and 2011-12, according to the Tendulkar Committee’s methodology, the reduction in poverty ratio was 7.9 points. According to the Rangarajan Committee’s methodology, it was 8.7 points.
Without doubt, the poverty ratio still remains high. However, what is important to note is that the faster the growth, the greater the reduction in the poverty ratio. To reduce the poverty ratio substantially and to improve our performance on other social parameters, the country needs to grow faster in a sustained way. Leaving aside these data, it is the high growth phase which witnessed the induction of several far-reaching social development programmes such as the rural employment guarantee scheme and extended food security scheme. Social and community service expenditures of the central and State governments, taken together, increased from 5.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 7 per cent of GDP in 2013-14.
GST, reforms in agriculture
Given the favourable impact of reforms on growth, what should be the focus of reforms in the coming years? The objective of reforms is to improve efficiency through enhanced competition. The introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) will be a step in the right direction, as it will help in enhancing efficiency. ‘Acquisition’ is against the spirit of competition and the reach of any Land Acquisition Act must therefore, be limited. At the same time, we should avoid fixing the price of land. Farmers have become fully conscious of the value of their land. They are unlikely to sell them at throwaway prices.
There are still some segments of the industry which are subject to a number of controls of the pre-1991 type. A typical example is the sugar industry. Molasses are subject to a type of control which results in a subsidisation of the liquor industry. The basic principle underlying liberalisation is of the need to create competitive markets with minimal barriers to entry and should be extended to all sectors. Pricing of natural resources has become an issue. In the absence of competition,luculent[loo-kyû-lunt(transparent,स्पष्ठ)] mechanisms for fixing the prices must be followed which will be fair to both the producers and the end users.
Among the sectors that have remained untouched by reforms, the most important is agriculture. Even as much remains to be done to improve agricultural productivity through scientific research and improved dissemination[di,se-mu'ney-shun(spreading,फैलाव)] of knowledge, there are areas like marketing where reforms are badly needed. The present marketing arrangements, particularly with respect to vegetables, are archaic. Barriers to movement of trade across the country must be brought to an end.
Reforms do not necessarily translate into growth. The policy framework that gave our country an annual growth rate exceeding 9 percent between 2005 and 2008 was very much in place when our economy witnessed a substantial slowdown post 2011. Reforms are at best a necessary condition for growth. They are not sufficient. The investment sentiment must be carefully nurtured. The investment climate is a function of several factors. We should not forget that non-economic factors also play a key role.
Equally, growth does not automatically result in increased social sector expenditures. There has to be a definite policy focus. Social sector expenditure must be prioritised to reflect the needs of the society. The administrative framework and delivering systems must be such as to maximise benefits. Efficiency in the use of resources is critically important. This is where good governance comes in.
Reforms, to be plausible[plo-zu-bul(credible,विश्वसनीय)], must not only result in higher growth but also benefit all sections of society. Government must therefore, pursue a two-fold strategy: of accelerating growth through an appropriate reform agenda and deploying the surpluses generated through growth to augment social welfare.
(The author is former chairman of the Economic Advisory Council to the Prime Minister and former Governor, Reserve Bank of India.)
The idea of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) is once again in the limelight[lIm,lIt(spotlight,चर्चा में)] because of the recent observations made by the Supreme Court. Besides the desirability of the UCC, these observations also raise issues about the court’s role in questioning the government on framing and implementing a UCC in a democracy founded on the principle of separation of powers. I deal with both these aspects in this article.
This is not the first time that the court has called for implementing Article 44 of the Constitution, enjoining the state to “endeavour[in'de-vu(effort,प्रयत्न)] to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.” In Sarla Mudgal (1995), the court controversially said that a UCC modelled on Hindu law would resolve the treatment of bigamy[bi-gu-mee(two marriage,द्विविवाह)] in different communities. Following widespread outrage[awt,rey(anger,नाराजगी)], the court clarified that its views were merely observations and not binding. In Pannalal Bansilal (1996), the court came full circle, saying that “a uniform law, though is highly desirable, enactment thereof in one go perhaps may be counter-productive to unity and integrity of the nation. The mischief or defect which is most acute[u'kyoot(sharp,तीक्ष्ण)] can be remedied by process of law at stages.” The court will find it impossible to reconcile this earlier, and arguably more reasonable, position with its present observations.
This is not to say that a UCC should be indefinitely postponed. However, the goal of Article 44 is perhaps misunderstood. In Shah Bano (1985), it was said that a UCC would help national integration by removing disparate loyalties to conflicting[kun'flik-ting(in disagreement,विरोधी)] laws.
But the UCC is not a magic wand[wónd(stick,छड़ी)] for uniformity, nor will uniformity achieve national integration overnight.
Instead, a UCC ought to have the objective of reducing gender discrimination[di,skri-mu'ney-shun(partiality,भेदभाव)] by empowering women and restoring their dignity and self-esteem. Such an approach can radically alter stakeholder perspectives, and give an impetus[im-pi-tus(force,प्रेरना)] of a different nature.
An interesting phenomenon in this context exists in the subcontinent itself. Personal laws in Bangladesh and Pakistan on the one hand, and India on the other, mirror each other in their treatment of majority and minority communities. Post-Partition changes to Muslim family laws in Bangladesh and Pakistan benefited women greatly, but legal benefits gained by Hindu women in India did not spill over into the neighbouring countries. Similarly, minority women in India do not enjoy the same benefits as their counterparts in Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Unfortunately, in contemporary discourse, this idea of a UCC for gender equity is completely lost. Instead, the debate remains steadfastly communal, opposed particularly by a large section of Muslims. In this regard, Tahir Mahmood (‘Walking away from the code’, The Indian Express, October 20) cited[sIt(mentioned,उल्लेख)] two reasons. First, ultra-orthodox Muslims regard Islamic personal law as revealed or inspired law, and thus, untouchable by the modern state. But countries like Turkey and Tunisia have modernised their Islamic personal laws as have also Pakistan and Bangladesh, albeit[ol'bee-it(even though,यद्यपि)] marginally.
Second, sections of the Hindu community perpetuate[pu'pe-choo,eyt(stay,बनाये रखना)] the perception that the UCC will be modelled on ancient Indian jurisprudence, uninfluenced by Islamic or other legal doctrines[dók-trin(belief,सिद्धान्त)]. Nevertheless, discrimination against women pervades[pu'veyd(spread,व्याप्त होना)] even modern codified Hindu laws. Clearly, no personal laws, Hindu or otherwise, can be a perfect model for the UCC.
This spotlight on the UCC is a wonderful opportunity to resume conversations on the issue. As Justice R.M. Sahai in Sarla Mudgal suggested, the Law Commission of India and the commission for minorities could work together to propose reforms, while co-opting bodies like the All India Muslim Personal Law Board.
We could also adopt a parallel civil and religious law system where, in certain matters, like maintenance, inheritance, etc, civil law would prevail, and be mandatory; but the ultimate goal would be to undo societal wrongs to women. Parallel systems of this kind already exist in London, New York and Toronto, where people marry first through civil ceremonies, and then may marry in a church or synagogue. Later, if necessary, they receive judicial remedy for religious aspects of their marriage and divorce. Such a parallel system would encourage an idea of uniformity that would simultaneously respect autonomous laws for defined religious communities, and address provisions inconsistent with constitutional principles.
Even though a UCC should be implemented, it cannot happen in a day. Such a code, in its true spirit, must be brought about by borrowing freely from different personal laws, making gradual[gra-joo-ul(slow,step by step,क्रमिक)] changes in each, issuing judicial pronouncements assuring gender equality, and adopting expansive
interpretations on marriage, maintenance, adoption and succession by acknowledging the benefits that one community secures from the others.
In this regard, the courts have sought to make a transition[tran'zi-shun(change,बदलाव)] through secular laws and dynamic judicial interpretations. For instance, adoption was made possible for Muslims and Christians only through an expansive interpretation of the Juvenile[joo-vu,nI(-u)l(immature,किशोर)] Justice Act. Geetha Hariharan’s (1999) case recognised the mother as a guardian irrespective of the age of her child. After Shabana Bano (2010) and Danial Latifi (2001), a Muslim divorced woman became entitled to just and fair maintenance even beyond the iddat period.
This is the role that the judiciary must play — of identifying and ironing out[I(-u)rnng awt(settle,समाधान)] internal and external inconsistencies — but developing a comprehensive code is a legislative function, not for judicial resolution.
At the end of the day, a UCC can only emerge through an evolutionary process, which preserves India’s rich legal heritage, of which all the personal laws are equal constituents. Until we acknowledge this, the debate will rage on, with no end in sight.
The writer is former chief justice, Delhi High Court, and former chairman
To characterise the foreign policy of the most peripatetic[pe-ree-pu'te-tik(traveller,घुमक्कड़)] Indian Prime Minister as ‘nationalist’ may appear contradictory[kón-tru'dik-tu-ree(in disagreement,विरोधी)]. The popular demand today is that he should be in India more often, to deal with the crying needs of the country. He is selective in his eloquence[e-lu-kwun(t)s(powerful language,वाक्पटुता)] on domestic issues, but he is opening out his heart to foreign audiences. He is seen more in the company of foreign leaders, not only political leaders, but also leaders in technology, finance and economics. But the core of his agenda is domestic, not international. His arena is international, but his concerns are domestic.
The transformation of India’s foreign policy from an ‘internationalist’ one to a ‘nationalist’ one may well have begun after Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon. Domestic preoccupations were brought to centre stage, though the old tradition of engagement in world affairs remained alive. The torrent[tó-runt(flood,बाड़)] of international issues — such as the conflicts[kón,flikt(battle,विवाद)] in Indo-China and Korea, the Suez Canal crisis and even the conflict in Austria — in all of which India played a role without any specific agenda for itself, became a trickle.
T. P. Sreenivasan
Perhaps our early day interventions happened because of the activism of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which pronounced itself on every major international issue in its declarations. By shaping those pronouncements, mainly by balancing and moderating them, India found fulfilment in playing its international role. It did not find it necessary to take initiatives to resolve disputes or avert[u'vurt(avoid,दूर रहना)] conflicts, except in its own neighbourhood. Our insistence on bilateralism in resolving issues may also have been an inhibiting factor.
From international to regional
In the post-Cold War era, India’s internationalism began to be confined to regional and other groupings, most of them economic. Concerns about the protection of the global commons, such as the environment, assumed importance. We began looking at protecting our own interests, taking positions like ‘no mandatory reduction of green house gases for the developing countries’. We realised that our interests coincided with those of the great powers and the large developing countries like Brazil and even China. Copenhagen was a real turning point in our environment policy when we virtually disowned[dis'own(Prevent,परित्याग)] the Kyoto Protocol except in name. Our nuclear tests in 1998 and the subsequent nuclear deal with the United States left India with no like-minded countries in disarmament. It was the arm-twisting by the U.S. that made the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) provide us an exemption.
UNSC membership
We had earlier used the non-aligned position that only non-permanent membership should be increased until comprehensive reform is accomplished, just to thwart[thwort(spoil,prevent,व्यर्थ)] the U.S. sponsored quick fix solution of Germany and Japan being made Permanent Members. However, we then moved on to the G-4 initiative — under which India, Brazil, Japan and Germany would seek permanent membership — which has very few takers among the small developing countries. The G-77 virtually disappeared from many forums because India’s leadership in it withered[wi-dhud(fade,मुरझाना)] away.
India continued to take a global view in G-20 and the World Trade Organization (WTO), primarily because of the reputation of Dr. Manmohan Singh as an economic guru, even for Barack Obama. Dr. Manmohan Singh’s withdrawal from the international arena and his close relationship with the U.S. in India’s interests changed the Nehruvian view that India’s dreams coincided with the world’s dreams. During our last term at the U.N. Security Council, India seemed to be in a dilemma[di'le-mu(confusion,दुविधा)] as to whether we should work with the nonaligned caucus[ko-kus(group,दल)] or plough a lonely furrow; we ended up in flip-flops. Both the Permanent Members and the nonaligned caucus found our term a mixed blessing.
“A study of Prime Minister Modi’s visits and speeches reveals that his strategy is that of a businessman, one who makes deals only for benefits. His neighbourhood policy is an example ”
Mr. Modi’s surprise initiatives in foreign policy from day one seemed to project him as an internationalist. As Raja Mohan summarised in his book Modi’s World, “he warmed up to America, recast the approach to China and Pakistan, sustained the old friendship with Russia, deepened the strategic partnership with Japan and Australia, boosted India’s neighbourhood policy, wooed[woo(seek favour,समर्थन मांगना)] international business leaders and reconnected with the Indian diaspora.”
We could add to this his championship of the reform of the Security Council; his stress on the environment; and him taking initiatives on getting closer to France, Germany, Canada, the island states and now Africa. But the change is not only in style and eloquence, but in turning Indian foreign policy inward. He has abandoned[u'ban-dund(leave,छोडना)] internationalism, genuine in the case of some of his predecessors[pree-du,se-su(former,पूर्वज)] and a cloak in the case of some others. In any relationship, the litmus test[lit-mus test(A test that uses a single indicator to prompt a decision,अग्नि परीक्षा)] now is: what India can gain for itself, not what India can contribute to the humanity.
Focusing on national interests in formulating foreign policy is fundamental for all countries. But turning statesmanship to salesmanship is a new phenomenon in Indian foreign policy. Our tradition has been to provide leadership to the world, not to demand it as our right, as Mr. Modi did in the case of the permanent membership of the Security Council. Speaking of our eminent[e-mu-nunt(high,famous,प्रसिद्ध)] qualifications is one thing, but claiming it as a right may drive our supporters away. Our case was that we were willing to serve on the Council to restore the balance there and to make it more relevant, not to claim membership as a right to protect our interests. Even the Permanent Members never claim that they have a right to be there.
A close study of the choice of countries Mr. Modi has visited and the speeches he has made would reveal that his strategy is that of a pragmatic[prag'ma-tik(experienced,अनुभवजन्य)] businessman who will make deals for his benefit, but the moment the profit dwindles[dwin-d(u)(smaller,कम)], he will go in search of new clients. His neighbourhood policy is a case in point. He started off with the ambition to remove poverty in South Asia through a renewed South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), but soon discovered the perfidy[pur-fi-dee(betrayal,धोखा)] of Pakistan. He persisted[pu'sist(remain,बने रहना)] for a while as India had much to gain from a transformation in India-Pakistan relations. However, SAARC is no longer a priority in his development agenda. Nepal is another case where his hopes were belied. Remember the cordiality[kor-dee-a-li-tee(affection,सौहार्द)] and the oneness he projected with Nepal in the name of the eternal values the two countries shared? However, today, he has virtually imposed an embargo[em'baa-gow(trade barrier,व्यापार प्रतिरोध)] on Nepal for not listening to our advice. Indira Gandhi did the same once, but she had explained repeatedly to the international community the rationale for her actions and had restored normalcy after a while. The world will watch our policies and make conclusions on our reliability and statesmanship.
Misplaced notion of grandeur
The common elements in Mr. Modi’s speeches abroad can be clearly identified. First and foremost, it is the grandeur[gran-ju(magnificence,भव्यता)] of India and his own role as its man of destiny. Second, he claims that things have changed dramatically since he took over and that India is now ready to receive investments and recognition as a global player. He feels the world has a stake in India’s development and security and that it is imperative for other countries to work with India.
He does not offer any specific concessions but expects the others to respond to his initiatives for their own benefit. According to him, ‘Make in India’ and ‘Digital India’ are opportunities for the world to promote India and derive benefits for themselves. In other words, the logic is one applied to a honest business in which every partner makes profit.
Statesmanship demands every national leader to have a global vision — he should place his country in the larger context of the well-being of the mankind. In Mr. Modi’s case, India is at the centre of the world. In his speeches at the UN, he claims that what the UN does today was anticipated by India long ago. If India considers the Earth as the mother and calls the whole world a family, it has nothing to learn from sustainable goals, so meticulously[mu'ti-kyu-lus-lee(carefully,सतर्कतापूर्वक)] put together by other nations.
Mr. Modi raised the reform of the Security Council even in the sustainable development session, without saying what India would do as a Permanent Member for the world. His sticking his neck out on this issue, when there is little hope of progress in the near future, seems ill-informed at best. Similarly, he did not seem to notice that the Presidents of the U.S. and China were grappling[grap-ling(fight,लड़ना)] with the problems of too much connectivity at the very moment he was selling ‘Digital India’ to the Silicon Valley. Mr. Modi also seems to take the diaspora’s loyalty for granted and expects the Indian community abroad to extend support to him at all times. History has taught us that the diaspora can be critical of India on occasions. The very people who supported the nuclear tests and the nuclear deal were critical when the deal appeared to fall through. Recent events in India have already sparked adverse reactions from them. In Dubai, they were disappointed that their issues were not addressed directly by the Prime Minister.
Whether or not a foreign policy which is premised on seeking advantages for India — without projecting a grand vision for the world —will benefit India, only time will tell. However, for an India that had once taken greater pride in giving to the world than taking from it, Mr. Modi’s foreign policy is strikingly new.
(T.P. Sreenivasan is a former Ambassador of India and a former Permanent Representative at the United Nations.)
What is the meaning of ‘buzz-kill’? (K Vijaylakshmi, Madurai)
The expression is mostly used in informal contexts in American English. When you refer to someone as being ‘buzz-kill’, you are implying that the person dampens other people’s enthusiasm. He is someone who prevents others from enjoying themselves. The expressions ‘killjoy’, ‘party pooper’ and ‘wet blanket’ have more or less the same meaning as ‘buzz-kill’. The word can be used with things as well.
Please don’t invite our boss to the party. He is a definite buzz-kill.
Running a marathon in this weather? Sounds like a definite buzz-kill.
What is the meaning and origin of ‘icing on the cake’? (Ramakrishna Rao, Ramachandrapuram)
Children love cakes; they are partial to ones that have icing on them. Some children take great delight in licking the icing off before they start eating the cake. They think that the icing makes the cake even more delicious. The expression ‘icing on the cake’ is mostly used when you are happy about the situation you are in. Then, something happens which makes your situation even better. It’s also possible to say, ‘frosting on the cake’.
I was thrilled after winning my first title. When the person from Nike told me the company was going to sponsor me, it was icing on the cake.
How is the word ‘feisty’ pronounced? (L Devika, Delhi)
The ‘ei’ in the first syllable is pronounced like the ‘y’ in ‘my’ and ‘by’, and the final ‘y’ is like the ‘i’ in ‘bit’, ‘kit’ and ‘sit’. The word is pronounced ‘FY-sti’ with the stress on the first syllable. It comes from the word ‘feist’ meaning ‘small dog’. When you say that someone is ‘feisty’, what you are suggesting is that the individual is very courageous and determined. The word is usually used with someone who is physically small, but is willing to take on others who are much bigger. Feisty has a negative connotation as well. It can be used to describe someone who is ‘thin-skinned’ — someone who gets upset or angry very quickly.
Don’t be fooled by her looks. She’s a feisty old lady.
He said something, and my brother got a bit feisty and slapped him.
What is the difference between ‘reticent’ and ‘reluctant’? (R Arunachalam, Chennai)
Though there is a tendency among people to use these two words interchangeably, there is a distinct difference in meaning between them. The word ‘reluctant’ suggests that the person is unwilling to do something — he may choose not to do it or he may delay doing it. ‘Reticent’, on the other hand, has nothing to do with unwillingness. When you say that a person is ‘reticent’, what you are suggesting is that the person is very reserved. He is someone who doesn’t interact with people freely; he is a very shy individual. During the course of a conversation, he doesn’t reveal too much about himself. Reticence is an inherent quality of an individual; reluctance is not. A person may be reluctant to talk about certain things; he may not be a reluctant conversationalist.
Rakesh was reluctant to tell his boss what happened at the party.
I don’t think Hari is conceited. He doesn’t say much because he’s reticent.
****
“A compromise is the art of dividing a cake in such a way that everyone believes he has the biggest piece.” Ludwig Erhard
With the success in reducing child mortality, the challenge before India is to safeguard early-life conditions in order to prevent long-run loss in welfare for individuals and the economy. Malnutrition rates for India are extremely high, with about 38.4 per cent of children being stunted[stún-tid(small in size or quantity,बौना)] and 46 per cent underweight (National Family Health Survey, 2005-06). There is an emerging consensus[kun'sen-sus(agree,सहमति)] that early childhood represents a critical period for the formation of cognitive[kóg-nu-tiv(knowledge,ज्ञान)] and non-cognitive skills that affect long-term wellbeing. Several recent studies examine the long-term effects of general nutritional deprivation at critical periods, starting in-utero[in 'yoo-tu,row(in the uterus,गर्भाशय)] till the first two years of life. The findings indicate that long-run well-being is highly sensitive to the environmental conditions experienced early in life.
The new economics of the lifecycle recognises that childhood is a multistage process where early investments feed into later investments. The effects of poor growth until the age of two are irreversible[i-ri'vur-su-bu(permanent,स्थायी)] for an important set of adult outcomes, including not only physical growth and disease resilience, but also education and economic productivity. Any shock during early childhood can prove costly, not just in the short run but also in terms of lifetime skill formation.
Increased climatic variability poses special challenges for child nutrition, especially for subsistence farmers depending on rain-fed agriculture. Given how dependent rural lives are on weather conditions, a rainfall shock is likely to affect household income due to a reduction in agricultural production, as well as food availability, which, in turn, affects the nutritional outcomes of children. Households often have to revert to suboptimal children coping mechanisms, like taking out of school or deferring healthcare expenditure.
Additionally, in the context of developing countries, child health shocks are likely to interact. For example, a child who is malnourished may be less able to fight off or recover from a disease. Similarly, a malnourished mother is more likely to bear a child who has lower ability to cope with health shocks. Moreover, the same shock can have differential impact depending on the initial level of health and access to social insurance. Importantly, the long-run consequences['kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)] of such shocks depend on the availability and effectiveness of mitigation[mi-ti'gey-shun(lessen,कमी)] strategies before the household. For example, households with better assets and access to credit are better able to compensate. There is evidence that children from households that are the most socio-economically vulnerable[vúl-nu-ru-bul(weak,कमज़ोर)] are worst affected in their nutritional outcomes.
One way forward is to have an effective social protection mechanism that would enable households to maintain food security and protect the nutritional outcomes of children. As such, research findings provide additional justification for interventions such as weather insurance, social insurance schemes or policies ensuring food security, which shield infants from the health consequences of temporary environmental, civil and economic shocks. We need to recognise that programmes safeguarding early childhood vulnerability can play a critical role in any sustainable development agenda.
Interestingly, by analysing the cost-benefit ratios, we find the returns to investing early in the lifecycle are high — both for the individual as well as the society in which she lives — whereas the follow-up remediation of inadequate[in'a-di-kwut(insufficient,अपर्याप्त)] early investment is often difficult and costly. There is no equity-efficiency tradeoff for early childhood investment, and this has an important bearing on policy design. Therefore, monitoring the nutritional indicators of children becomes especially important. To design better action plans, we need objective data on nutrition and its drivers at the most disaggregated[dis'ag-ru,geyt(separate,अलग)] level. Nutritional biomarker data, which is critical to this debate, should be made open and at least available on request to researchers and policymakers.
In spite of the increased importance of early childhood investment, we seem to be going in the opposite direction, with reductions in the outlays for the midday meal scheme, etc. The government must keep in mind that investing in disadvantaged young children simultaneously promotes equity and productivity.
Indian economic policymaking today faces two criticisms: First, that storytelling is far ahead of reality and second, that incremental reforms represent a lack of courage. But how does this square with India’s nine-rank rise in Transparency International’s corruption index, 16-rank rise in the WEF’s competitiveness index, and its topping global foreign direct investment rankings? One explanation is that the world has been fooled by marketing that “puts lipstick on a pig”. I disagree; these rankings echo[e-kow(repeat,दोहराना)] historian Samuel Huntington’s quip[kwip(witty saying,चतुराईपूर्वक उत्तर)] that the gap between India’s ideals and reality is not a lie but a disappointment. We have always been a 10-horse power engine running on two, and confidence is not a mathematical state but an emotional one. India doesn’t need a “realistic” plan, but a multi-year vision far ahead of our reality. While it’s fair to criticise the government’s crazy fringe grinding its dated social agenda, it’s unfair to ignore the potentially self-fulfilling impact of unrealistic visions, marketing and incremental reform on job creation.
Mocking the new economic vision — Make-in-India, Digital India, Skill India, cooperative federalism and ease-of-doing business — gathered momentum after the recent Silicon Valley tour with Edward Luce writing about “digital delusions”, Aakar Patel calling India’s “march to greatness” a “giant[jI-unt(large,बड़ा)] bubble” and 100 US academics of Indian origin warning that Digital India will “repress the constitutionally protected rights of citizens”. But any great first-generation entrepreneur knows that ambitions and goals must be larger than your pockets, or current capabilities. Progress needs the useful delusion that economist Albert Hirschman called the “hiding hand”, under which entrepreneurs grossly underestimate the real odds of failure. Given the guaranteed time lag[lag(fall back,पिछड़ना)] between big visions and reality, entrepreneurship is the art of staying alive long enough to get lucky; Richard Attenborough’s movie Gandhi was released 20 years after it was proposed in 1962, Lupin took 33 years to reach a market cap of Rs 1000 crore but reached Rs 90,000 crore in the next 15, and Infosys took 23 years to reach its first billion dollars in revenue but reached the next in a few months. Similarly, political entrepreneurship is the art of getting re-elected before your long-term interventions work, but that is not easy. NDA 1 lost, but UPA 1 reaped the harvest; Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy beat Chandrababu Naidu but soared on his reforms; and Gerhard Schroeder’s labour reforms cost him the next election but converted Germany from “the sick man of Europe” into Angela Merkel’s manufacturing powerhouse. India’s inexorable[in'ek-s(u-)ru-bul(relentless,लगातार)] elections and deep problems need political entrepreneurs to buy time with big visions; the confidence of foreign and domestic job creators is a mind game that precedes job creation.
Political entrepreneurs have three reasons to choose incremental over big bang reforms. First, India is a genuine democracy; it’s clear that, say, Chinese President Xi Jinping would never need to withdraw a GST or land bill. A benevolent[bu'ne-vu-lunt(generous,उदार)] dictatorship might seem to be the best form of government but you are more likely to end up with Robert Mugabe rather than Lee Kuan Yew. Indians are not irrational, ignorant or dyslexic — it’s just that our citizens and 30 lakh election winners disagree a lot. Second, big bang reforms imply one solution for all of India, but exports labour markets like Bihar need different interventions than import labour markets like Kerala, whose population is now 9 per cent Bihari. Finally, big bang reforms create an antibiotic reaction. If you propose 100 or zero, you usually get zero. India got more labour reform in the last one year than the 20 years before that because we stopped equating it with hire and fire and tackled inspections, apprentices[u'pren-tis(learner,प्रक्षिशुता)], provident fund, decentralisation and online compliance. Of course a labour contract that is marriage without divorce must change but, just like the difference between a list of ingredients and a recipe, successful reform needs sequencing, proportioning and prioritising. Improving the ease-of-doing business involves a million negotiations but it would be delusional to believe that a public target to improve India’s global ranking and publishing a state ranking do not help. Big bang reforms are surgery without anesthesia; sustainability for India’s reforms will not come from a regulatory beheading, but with death by a thousand cuts.
Countries are narrative. Poet Maya Angelou says the universe is not made of atoms but stories. Is America’s exceptionalism and optimism — Abraham Lincoln said America was the last best hope of the earth and Ronald Reagan believed it was always morning in America — a child or parent of its success? Leaders are dealers in hope, as reflected in Jawaharlal Nehru’s 1942 letter from Ahmadnagar jail: “Whether we were foolish or not... we aimed high and looked far.” Of course this government’s undoing could be friendly fire from its crazy fringe. And big vision without civil service reform will fail, because the brain of the Indian state is currently not connected to its backbone and hands. But its economic ambitions aim high and look far. I understand the mocking by Western columnists because, as Peter Frankopan cites in the great new book, The Silk Roads: “The accepted and lazy history of civilisation, wrote Wolf, is one where ‘Ancient Greece begat Rome, Rome begat Christian Europe, Christian Europe begat the Renaissance, the Renaissance the Enlightenment, the Enlightenment political democracy and the Industrial Revolution. Industry crossed with democracy to yield[yee(-u)ld(give,देना)] the United States, embodying the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’.” What I don’t understand is the letter from Indian academics in the US; the India of their youth was hostile[hós,tI(-u)l(unfriendly,विरोधी)] to their ambitions, so they chose exit over voice or loyalty (as in Hirschman’s superb framework about the three responses to country decline). But India contains multitudes, is changing rapidly and needs their help by their moving back, rather than a collective display of Wysiati — What you see is all there is, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman’s wonderful phrase for “the cognitive illusion that prevents people from seeing beyond what is visible from the tip of their noses”. The odds have always been tough for India, but odds can change radically with unrealistic ambition.
