Puncturing wrong notions of the Northeast

Peace accords[u'kord(agreement,सहमति)] are always met with some amount of cynicism[si-ni,si-zum(distrust,दोषदर्शिता)]. The Naga Peace Accord signed on August 3 was no exception; it too had people just waiting for it to fail. Several of these people wrote long pieces in the media too. The problem with these experts is that they look at peace from the conventional[kun'ven-shu-nul(traditional,पारम्परिक)] prism of the state, putting so much pressure on militants that they eventually surrender. This method of bringing about peace in Nagaland was tried for several decades, but met with no success.This is because the Nagas want an ‘honourable settlement’, and that can only take place when the peace dialogue is among equals.

For someone living in what is conveniently termed a ‘conflict[kón,flikt(battle,विवाद)] zone’, I may be forgiven for expressing hope that the framework agreement signed between the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) [NSCN (I-M)] and the Government of India will lead to a process where not just the NSCN (I-M)’s terms will be included but also the terms of other stakeholders in what could finally become a peace deal. The others include elected representatives of Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam; civil society groups; and factions of the NSCN, and other militant outfits in Nagaland. Those with dismissive[dis'mi-siv(disregard,उपेक्षापूर्ण)] attitudes towards the NSCN(I-M) are only betraying the mindset of many in this country, particularly those who head institutions of strategic importance.

Conventional wisdom says India has plenty of experience in the effective management of conflicts in the Northeast. But look at the result. Three-fourths of the Northeast is perpetually[pu'pe-ch(oo-)u-lee(always,हमेशा)] declared disturbed and dangerous under the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA); there are over 4,00,000 troops deployed to hold the region together; the rule of law has virtually collapsed; there is rampant[ram-punt(uncontrolled,अनियंत्रित)] trampling[tram-p(u-)ling(crush,कुचलना)] of human rights. Does this make India proud? For those who believe that the Northeast is too complex and hence its problems can only be ‘managed’ and not resolved, such tactical management interventions have actually rendered[ren-dur(cause to become,बना देना)] the region untenable[ún'te-nu-bul(indefensible,असमर्थनीय)] and the situation messy.

From management to resolution

Even the NSCN (I-M) talks began with the aim of ‘managing’ the violence. The present dialogue is a paradigm shift from ‘management’ to ‘resolution’, by enlarging the spectrum of engagement. At no point have so many disparate[dis-p(u-)rut(different,पृथक)] groups expressed their desire to be part of the peace dialogue.

Part of the problem lies in the fact that there seems to be serious doubts about the integrity of the citizens of the Northeast and Kashmir. AFSPA has been enforced only in these areas because these regions are ‘disturbed areas’. Yet, despite the horrific uprisings in Central, Eastern and Southern India, those Maoist-hit regions are not seen as ‘disturbed’. This says a lot. Also, how does the government sitting in Delhi expect a ‘disturbed’ region to behave normally when it comes to delivery of governance?

Kashmir has its inherent contradictions[kón-tru'dik-shun(opposition,विरोधाभास)], but the people of the Northeast are, by and large, reconciled[re-kun,sI(-u)ld(harmonize,सामंजस्य)] to the idea of nationhood even though they still battle with a past that privileges ethnicity over nation. Communal tensions are palpable[pal-pu-bul(being felt,स्पर्शग्राह)], but the truth is that except for Nagaland and Manipur, the other five States are moving on an even keel despite the occasional gunfire. And the ordinary people in this region want a climate of peace where they can pursue their education and livelihoods without having to pay the militants an undue share of their hard-earned profit.

We are talking here of a region with disparate forces which had to be brought on board for the peace talks. This required a rather unconventional approach on the part of the government interlocutor[in-tu'lók-yu-tu(middle man,वार्तालापि)], R.N. Ravi. The run-of-the-mill containment policy is passé[pa'sey(old,पुराना)]. People here are tired of semantics[si'man-tiks(meaning of a word,अर्थविज्ञान)] from the warring sides. But they are also acutely[u'kyoot-lee(sharply,तेज़ी से)] aware of the entrenched[in'trencht(established,मज़बूत स्थिति बनाना)] orthodoxy in the higher echelons[e-shu,lón(Level,प्रतिष्ठा)] of this country, which is taking an uncharitable view of the Naga peace process. These people would like to believe that the Naga problem is merely one of law and order. In fact, the entire argument is based on the presumption that the NSCN (I-M) is Thuingaleng Muivah-centric and Mr. Muivah is a hold-over of the past; that his outfit is a debilitated[du'bi-lu,tey-tid(weak,कमज़ोर)] entity; that its resonance[re-zu-nun(t)s(vibrancy,गूँज)] is limited to the Tangkhul Nagas of Manipur. How far this is from ground realities!

‘Sovereignty[sóv-rin-tee(independent,प्रभुसत्ता)]’ also has other connotations[kó-nu'tey-shun(intension,संकेत)] that the two parties need to work out. For instance, the concept of sovereign power-sharing between the Centre and the States is not new; this is the essence of Indian federalism. If the States have, in the past decades, ceded[seed(surrender,त्यागना)] much of their powers to a willing Centre because they find it convenient to do so, then they have themselves to blame. When the framers of the Indian Constitution cogitated['kó-ji,teyt(think,सोचना)] on the idea of federalism, they perhaps envisaged[en'vi-zij(imagine,कल्पना)] that strong States actually make a strong Centre and not vice versa.

On the issue of integration, it has been reiterated[ree'i-tu,reyt(repeat,दोहराना)] by the interlocutor that re-drawing the political boundaries of the Northeastern States is not on the agenda. He seems to be suggesting a safety valve for fulfilling the political aspirations of Nagas to live together in future through a democratic process and not by effecting integration under the shadow of the gun.

There are also security experts who assert[u'surt(affirm,दृढ कहना)] that Naga Hoho, the apex body of the Nagas, has not endorsed the peace framework. This betrays their ignorance. The Naga Hoho has repeatedly endorsed it. Even the Nagaland Legislature has adopted unanimous[yoo'na-nu-mus(full agreement,एकमत)] resolution in its support.

It is no joy to puncture certain well-entrenched viewpoints that find expression in the mainstream media and speak of the Northeastern region either from a position of patronage or of ignorance. But it must be done and this article is one such attempt.

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After the cut

RBI Governor Raghuram Rajan sprang a surprise on Tuesday by reducing the benchmark repo rate by 50 basis points (bps) — twice what was expected. The move paves[peyv(make,बनाना)] the way for the banking system to lower interest rates, which, in turn, would lead to cheaper retail loans for homes and cars, etc. More importantly, it is expected to spur[spur(inspire,प्रेरित)] investment activity in the domestic economy. Recently, almost all economic data pointed towards the need for a rate cut. Global demand has plummeted[plú-mit(drop sharply,अचानक गिर जाना)], with Indian exports registering nine straight months of decline. Domestic economic recovery is still tentative[ten-tu-tiv(doubtful,अनिश्चय)], with inventories piling up[pI(-u)ling úp(gather,collect,इकट्ठा)] in the face of weak demand. Credit growth fell to a 20-year-low in June, and yet the banking system is saddled[sa-d(u)ld(burdened,लदा हुआ)] with growing bad loans, thanks to persistent[pu'sis-tunt(continual,लगातार)] policy logjams[lóg,jam(blockage,problem,कठिनाई)] delayed clearance of projects and aggressive expansion by the corporate sector since 2011-12. For an investor, it is a paralysing scenario. However, the inflation rate has moderated to the RBI’s liking, and it appears Rajan is now willing to do his bit to induce[in'dyoos(bring,लाना)] investment at a time when the other engines of growth are sputtering[spú-tu(scramble,लड़खड़ाना)]. The focus must now shift to the transmission of these cuts to the intended beneficiaries.

Before the cut on Tuesday, the RBI had reduced repo rates by 75 bps since January. However, the pass-through by banks to customers was only 30 bps, on an average. With the latest cut, that differential stands at 125 bps. In fact, the current gap between the repo rate and the bank rate is 300 bps. In other words, a loan seeker has to pay 3 per cent more than what the RBI signals. In the past, banks have blamed the high interest rates paid by the government on short-term saving schemes like the public provident fund, or post office deposits. But the real reason for the inefficient pass-through is that banks must constantly allocate more funds to counter the growing NPAs. To boost transmission and push banks to aggressively cut interest rates, the finance ministry has announced that it would review the interest it pays on small savings.

The NDA government has signalled that it would push for investment-led growth as against the UPA’s consumption-led model. However, high interest rates, deeply stressed banks and an over-leveraged corporate sector make that strategy a non-starter. This cut could help break the negative cycle. But the government must ensure that two key conditions are met. One, no fiscal slippage that could renew the inflationary spiral and lead to high interest rates. Two, speeding up of reforms that make it easy for people to invest and do business

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Can india create the next google

The sun may set last in California, but start-ups are first to rise on this Californian coast,” began Prime Minister Narendra Modi in an address to Silicon Valley on September 26.

PM Modi, in his first-of-its-kind visit to Silicon Valley last weekend, discussed the burst of innovation in India and continued collaboration with the United States. Indian start-ups received more than $3.5 billion in venture funding in the first six months of this year alone. India is now the largest tech in Asia, the third-biggest in the world, and it’s on track to become the global leader. There has been tremendous progress and we have much to celebrate.

The question Indian entrepreneurs must propose in return is: “How can India become a place where start-ups rise to the same greatness as in Silicon Valley?”

Indian entrepreneurs have built our country into a strong contender for the next tech hub, in spite of regulatory hurdles. The results of a recent survey on cross-border deals demonstrate the urgent need for India’s government to update policy. The American Bar Association recently asked 300 US- and India-based attorneys about, among other things, doing business in Southeast Asia. Many respondents said they were hesitant to engage with Indian companies, citing[sIt(mentioned,उल्लेख)] several regulatory problems inherent to the region. Sixty-five per cent of those surveyed reported it is difficult to work with Indian companies. Only 40 per cent said the same of working with Chinese companies. US start-ups were considered the least difficult to work with, at 30 per cent.

If these obstacles[ób-sti-kul(problem,बाधा)] were to be removed, one could only imagine India quickly growing into the superpower it has always wanted to be, bringing jobs and economic resources to a country at a crossroad.

Modi’s strong focus on “Start-up India” is very encouraging to those of us hoping for an international playing field that gives Indian start-ups a fair chance. In order for Start-up India to succeed, the government must rework the system to make it a more efficient.

Start-ups are responsible for two-thirds of the jobs in the US. The same can be true of India with the implementation of streamlined policies addressing the entire life-cycle of a start-up (creation, growth and shutdown). If unleashed, Indian start-ups will employ a majority of the 10 lakh youth that join the workforce every month. Start-ups will employ the next generation.

To truly move the needle on the Start-up India vision, the government needs to do at least the following.

First, decide the rules. Regulators must stop procrastinating[pru'kra-stu,neyt(delay,विलंब)] on making difficult decisions. Investors don’t want to hedge bets on a country lacking reliable rules. A tax treaty with the US is another policy that demands attention. Currently, most venture capital investments into India’s technology product industry are being routed through Mauritius or Singapore because of their favourable capital gains exemptions in the event of an investor exiting. It is to India’s advantage to allow investors from Silicon Valley to work with Indian companies directly, without Mauritius as a middleman. A zero capital gains regime[rey'zheem(rule,शाशन)] will substantially increase flows even from individual angel investors. In any case, around 80 per cent of start-ups fail, leading to no capital gains taxes. There is no revenue loss for the government here, even while it will earn personal income and other taxes from employees of these start-ups until they fail.

Second, make the rules simple. Tax laws should not only be certain, they should also be simple. The government must ensure consistent application of clear tax rules. Enough of officials chasing larger tax notices!

On Sunday, I was able to attend a breakfast with senior government advisors leading the Start-up India initiative. The meeting was extremely collaborative and they solicited[su'li-sit(request urgently,beg,incite,आग्रह,उकसाना)] detailed feedback on how to make Start-up India a reality. It was encouraging to see the bureaucrats with a sense of purpose, as they laid out their objective to have positive policies that nurture a start-up throughout its business life-cycle: One, simplify company creation; two, introduce a bankruptcy law; and three, streamline issues around exits and liquidity.

We also discussed in some detail how to streamline exits in terms of M&A and IPO. There is now a direct line of communication between the policymakers in government and TiE (The Indus Entrepreneurs,an organisation fostering[fós-tu-ring(raising,nurture,बढ़ावा देना)] entrepreneurship) in Silicon Valley. The Indian government will benefit from working with TiE and investors, who together bring deep institutional knowledge of creating and scaling start-ups.

TiE’s Billion Dollar initiative, meanwhile, has united top legal minds, investors, entrepreneurs, think-tanks like iSPIRT (Indian Software Product Industry Round Table) and trade bodies like Nasscom (National Association of Software and Services Companies) to consolidate[kun'só-li,deyt(strengthen,सुदृढ़)] key policy recommendations. The next step for this group is to include other voices and provide a single body of unbiased[ún'bI-ust(impartial,fair,निष्पक्ष)] feedback.

The plan set forward by Modi’s team is a major leap forward and reflects the prime minister’s view that start-ups are “the engines of progress”. India is home to some of the world’s most brilliant technical minds, most innovative start-ups and a growing collective of venture firms. If China can create large success stories like Alibaba, why can’t India create the next Google?

Modi embodies the traits of an effective and empathetic CEO of 1.25 billion people. He has hired and appointed amazing talent to carry out his vision. As an investor, my bet is that Modi will “scale up” India to great success.

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Benign gatekeeper not the solution

It’s hard not to appreciate Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg’s dogged[dó-gid(stubborn,दृढ़)] pursuit of acceptance for his idea —internet.org, which is about providing a taste of the Internet to those who have no access to it, despite the heat it has generated in countries such as India.

The social network giant[jI-unt(big,बड़ा)], which, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi rightly pointed out, would be the third-most populous in the world if it were a country, last week announced a few changes to internet.org, including a new identity, Free Basics. The changes come just a few months after a huge uproar in India over internet.org being antithetical[different,विपरीत)],an-ti'the-ti-ku to the idea of Net neutrality, which is that nobody plays the gatekeeper to the Internet.

Sriram Srinivasan

Earlier this year, Facebook tied up with Anil Ambani’s Reliance Communications to launch the service in India. The start was surprisingly quiet, given that only a few months earlier India’s netizens had risen quite vocally against India’s No. 1 telecom carrier Bharti Airtel’s decision to charge consumers extra for use of apps such as Skype to make free calls over the Internet. The awareness about Net neutrality, the principle that all data must be treated equally, caught on.
Before long, internet.org found itself caught in the wrong end of the Net neutrality debate.Amid[u'mid(in the middle of,के बीच)] massive public outrage[awt,rey(anger,गुस्सा)], Mr. Zuckerberg defended the idea. This, even as numerous[nyoo-mu-rus(many,बहुत से)] petitions against it were signed and partners such as NDTV and Cleartrip decided to opt out of the internet.org platform.

Fast forward to now. The service is available in 19 countries. In February, India became the sixth country to have internet.org. That points to quite a fast scale up.

Indian market crucial

The changes to internet.org, significantly, came barely days before Mr. Modi met with Mr. Zuckerberg. India currently represents Facebook’s second-biggest user base in the world even as it still has a large population of Internet have-nots. It is clear that Facebook needs the blessings of India’s policymakers. It is also clear that the social network has worked to make the idea more politically palatable[pa-li-tu-bul(acceptable,स्वीकार्य)].

This is how: the brand name change, for instance, is much more than just cosmetic, as internet.org’s likeness with the real Internet was considered to be hugely misleading. Already, as a Quartz story in February this year, citing[sIting(mentioned,उल्लेख)] a study, showed, many Facebook users in Indonesia had no idea they were using the Internet. The story said, “This is more than a matter of semantics[si'man-tiks(meaning of a word,अर्थविज्ञान)]. The expectations and behaviours of the next billion people to come online will have profound effects on how the Internet evolves.” So, the name change does matter, even if Facebook won’t explicitly[ik'spli-sit-lee(clearly,स्पष्ठतया)] say so.

Also, to be fair, Free Basics is more open than its earlier avatar, with Facebook some months back opening up its platform for outside developers. The service started just as a collection of some pre-selected websites that got chosen through an obscure process. Encryption of information flowing through the platform is the other initial loophole that has been plugged.

“It is difficult to believe it is just altruism[al-troo,i-zum(selfless,निःस्वार्थ)] that is making companies such as Facebook, with business models directly linked to numbers with access, solve the problem of connectivity. ”

All of that, however, can’t erase the fundamental problem with such a service, which is that it allows Facebook to be a gatekeeper to the Internet where none existed earlier. 

There’s surely a case to be made for Free Basics in a country such as India, where universal access to the Internet is still a long way away. As Mr. Zuckerberg likes to say, more than a billion Indians don’t have access to the Net.

And it is absolutely true that the have-nots “can’t enjoy the same opportunities many of us take for granted.” There is also some merit in the thinking that people who can afford Internet cannot sit in judgement about the quality of Internet that is made available for those who cannot afford it.

Free options

But even if one were to acknowledge that Free Basics has a role, in the best interests of Internet’s openness it has to be argued that such a role can only be a stopgap['stóp,gap(temporary,कामचलाऊ)].Even today, it can be argued that Free Basics is a suboptimal solution to the problem of lack of Internet access.

There are alternatives that manage to offer free data to users without donning the role of a gatekeeper. One such alternative goes by the name Jana. The Boston-based start-up’s pitch is that it has figured out a way to offer Internet access to billions of people in the emerging world without it playing gatekeeper. And its pitch appears more convincing.

Jana rewards its smart phone users in two ways, as an article about it in The Hindu some months back pointed out. It reimburses[ree-im'burs(compensate,क्षतिपूर्ति)] users the cost of downloading its clients’ app. It also gives them free data, with which they can access any content online.

It’s also extremely difficult to believe it is just altruism that is making companies such as Facebook look to solve the problem of connectivity. The business models of Internet companies, Facebook included, is directly linked to the number of people that can be brought under Internet access. More the merrier!

Whether Free Basics will pass the Net neutrality test of India’s administrators is anybody’s guess. Even if it does, there are enough reasons to believe it must have an expiry date if the government is serious about providing universal Internet access.

It’s an ‘A’ for Mr. Zuckerberg’s determination to see internet.org succeed. As far as the government is concerned, it must now work towards delivering the real deal (cheap, easy and universal access) in the years to come, so that the likes of Free Basics can become redundant[ri'dún-dunt(extra,अनावश्यक)] fast.

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Health And The UN

September 8 marked 15 years to the day since the United Nations espoused[e'spawz(adopted,स्वीकार)] the millennium development goals (MDGs). Soon the world will adopt a new regime[rey'zheem(rule,शाशन)] in global milestones, the sustainable development goals (SDGs) that extend for the next 15 years, from 2015 to 2030. Given the way the MDGs captured the imagination of the developing world, it is perhaps safe to say that the SDGs will be a akin[u'kin(similar,के समान)] rallying point on a series of development issues.

Of the eight MDGs, three relate directly to health. The first goal was to reduce mortality among children under the age of five; this is only moderately on-track. The second goal was to reduce maternal mortality. On this India is off-track. India is on-track for the third goal, which was to halt[holt(stop,रोकना)] and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, and only moderately on-track on the fourth goal, which was to halt and reverse the spread of malaria and other major diseases. In short, we have achieved only one out of four targets. Globally, this is a worry, because if India does not achieve the MDGs, given its size, neither will the world.

Are the SDGs any different from the MDGs? For one thing, only one SDG addresses health, as compared to three MDGs. On maternal and child health, the SDGs extend the MDGs, since they have largely not been met in many developing countries. Non-communicable diseases have been included, reflecting concern for the growing incidence of non-communicable disease even among the poor. Alcohol abuse and tobacco have also been targeted.

Interestingly, the targets that have a specific timeline mentioned are those for which cost-effective interventions have been identified — for example, institutional delivery to reduce maternal mortality. It raises the question: Are we adopting goals that have the “right” cost-effective interventions, rather than discovering cost-effective interventions for the right goals? For instance, mental illness is one of the most prevalent morbidities in India, and suicide is the leading cause of death among people between 15 and 29. There is only a passing mention of this in the SDGs. Perhaps because there is no cost-effective intervention against mental illness and suicide?

If the SDGs are seeking to complete and extend the task of the MDGs, they should learn from the experience of the last 15 years. The failure of the MDGs has been blamed on a lack of adequate[a-di-kwut(enough,पर्याप्त)] financing and governance failure. This seems to be a simplistic answer. The critique should look also at the way the MDGs were structured. First, the goals and targets were interpreted too literally, without reference to the starting point from which different countries began the journey. Second, the cost-effectiveness analysis focused on addressing the biological causes of disease, with little recognition of the social determinants of health. It was this biological agent that was the target of the cost-effective intervention, maybe because biological causes are easier to tackle.

Let us reckon[re-kun(consider,सोचना)] one of the key goals that India has failed to achieve — reduction in maternal mortality. Institutional delivery was the solution chosen to achieve this goal. Strengthening health infrastructure, training manpower and incentivising women who would otherwise have given birth at home to come to an institution for their delivery have been the goals of the health system since 2005. Yet we did not achieve the MDG for maternal mortality reduction. Why? The answer lies outside the health system: Poor women in rural areas face tremendous challenges in reaching an institution for delivery, despite government subsidies. There is evidence that skilled birth attendance inside the home can be just as safe. Many women find it more comfortable, less socially intimidating[in'ti-mu,dey-ting(daunting,भयभीत करने वाला)], and certainly less expensive. But it takes time and sustained effort to ensure the quality of care that will make it a plausible[plo-zu-bul(credible,विश्वसनीय)] choice.

This should teach us that the goals we set should be informed by the realisation that health issues cannot be seen in isolation from the social context. Can we put in place strategies that may not bring quick wins, but over a period of time will ensure better health equity? Can we

liberate ourselves from time-bound targets? We need to recognise the flaws[flo(fault,गलती)] in the design of these targets and reflect on ways to address them if we are to fare any better in the next 15 years than we did the previous 15.

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Revolt of the aspirational class

Hardik Patel is today one of India’s most watched political serials. He represents a movement, enacts a fable[fey-bul(short moral story,नीतिकथा)] and constitutes, along with Indrani Mukerjea, the two great aspirational tales of contemporary India. Today, one should not ask: “Who is Hardik Patel?,” but realise there is a Hardik in all of us. He is a Patel in a sea of Patels, who has branded his difference. He is a Patel who knows that he can make a difference.

The key to Hardik, the man, is his face, his style. There is a belligerence[bu'li-ju-run(t)s(aggressiveness,आक्रामकता)], an impatience representing an India which is tired of waiting, a majoritarian group ready to flex its regional muscles. Hardik understands market as well as electoral mathematics. The market tells him that you need a degree to be employed and the maths tells him that the political power of the Patels should guarantee educational entry. It is clear that this is a demand for more, a demand the Patels realise no electoral government can refuse. The bully-boy maths is clear and, with it, the barely repressed violence. In fact, this violence makes it clear that Hardik is neither Sardar Patel nor Mahatma Gandhi.

Shiv Visvanathan

His quaint[kweynt(strange,अजीब)] slogan relating to the proposed, then cancelled, ‘Reverse Dandi March’ explains it all. If the Dandi march spoke of non-violence and confronted the British Empire with the vulnerability[vúl-nu-ru'bi-lu-tee(weakness,कमज़ोरी)] of the body, the reverse march not just abandons[u'ban-dun(give up,त्यागना)] but completely reverses these symbols of the past. The idol of the present reverses the iconography of the past, trampling[tram-p(u-)ling(crush,कुचलना)] the memory of history in pursuit of politics.

More middle class than marginal

The ‘Reverse Dandi March’ is neither Swadeshi nor for Swaraj, it is more middle class than marginal. It projects ban, threat and boycott as messages. In fact, as Hardik explained, if Gandhi were present today, he would abandon non-violence, as the current state is more repressive and violent than the British Raj. When he argues, “bring out the swords,” he moves closer to Bhagat Singh. In fact, even that comparison is unfair. Hardik smells more of Shiv Sena and Bajrang Dal within a caste idiom.

In fact, he can be considered part of ‘project Macaulay II’. If Macaulay spoke of English education and the power of the degree, Hardik speaks of education as a guarantee for jobs. There is a double battle here, a pitched struggle against two systems. First, it is a battle with the Patel patriarchs who have been pompous[póm-pus(overblown,दिखावा)] about power and remiss about caste responsibilities. The very idea of reservation handicaps the Patels in the education game and it is worse to see Patel-run educational institutions being extortionate[ik'stor-shu-nut(outrageous,steep,बेहिसाब)] about entry.

Harik Patel plays the new Macaulay by claiming “no degree, no democracy.” There is an Oedipal struggle here where Patel challenges the patriarchy of Modi, claiming that the lotus will not bloom till the Patels come home. The Patels, despite minor differences, were a taken-for-granted constituency of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Hardik’s father was a middle-level BJP worker. So, the revolt against both Modi and the Patel establishment emphasises an Oedipal revolt, establishing the role of youth in the movement. For them, the talisman[ta-lis-mun(amulet,ताबीज़)] is an educational degree in this era of development.

Hardik, one senses, is both popular and populist. His popularity is seen in the responses his calls for action attract. Every wave, threat or promise of violence adds a layer of support for him and his mystique. If the ban is the Modi regime’s[rey'zheem(rule,शाशन)] favourite policy, the boycott becomes Hardik’s weapon.

Patel power is demonstrated by threats to withdraw milk supplies, and collective withdrawals from banks. Protests by women across towns and cities also shows that the movement has caught on. It is clear that this is not a Dalit struggle for rights but the struggle of a dominant caste asking for bigger takeaways from the caste pizza. A demonstration conducted in cars and tractors does not indicate backwardness.

There is a change in attitudes which indicates not just a new sense of society, democracy and law as rule games. Hardik and all the new Patels, Gujjars and Jats are very clear that the rules should work for them, that the Supreme Court ruling that reservation be capped at 50 per cent is irrelevant as long as they have not been accommodated. The cynicism[si-ni,si-zum(distrust,दोषदर्शिता)] of political life allows them the refuge of the Ninth Schedule, the safe haven that places laws outside the ambit[am-bit(range,पहुँच)] of judicial review. However, the questions our democracy and the administrative system will soon ask is: How many provisions in the Ninth Schedule are the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) likely to have? Is it going to a special, dominant caste haven for the Gujjars, the Jats and the Patidars? The Patel attitude makes a mockery of the reservation games, because now it is every caste for itself. The battle now is for a bigger share and not for justice. One wonders if this scenario represents the altruistic[,al-troo'is-tik(selfless,निःस्वार्थ)] world envisaged[en'vi-zi(imagine,सोचा)] by Gandhi and Patel.

Hardik is contemporary. In fact the BJP, as a party and the ruling power, realises that he thrives[thrIv(flourish,पनपना)] on the present. He is a figure lapped up[lap up,(lick,सोखना)] by the media, an ideal subject for interviews even if his is a reverse march. He thrives on the media and network and the BJP’s attempt to block networks was a desperate attempt to mute his impact. The news of his arrest was enough to spark protests. He understands the media’s power and its multiplier effect. Second, he knows how to work the media. By contacting the diaspora, he plays on Modi’s weakness because for Modi, they are the ideal Indians — hardworking and trouble free. Here, protest movements sound like agony aunt columns, while the diaspora abroad is stoic[stow-ik(unimotional,भावहीन)], civic and proud of its civic self.

The diaspora is Modi’s ideal constituency as it is even more patriotic than the resident Indian. The Patels there represent a civic class as opposed to the local Patels, who are political and agitationist. Hardik is shrewd[shrood(smart,चतुर)] and calculating enough to issue threats of a Patel demonstration in New York. For Modi, that is sheer[sheer(complete,pure,शुद्ध)] embarrassment and amounts to irreverence[i're-vu-run(t)s(disrespectful act,अनादर)] within the very symbolic constituencies he made powerful. Hardik, the trickster, was not something the BJP anticipated.

A Patel vs. Patel battle

The battle between Patel and Patel is fascinating to watch. ‘Patel vs. Patel’ is the stuff of graphic novels, somehow reminiscent[re-mu'ni-sunt(remindful,याद दिलाने वाला)] of Mad magazine’s great comic strip Spy vs. Spy. At one end stands Anandiben, who has been completely ambushed[am,bûsh(wait in hiding to attack,घात)] by the Patel uprising in her backyard. The Chief Minister invokes the riots of 1985 and 1987 but what she really seems to fear is a Nav Nirman Andolan-like agitation. It may be recalled here that the Nav Nirman agitation of 1974 brought down the elected government of then Chief Minister Chimanbhai Patel.

Anandiben gives the official spiel[speel(speech,भाषण)] that caste and community have no role in the secular game of development while realising that her politics and power is totally Patel- driven. It is interesting that she treats the masses as ‘labour’ needed for development while Hardik speaks the language of electoral politics. The Chief Minister emphasises caste and class as the critical categories while Hardik plays up the youth card. For Anandiben, ‘youth’ is not a category. She sees Hardik’s complaints as humbug[húm,búg(fraudulent,धोखेबाज)], clearly showing she is out of touch. The first threat to Modi’s legitimacy is emerging from his own backyard and the BJP is speechless with misunderstanding. Hardik realises that youth and women are bandwagons[band,wa-gun(popular trend,चढ़ता सूरज)] on which he can ride to power.

It is clear that Hardik is no longer a local figure because media and the limits of electoral politics have made him a new hero. Hardik Patel is not just a sign but a symptom that the politics of caste quotas needs to be revisited and debated. Our politics has become a politics of quotas where administrative fiat can make or break the future of communities. The battle to be seen as “more backward” becomes critical. Caste becomes the most critical idiom of politics, a currency to be speculated with, in the electoral brokerage of power. The gap between distribution as disbursing an increasing share of the cake and justice as a normative phenomenon becomes bleak[bleek(despair,black,निराशाजनक)].

The court intervenes to argue that caste cannot be the sole determinant of reservation. In fact, it struck down the government’s notification that included Jats in the official list of OBCs. Hardik Patel’s campaign has opened up the Pandora’s Box about justice and the ability of electoral democracy to handle issues of affirmative action.

Hardik is the new sign of our times and his actions indicate that the new generation is not going to wait for the court or the Parliament to determine its fate. In fact, what Hardik represents is the ambitions of the small town, ready to see democracy and market as acts of consumerism. This is a generation that has no memories of the ration card, that believes in speed and struggles for instant gratification, which believes that life, whether in the form of a start up or a struggle, is just a few steps away. The power of the Hardik Patel story lies in this. He is representative of the new Indian small town — confident, parochial[pu'row-kee-u(narrowly restricted,सिमित)], primordial yet deeply modern. He is the new Indian of the global era, one who can make or break democracies. His mood becomes the litmus test of politics today.

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Tricks of trade

Last month, the department of commerce (DoC) suspended negotiations with the European Union on the proposed Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement. This came on the heels of EU regulators banning the sale of some generic drugs on grounds of data manipulation. The DoC’s decision has invited three criticisms. First, that there was no need to take such an extreme measure; negotiations could (and should) have continued. Second, that India’s action suggests trade negotiators are unaware of global trends and the prospective emergence of large trading blocs like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); instead, India should be actively seeking opportunities for bilateral and regional trading arrangements that expand its commercial outreach. Finally, that India’s approach to trade negotiations ought not to be restricted to free-trade agreements (FTAs); it should embrace[em'breys(adopt,समाविष्ट करना)] sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) as well as technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and trade in services. Some of this commentary is spot on; part of it is misplaced and inaccurate.
There was no need to suspend the negotiations. It smacks of a lack of maturity in dealing with trade partners. In the past, there have been numerous[nyoo-mu-rus(many,बहुत से)] instances of agri-product consignments being destroyed or the entire EU market being effectively closed. Even in such trying circumstances, dialogue continued. Commercial diplomacy means remaining engaged.
Drama and posturing are always part of trade negotiations. But that should remain strictly within the confines of the negotiating room. The unwritten widely accepted rule is that theatrics should never spill into the public domain. Negotiations cannot and should not be conducted under the glare of the media. Moreover, a display of petulance[pe-tyû-lun(t)s(irritability,चिड़चिड़ापन)] sends avoidable signals to other prospective trade partners with whom similar economic arrangements are being negotiated. There is another major downside. Since India suspended the negotiations, it will be for India to seek to resume them — and that will come at a cost.
With a weakened WTO, it is vitally important to be alive to global trends and newly emerging trading blocs. However, there is no reason to presume that Indian negotiators are not. As for their political masters — that is another story. Fortunately, the TPP does not appear to be imminent. In all likelihood, it will be hostage to the next US presidential elections, and once the silly season starts in January 2016, the prospect of a trade agreement will rapidly recede. Some partner countries in Asia and Europe may heave a sigh of relief as they have reservations about components of the treaty. Yet others will be relieved given the rough economic patch they are going through. However, there are other disconcerting global trends. The WTO has been enfeebled[en'fee-bul(make weak,कमजोर)] by the developed countries. The US will never allow the Doha Round to be completed; witness how it has stalled[stol(delay,रुका हुआ)] it from 2008 on. The WTO will, therefore, be confined to salvaging[sal-vij(save,बचाना)] the remains of Doha, arrangements for bits and pieces — that is, those that do not materially impact global trade flows or correct major distortions. Hence, India must start looking at alternatives, such as regional and bilateral trading blocs. This has been conscious policy since 2004.
It is certainly true that in the initial stages trading arrangements were confined to trade in goods, or FTAs. However, for over a decade, India has worked on comprehensive economic partnership agreements (CEPAs) that embrace trade in goods, trade in services, investment, SPS, TBT, competition, mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) and a number of other subjects. It is, therefore, plain wrong to aver[u'vur(affirm,दावे के साथ कहना)] that India has confined its approach. These add-on topics are technical and replete[ri'pleet(full,परिपूर्ण)] with legal pitfalls[pit,fol(difficulty,कठिनाई)]. It is these complexities that have delayed culmination[kúl-mu'ney-shun(completion,समाप्त)] of many CEPAs. It is easy to talk about why such matters should be addressed; it is quite another matter to negotiate legally binding arrangements.
There are several problems that beset India’s trade negotiations. First, and a favourite among politicians, is the often unfounded but firmly held belief that the partner needs India more than India needs it. Second is the erroneous notion that India must win on all fronts. Negotiations are about give and take. Third, the give and take has to be viewed from a pan-economy perspective, not an individual ministry’s. And, yet, this is precisely what we do. Hence, the innate[i'neyt(natural,सहज)] reluctance[ri'lúk-tun(t)s(unwilling,अनिच्छा)] of ministries to cede[seed(surrender,सौप देना)] anything until they have something in exchange. Fourth, negotiators need bargaining chips; if India wishes to access developed country markets in services, it has to open up its markets in services. And it fails on the latter. Fifth, the counterpart’s negotiating team strength is five to 10 times that of India’s. Our negotiators are amongst the ablest in the world, but they are seriously short-handed. Last, occasional hiccups prompt a disproportionate outcry motivated by narrow interests. Playing to the domestic gallery yields[yee(-u)ld(return,outcome,देना)] meagre and short-term returns. But that is invariably what we do.
Over the past year, the woes[wow(suffering,विषाद)] of domestic industry have been ascribed[u'skrIb(attribute,श्रेय देना)] to preferential trading arrangements, mostly without any factual basis. And there have been calls by publicly elected representatives to review the entire policy surrounding such arrangements. In stark[staak(blunt,कठोर)] contrast, the prime minister has repeatedly asserted[u'sur-tid(affirm,दृढ़तापूर्वक कहना)] his view that commercial and economic relations must be the cornerstone of diplomacy. The PM has affirmed his commitment to CEPAs. It is, therefore, astonishing[u'stó-ni-shing(surprising,चौका देने वाला)] that both the deeds and words of others in the establishment convey completely different signals. It is time the government provided a clear-cut policy announcement, if only to assure prospective trade partners. Else, there will always be the doubt: Is India really serious?
Some thoughts on what the government needs to do immediately. First, credible commitment to preferential trading arrangements has to be demonstrated, and only the PM, who carries conviction, can do this. Second, CEPAs have political economy dimensions and some subserve larger strategic objectives. This is why the Trade and Economic Relations Committee (TERC) was established. Chaired by the PM, the TERC comprised the finance minister, external affairs minister, agriculture minister, commerce minister and others who could take an overall view on the balance that needed to be stuck through negotiations and the political red lines that could not be crossed. This was useful to set goals (and limits) for trade negotiators. The TERC should be reactivated.
Third, in 2010, a proposal was mooted[moot(consider,विचार करना)] to significantly strengthen India’s negotiating teams by inducting subject-matter specialists, blind to their origins. Despite repeated reassurances of the primacy of our ambassadors, this proposal was systemically stymied[stI-mee(blocked,रोकना)] by interested parties in the MEA. It has languished[lang-gwish(fall,गिरना)] there for five years, as has our ability to strengthen negotiating teams. This must change. Again, only the PM can get this done. Finally, India’s competitiveness has been eroded because of the steady real appreciation of the rupee. Why should we be so concerned about a strong exchange rate? Why not let it depreciate? With low commodity prices, the pass-through effect on inflation will also be muted.

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Lessons in crowd computing

On July 14 this year, at least 27 people were crushed to death on the banks of the river Godavari in Andhra Pradesh when a crowd surged[surj(rise rapidly,तेज़ी से बढ़ना)] towards the ghat, causing a stampede[stam'peed(run hurriedly,भगदड़)].This is yet another example of a tragedy that was waiting to happen, given the lax[laks(loose,ढीला)] crowd management systems in India and our reluctance[ri'lúk-tun(t)s(unwillingness,अनिच्छुक)] and inability to learn from similar incidents in the past.

To understand the situation, we can use a systems approach: even a passing familiarity with networks, fluid mechanics and operations research (queuing principles and assembly line balancing) are enough to start with. Network and flow principles used by irrigation engineers to control floods and dam bursts, or by the police to manage traffic, or by sanitary engineers to control water/ sewage flow, or by electric engineers to prevent tripping and excess loads, or by IT specialists to ensure data flow are all equally applicable in crowd management and control. Of course, the caveat['ka-vee,at(warning,caution,चेतावनी)] is that we are dealing with people.

To take an example, if in-flow exceeds out-flow over a period of time, the volume of the material inside the system will continue to rise till it exceeds the designed capacity of the confined space at some point. Two things will then occur: either the flow channel will collapse under pressure or the space will become unfit for survival. The result will be a disaster of the kind that happened at the Godavari Pushkaram. Careful planning, monitoring and regulation could have prevented the disaster, as evident from what was put in place after the disaster happened.

Dimensions of planning

The first step is to plan. Three dimensions need to be considered: the spatial,temporal and the event-related; or, ‘a confluence[kón-floo-un(t)s(meeting,संगम)] of place, time and event’. If any space, say, a cricket ground, is required to host a crowd, then it first needs to be studied. Next, if at any point of time a sudden surge of activity is anticipated, then additional planning is needed. Third, if there is a specific event happening in that space-time context, this will imply extra attention.

So, for instance, we know that a temple attracts crowds during festivals, and all these people aim to visit the garbhagriha or sanctum sanctorum. Therefore, it is this space especially that needs to be carefully monitored. Second, during any event, festivities will reach a peak at some point: in marriages it is when the muhurat starts, for example. Last, some events can precipitate[pri'si-pu,teyt(Hurried,जल्दबाज़ी) uncontrollable crowd behaviour: for instance, distribution of prasad, which can render[ren-du(provide,प्रस्तुत)] crowds unruly[ún'roo-lee(disobedient,उपद्रवी)].

Of course,sudden,unforeseen emergencies (like a fire) can also trigger unfortunate incidents. Even if such incidents can’t be predicted, they should always be anticipated and prepared for.

Administrators should understand all three dimensions of crowd management. Solutions include enlarging or creating additional spaces for the event, counters (ghats in this case), extending the time for the event, planning for large crowds and, finally, anticipating whether any particular event can trigger sudden, unusual movement. The confluence of event, space and time can then be either avoided by repeating the event at other locations, or by creating more regulated space.

The second aspect of crowd management is ‘flow regulation’. On normal days, one would expect crowds to be distributed randomly, peaking perhaps twice or thrice. However, during the confluence of event, space and time, there may be a sudden, sharp peak; even if arrivals follow the famous bell or normal distribution curve, the curve may have a narrow base and a sharp peak (sudden increase in arrivals). Therefore, flattening this curve by regulating the rate at which the crowd builds up can be achieved through controlling crowd flow at the entry and exit points. If, in a continuous flow process, monitoring the flow and keeping check on how it’s being exceeded is not possible, a system can be created whereby people can be allowed in batches of fixed numbers. Again, like in an assembly line, balancing is important: every stage of flow should roughly take an equal amount of time to negotiate, or we will have queues building up at some stages, which will become bottlenecks.

Third, it is easier to manage steady rather than turbulent[tur-byu-lunt(disruption,उग्र)] flows, but human movements will naturally be turbulent. To ensure steady flows, apart from manned entry and exit points, it might be useful to make all movements unidirectional, segregating[se-gru,geyt(separate,अलग करना)] the flows in different directions. Signage, announcements and volunteers to assist should be available. Buffer zones to cater to additional flows are essential. Decongestion is possible only if movement regulation starts from the peripheries. There is no point imposing order at the location itself, since managing huge masses of people within a limited space is difficult; spreading out to the peripheries is a better option.

Monitoring the crowd
Last, even if planning is done well, systematic and meticulous[mu'ti-kyu-lus(carefully,सावधानी से)] monitoring is important. The feedback received through monitoring can help regulate the system. If, at some point, outflow doesn’t happen at the planned rate, the control room should, through some mechanism (say CCTV), check the reason and immediately act to decongest and restore the flow. Those who are part of the crowd (or a traffic jam) will never know where the bottleneck is; only someone outside the system, but monitoring it closely, will be able to recognise this and act immediately. Regulation will include controlling flows at entry and exit points, decongestion and removing bottlenecks along flow paths and resorting to transfers to temporary buffer spaces, if necessary.

All this may require additional resources. But it is better to spend more than lament[lu'ment(sorrow,regret,शोक)] later. It is also important to create awareness. Lack of information often confuses crowds: rumours and panic can lead to tragedies. The benefits of queuing up should be explained to children early. A contingency[kun'tin-jun(t)-see(possibility,संभावित)] plan should be in place including evacuation[i,va-kyoo'ey-shun(emptying,रिक्तीकरण)] and approach channels, first aid, ambulance, fire services, water supply and so on.

A systems approach where lessons from one field are applied to others is usually successful and productive. The sooner we learn to do this in the case of crowd management, the better. Only then can we call ourselves a developed country.

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Rekindling the disarmament momentum

India today has a unique opportunity to rekindle[ree'kin-dul(arouse again,फिर से जगाना)] the global nuclear disarmament momentum, and to kick-start this ambitious but useful project, New Delhi should offer to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).This proposal may sound untimely and strategically unwise, but there are at least three reasons why India should accede[ak'seed(to agree,स्वीकार करना)] to the CTBT, besides being able to tap into a wealth of data generated by the CTBTO’s International Monitoring Stations:

First, to respond to global developments in nuclear disarmament and arms control as a responsible stakeholder in the non-proliferation regime[rey'zheem(rule,शाशन)];

Second, to negotiate India’s entry into the global nuclear order and third, to revive[ri'vIv(recreate,पुनर्जीवित)] India’s long-forgotten tradition of campaigning for global nuclear disarmament.

Global nuclear developments

Seventy years since the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945, and 45 years since the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into force in 1970, the global non-proliferation regime is under unprecedented[ún'pre-si,den-tid(new,अभूतपूर्व)] stress. The recently concluded 2015 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) was a failure of historic proportions and the international nuclear order will now find it hard to get back on its feet, both normatively and functionally. Indeed, most of the regime’s key pillars — non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — are under immense[i'men(t)s(big,विशाल)] stress, contributing to a systemic crisis.

Post the 2015 RevCon, both the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) — the U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China — of the NPT and the disarmament enthusiasts among the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) seem to have run out of ideas on how to revive the global nuclear order.

While the NPT is staring at an uncertain future, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has not even been able to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut off treaty (FMCT) thanks to Pakistan’s unhelpful decision to block the commencement[ku'men(t)s-munt(start,शुरुवात)] of negotiations, and the CTBT seems to be losing steam due to the lack of enthusiasm shown by its one-time forceful supporter, the United States.

The primary reason behind this system failure is the unkept promises by the NWS on the issue of global nuclear disarmament. The lack of any progress on Article VI of the NPT, which deals with nuclear disarmament, remains a stark[staak(complete,पक्का)] reminder of the lopsided['lóp'sI-did(one side,एकतरफा)] and flawed[flod[imperfect,defective,दोषी)] nature of the global nuclear order. The so-called ‘13 Practical Steps on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’, agreed to by the NWS at the 2000 NPT RevCon were regrettably ignored thereafter. The complete absence of any progress on the ‘grand bargain’ (that the NNWS would not make nuclear weapons and the NWS would eventually abolish[u'bó-lish(do away with,बहिष्कार)] the weapons they have) that lay at the heart of the NPT-led non-proliferation regime, has eroded the normative core of the global nuclear order.

Moreover, there is an unhealthy shift in the contemporary non-proliferation agenda. From the traditional concerns of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the focus today has shifted to counter-proliferation and nuclear security, primarily due to concerns about nuclear terrorism and the physical security of nuclear material. It is likely that future state-sponsored non-proliferation initiatives would eschew[e'shoo(stay away,दूर रहना)] disarmament but deal with counter-proliferation, with an emphasis on the potential use of force.

Various counter-proliferation initiatives such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the global nuclear security summit process essentially function outside the NPT framework, with states voluntarily participating in them; so they are hardly focused on questions of global nuclear disarmament.

Finally, the newly minted disarmament initiative called the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’, dealing with the ‘catastrophic[ka-tu'stró-fik(harmful,विनाशकारी)] humanitarian consequences[kón-si-kwun(t)s(result,परिणाम)] of the use of nuclear weapons’, and spearheaded by NNWS and European Non-proliferation enthusiasts, has further complicated the traditional non-proliferation agenda, especially for India. Many of the promoters of the Humanitarian Initiative view India’s exceptional treatment by the contemporary nuclear order as setting an unhealthy precedent[pre-si-dunt(example,मिसाल)] and damaging to the normative framework of the nuclear order. Moreover, given the potential of the Humanitarian Initiative to drastically alter the traditional non-proliferation agenda, India’s desire to be accommodated in the global nuclear order is bound to hit major roadblocks.

In short, therefore, the recent RevCon failure and the decaying[di'key(decompose,विघटन)] global nuclear architecture would have adverse implications for India’s desire for an enhanced role. New Delhi has been seeking the membership of various strategic export control cartels such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). But it will now be harder for it to convince the European non-proliferation supporters to continue to treat India as an exception, without making a substantive normative offer in return. In this rather indeterminate structural context, New Delhi should be able to think and act creatively to make its case look attractive to the gate-keepers of the system.

To do that India should put forward two proposals: First, propose and push, with like-minded countries, for the adoption of a global ‘No first use’ agreement on nuclear weapons, and; second, sign the CTBT, if not immediately ratify the same. This will clearly reinstate[ree-in'steyt(restore,पुनः स्थापित करना)] the lost global enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament and clarify India’s ‘benign’ nuclear intentions to the international community.

India should offer to sign the CTBT as a quid pro quo[kwid'prow'kwow(return for something,प्रतिदान)] for admission into the institutions governing the global nuclear order, which essentially means membership of strategic export control cartels such as NSG, MTCR, Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement. Although they are private initiatives functioning outside the NPT-centric treaty framework, they form an important cog in the non-proliferation regime. New Delhi has been pursuing membership of these organisations for years now without much headway. Indeed, New Delhi has not even formally applied to the NSG for membership precisely because it has not been able to garner[gaa-nu(collect,एकत्र करना)] enough support from the 48 member countries of the cartel, some of which remain unconvinced about India’s credentials. It is time for New Delhi to think creatively and out of the box about securing membership of these organisations. In the run up to the accession to the CTBT, India should seek admittance into them, and the promise of signing the CTBT will clearly work in India’s favour.

India’s inability to reach an accord with Tokyo has been yet another roadblock in its pursuit of producing more nuclear energy as this deal is key to further operationlising its deals with France and even the U.S. The current dispensation in Tokyo is not averse[u'vurs(unwilling,अनिच्छुक)] to a deal but has been insistent on a guarantee from New Delhi that the latter would not conduct any more nuclear tests. While doing so in writing would infringe[in'frin(go against,उल्लंघन करना)] on India’s sovereignty[sóv-rin-tee(free from control,प्रभुसत्ता)], offering to sign the CTBT could assuage[u'sweyj(pacify,alleviate,कम करना,शांत करना)] the Japanese anti-nuclear sensibilities.

Phased nuclear disarmament

Finally, signing the CTBT would also make India’s claim for a UNSC seat stronger.

By signing the CTBT, India could signal its intent to help revive the global arms control and disarmament momentum, despite being a nuclear weapon state, thereby once again becoming part of the global disarmament movement which it once was.

Let us not forget India’s remarkable history of anti-nuclear activism, from proposing an end to nuclear testing in 1954 after the U.S. nuclear testing in Bikini Atoll to signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 to Rajiv Gandhi’s impassioned plea to the U.N. General Assembly in 1988 for phased nuclear disarmament.

India played a key role in the negotiations to establish the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and actively participated in the negotiations on the NPT, but decided not to sign when it became clear that it would become an unequal treaty. Let us also remind ourselves of the fact that India had also for long advocated for a CTBT, although the eventual treaty was not accepted. However, resistance to CTBT does not need to continue anymore given that India does not intend to conduct any more tests (as declared in its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests). Hence accession to the CTBT can be used as a bargaining chip to mainstream itself into the nuclear order.

India’s current engagement with the international nuclear order can be described as its second coming, after its anti-nuclear activism from the 1950s to the 1980s. From being vehemently[vee-u-munt-lee(fierce,strong,जोरदार ढंग से)] opposed to nuclear weapons and any less-than perfect nuclear treaty, India today is open to negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and is no longer as opposed to signing the CTBT as it was in the mid 1990s. The then Foreign Secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, said in 2009 that India “won’t stand in the way’ of the CTBT if it ‘actively contributes to nuclear disarmament”. Various statements by Indian officials have since hinted India’s reduced opposition to signing the treaty. In any case, India was one of the co-sponsors of the CTBT resolution at the 1993 session of the UN General Assembly.

Once India signs the CTBT, some of the other hold-out states are likely to follow, such as Pakistan. Others like the U.S. (whose Senate is blocking the ratification[ra-ti-fi'key-shun(confirmation,अनुसमर्थन)] though the U.S. government has signed it) and China would also come under pressure to accede to it. Thus India will be able to reverse the current non-proliferation pressure which makes sense not only from a strategic point of view but also from a normative perspective. Signing the CTBT, then, is in India’s enlightened self-interest.

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Know your english,26 sep,2015

What is the meaning and origin of ‘queer the pitch’?

(K Nitya, Warangal)

The expression is mostly used in rather informal contexts. When you ‘queer someone’s pitch’, you ruin his plans. This act of interfering may be deliberate or it may be an accident. In either case, you are making it difficult for someone to achieve his goals. Another expression that has a similar meaning is ‘to rain on someone’s parade’.

*Seetha queered my pitch by applying for sabbatical leave before I did.

*I wanted to go for a long drive. But my wife queered the pitch by lending the car to her brother.

The expression comes from the world of street markets. The place where a vendor sets his barrow down or where he puts up his stall for the day is called a ‘pitch’. ‘Queer’ originally meant to ‘spoil’ or ‘ruin’. Very often, the location of the ‘pitch’ played a key role in determining the success of a business. To make sure they found a good spot — one that customers would gravitate to — vendors usually arrived early to the market place. Those that couldn’t find a suitable place often came up with innovative ways of attracting the attention of potential customers. They would shout, sing, tell jokes, chatter non-stop, etc. to get people to look in their direction. By doing this, they often ruined or spoiled (‘queered’) the chances of other vendors doing good business.

What is the difference between ‘ambiguous’ and ‘equivocal’?

(M Lakshmi, Pune)

First, let us deal with the pronunciation of ‘equivocal’. The first vowel sounds like the ‘i’ in ‘it’ ‘bit’ and ‘sit’, while the following ‘qui’ sounds like the ‘qui’ in ‘quit’, ‘quiz’, and ‘quill’. The ‘o’ and the ‘a’ that follow sound like the ‘a’ in ‘china’. The word is pronounced ‘i-KWI-vi-kel’ with the stress on the second syllable. When something that someone says lacks clarity, it can be said to be ambiguous or equivocal. Both words suggest that what the person has said can be interpreted in several different ways; the statement can have several different meanings. When you accuse a politician of being ‘equivocal’, you are suggesting that he has deliberately or intentionally chosen to be vague. An ambiguous statement, on the other hand, can be intentional or unintentional.

*The Minister’s equivocal remarks made some of the reporters angry.

*Rewrite the sentence. It is ambiguous.

Is it okay to say ‘I am shifting house’?

(Sarath Kumar, Pollachi)

In India, when we change our place of residence, we normally say ‘I am shifting house’ or ‘I am shifting’. The few dictionaries that list ‘shift house’ as a possibility, insist that it is an expression used only in India. Native speakers of English do not ‘shift house’, they ‘move house’.

*We will be moving house next month.

What is the meaning of ‘Grey hair becomes you’?

(N. Sidhesh, Tiruchi)

When you tell someone that something becomes him/her, you are paying the individual a compliment. In the example you have given, you are suggesting that grey hair suits the person; it makes him/her look attractive or dignified. The expression ‘becomes you’ is mostly used in formal contexts.

*The blue saree she is wearing becomes her.

*Don’t try to be a stand-up comedian in class. It doesn’t become you.

******

“Kids make nutritious snacks.” — Ambiguous Newspaper Headline

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Know your english 26 sep,2015

What is the difference between ‘amateur’ and ‘novice’?

(J Shanthi, Chennai)

The word ‘novice’ is mostly used to refer to someone who is a beginner. For example, if you say, ‘When it comes to cricket, I’m a novice’, you mean that you are not very good at the game because you have just started playing it. When you say that someone is an ‘amateur’ cricket player, what you mean is that the individual is not a professional; he does not play the game for the money. An amateur is someone who takes part in an activity for the sheer joy of it. Unlike a novice, an amateur can be very skilled at the game; he is not necessarily a beginner. The word comes from the Latin ‘amotorem’ meaning ‘lover of’.

*Devi is an amateur cricket player. He plays on weekends.

*I didn’t want a novice like Mala on my team.

Unlike ‘novice’, the word ‘amateur’ can be used to show disapproval. When someone doesn’t do a very good job of something, you can say that he has done an amateur job.

*Raghavan did an amateur job of fixing the leak.

What is the meaning of ‘tail wagging the dog’?

(Vivek Sharma, Delhi)

The ‘tail’ is a very small part of a dog, and usually it’s the dog that wags the tail and not the other way around. The American expression ‘tail wagging the dog’ is normally used to refer to a situation where a minor or insignificant part of something controls the whole.

*In some households, the parents do whatever their children want them to. It’s a case of the tail wagging the dog.

Another expression that is sometimes heard is ‘wag the dog’. Whenever there is a scandal, the government tries to divert the attention of the public by turning the spotlight on something insignificant. Such a ploy is called ‘wag the dog’.

How is the word ‘emeritus’ pronounced?

(George Matthai, Cochin)

The first ‘e’ and the ‘i’ in the third syllable sound like the ‘i’ in ‘sit’, ‘lit’ and ‘fit’, while the ‘e’ in the second syllable is pronounced like the ‘e’ in ‘set’, ‘pet’ and ‘get’. The final vowel sounds like the ‘a’ in ‘china’. The word is pronounced ‘i-ME-ri-tes’ with the stress on the second syllable. It comes from the Latin ‘emereri’ meaning ‘earning one’s discharge by service’. It was first used to refer to veteran soldiers; those who had earned their retirement after having served in the army for many years. Nowadays, emeritus is frequently heard in academic contexts. When a professor who has served the university with distinction retires, he/she is sometimes given the title ‘emeritus’. The word can also be used to suggest that the retired individual retains the title on an honorary basis. For example, when the editor of a newspaper retires, he can call himself ‘Editor Emeritus’.

Is it okay to say ‘Sita has gotten to like him’?

(L Divya, Chennai)

In American English, ‘gotten’ is frequently used in speech. ‘I’ve gotten used to the pain’; ‘She’s gotten a new car’, etc. Such sentences would be frowned upon in writing because many people consider ‘gotten’ to be non-standard.

******

“Don’t accept your dog’s admiration as conclusive evidence that you are wonderful.” — Ann Landers

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Is India staring at deflation?

The Chief Economic Advisor raised an alarm when he said, “price-wise, the economy appears to be in or close to deflation[di'fley-shun(decline of prices,अपस्फीति)] territory,” and this view was based on the GDP deflators estimated through first-quarter GDP data. This is indeed a serious issue at a time when all out efforts are on to revive[ri'vIv(recreate,पुनर्जीवित)] the investment cycle and growth in the economy. So how serious is the issue of deflation in India?

To begin with, one needs to understand that deflation is nothing but falling prices over two consecutive quarters. In other terms, it is negative inflation. To answer the query about deflation, one would have to look at global prices trends, along with data from both the wholesale price index (WPI) and the consumer price index (CPI).

Based on WPI inflation, one might infer[in'fur(guess,अनुमान)] that we are in a deflationary situation because, for the 10th straight month, inflation is in the negative zone. That is, prices have been falling every successive month. For August, WPI inflation stood at minus 4.95 per cent. Indeed, the fall in prices in August took place across all groups in the N.R. BhanumurthyWPI basket.

But the CPI inflation data tells a different story. As compared to the deflationary trend in the WPI, the CPI is experiencing disinflation.That is, while prices continue to rise, the rate of inflation (or price rise) is slowing. This is contrary to what the trend in the WPI suggests. In essence, it implies that consumer prices continue to rise, but at a progressively slower rate. The combined CPI inflation stood at 3.66 per cent in August. This is much lower than what the RBI has kept as its target for January 2016.

By looking at both these indices one would, at best, be unable to come to a conclusion regarding deflationary pressures. The ongoing confusion about whether or not India is experiencing deflation is largely due to the divergence in these two main price indices of the economy.

With the availability of economy-wide inflation data, CPI numbers have become the nominal anchor for monetary policy in India and are therefore subject to rigorous[ri-gu-rus(exact,सही)] scrutiny[skroo-t(u-)nee(examine,जाँच)], both by producers as well as users of the data. On the other hand, WPI inflation, which reflects only a segment of the price pressures in the economy — it essentially covers about 40 per cent of economic activity — receives far less scrutiny. Moreover, a significant portion of the prices included in the WPI is still administered by the government.

Under the circumstances, and to avoid confusion, it might be a good idea to discontinue the WPI and focus on a producer price index (PPI). A PPI maps the prices received by domestic producers in the wholesale market and is, as such, a better measure. The work for building a PPI is already underway. So instead of using WPI data and arriving at erroneous[i'row-nee-us(wrong,गलत)] estimates of GDP growth and its deflators, it would be better to simply dump the index itself.

Beyond the confusion created by the divergence in CPI and WPI data, there are some interesting observations if one was to look more carefully at the details of CPI numbers. Fortunately, the Central Statistical Office (CSO) has started providing CPI numbers for rural and urban areas. The CSO also provides CPI data for 22 states. This data can provide some regional perspective on inflationary trends for the purpose of macroeconomic policymaking. The graph represents the standard deviations of CPI inflation across the states in rural and urban areas. While they need little deeper analysis, the trends in both rural and urban areas suggest that the divergence in urban areas is less than the divergence in rural areas. This suggests that the decline in inflation in rural areas across the states is less uniform.

Finding answers to why the divergence is more in rural areas could help in resolving the deflation conundrum[ku'nún-drum(puzzle,पहेली)].To some extent, it may also explain the reduced demand in rural India. Although each one of them needs rigorous empirical[em'pi-ri-kul(experimental,अनुभवजन्य)] verification, some plausible[plo-zu-bul(believable,विश्वसनीय)] answers could be as follows.

One major reason for higher inflation could be the sharp fall in agricultural activities in most of the states, especially in eastern and southern parts of the country, which are staring at drought-like conditions. While the supply-side impact of a bad monsoon could show up in price levels with a lag, the higher price volatility[vó-lu'ti-lu-tee(instability,अस्थिरता)] in rural areas might explain why rural demand has already fallen. Second, undermining of some rural development programmes (such as the MGNREGA) in the recent past, which used to act like automatic stabilisers at the state level, could explain such divergence. Third, it is also important to analyse whether higher devolution of resources from the Centre to the states, from the current year onwards, has contributed to the demand slump in rural areas. Preliminary information suggests that higher devolution to the states has been accompanied by significant cuts in the Central government’s budget allocation to some flagship social sector programmes that were mainly for the benefit of the rural population. The cuts in the Central budget were made on the assumption that state governments, with their increased pool of resources, would compensate any shortfall. However, any violation of this assumption could be a major source of the fall in rural demand. Finally, differences in public-expenditure efficiencies and monitoring mechanisms among states as well as local bodies might explain such variations in rural demand. Ambiguity[am-bu'gyoo-i-tee(unclear,अस्पष्ठता)] about the Central government allocations under plan transfers, through flagship programmes, could also be hampering[ham-pu(prevent the progress,बाधा पहुँचाना)] the expenditure strategies of state governments and further increasing regional divergences.

To sum up,while India may appear to be far from a deflationary situation, there is clearly disinflation in the economy. This deceleration in inflation could be due to external factors as well as a fall in domestic demand. The ambiguity surrounding the Centre- state expenditure strategies post the 14th Finance Commission recommendations could be a crucial determinant of the reduced demand. The more alarming bit is the volatility in rural inflation, which needs a special focus. Monetary policy, while focusing on the headline and sectoral prices, also needs to take into consideration the regional inflation perspective. For their part, both the Centre and the states should work to ensure that rural consumption smoothens. Else, growth in India might take much longer to recover.

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Modi’s unrealistic American dreams

There is at least one dimension in which the distance between Narendra Modi and Jawaharlal Nehru is not so great after all. I speak not of their fondness[fónd-nus(fónd-nus(affection,लगाव)] for the bandgala but of their penchant[penchant(preference,झुकाव)] for world travel. Not a day passes without us being informed of some impending visit by our Prime Minister. Right now, we are being bombarded with the details of the itinerary[I'ti-nu-(ru-)ree(travel plan,यात्राविवरण)] of his visit to the U.S. later this month. He will start, we’re told, with the annual meeting of the U.N. General Assembly and from there proceed to the west coast.

Nehru had undertaken this journey too, in 1949. However, we were a different country then, having inherited a bloodily-partitioned nation with a declining per capita income. On the other hand, India is today one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, hoarding a young labour stock and a substantial talent pool, making the task of its leadership a little easier by comparison.

While India must constantly engage with the rest of the world at all levels, the rest of the world does not hold the key to either the pace or inclusiveness of its economic growth. It is, therefore, altogether surprising that the leader of India should travel westward urging[ur-jing(inspire,प्रेरित)]“Come make in India.”

India’s unique place in world order
India is made to appear as a supplicant when no one asks it to be one. Nehru himself had travelled the world as the torchbearer both of an ancient civilisation and a cosmopolitan internationalism with roots in the West to which he considered himself a natural heir[ehr(heritor,उत्तराधिकारी)].Till the 1990s, many an Indian abroad would have been the beneficiary of praise from African students and American workers for India’s role in hastening[hey-suning(hurried,जल्दबाज़ी)] the process of decolonisation.It is not without significance that India had been the first port of call for Nelson Mandela after the end of apartheid[u'paa,teyt(racial favoritism,रंगभेद)] in South Africa.

Before it comes to be imagined that Nehru’s forays[fó,rey(initial attempt,प्रारंभिक)] into the wider world had amounted only to showcasing Indian attire, we may want to remember that extraordinary financial inflows had been elicited[i'li-su-tid(raised,प्राप्त करना)] then. Non-alignment brought with it an unexpected reward as the rival ideological blocks vied[vI(compete,प्रतिस्पर्धा)] with one another to shower India with aid. Over a quarter of the total financing for the Second Five-Year Plan was via official aid from the rest of the world. Michal Kalecki, the astute[u'styoot(smart,चतुर)] Polish economist who was one among many intellectuals who had made a beeline for this quickening country, had remarked pithily[pi-thi-lee(consise,सारगर्भित ढंग से)] that India’s policy of non-alignment was akin[u'kin(similar,के समान)] to “a clever calf sucking milk from two cows!”

It is also of interest that Nehru had shown no particular anxiety over wanting India as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, even as he thanklessly championed Communist China’s claims. It is not known what exactly he had thought of the prize itself, but it could not have escaped his attention that even when it was not a cabal[ku'bal,conspiracy,गुप्त दल)] of the rich and powerful it could hardly count as a democratic arrangement. Contrast this with India’s desperate attempts today to gain membership of this discredited club. But of course the world has changed since the fifties. Apartheid and colonialism have vanished[va-nisht(disappear,गायब होना)], and China is firmly entrenched[in'trencht(establish,मजबूत स्थिति बनाना)] in the Security Council, and one might say with nary a thought for India’s inclusion.

So, one should not expect Mr. Modi to travel to the U.S. with an anachronistic agenda. Yet, one may expect him to be clear of what it will yield[yee(-u)ld(give,return,मुनाफा)] in relation to India’s current priorities. An argument is usually made out in terms of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and, possibly, technology to drive the ‘Digital India’ programme.

It is incontestable that both foreign investment and the spread of Information and Communications Technology are very important for India. In fact, every effort must be made to accelerate their adoption. However, on FDI, much of what can be achieved via enabling legislation has been achieved. Further, the tariff barrier to trade has been rescinded[ri'sind(cancel officially,रद्द करना)] along with quantitative controls.

Foreign trade accounts for more than 50 per cent of the Indian economy by now. However, the promised gains in manufacturing are disappointing, suggesting that domestic supply and demand conditions may be at least as important for Indian manufacturing as is an open trade regime. It is indeed correct that FDI has increased exponentially over the past one year, suggesting to some that this reflects a new international confidence in India’s economy. While the figure is impressive it is not unprecedented[,ún'pre-si,den-tid(new,अभूतपूर्व)]. In any case, FDI accounts for less than 10 per cent of total capital formation in the country. As for the IT Mr. Modi is to meet in Silicon Valley, the U.S.-based IT industry, with its significant Indian presence, has long ago sensed the profit opportunity in engaging with India and does not need handholding. So it is likely to bide its time.

Altogether, while the government is right to pursue foreign investment and technology, it does gives the impression of not giving as much importance to other areas. Without suggesting what these areas are, we might suggest that soon as the PM returns from abroad he goes on a virtual Bharat darshan. He could even remain in the PMO while travelling backwards in a time-machine. What would be the things that he will get to see?

Domestic issues, imported solutions

He will find a farmer committing suicide in Hyderabad because he couldn’t afford medical care for his son. He will find that in Bihar, to which State he has promised an out-of-turn special assistance of Rs. 1.25 lakh crore, the overwhelming majority of rural households do not have access to sanitation. In Delhi, he will find a doctor of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) announce on television that dengue is “endemic” to its population, a grave diagnosis indeed. In Rajasthan, a State run by his own party, he would find that a senior civil servant ran an extortion racket yielding four crores in ready rupees, thus taking the meaning of “ease of doing business” to an altogether new level. So, alighting from the time machine, he is likely to be struck by the thought that while ‘Digital India’ is a worthwhile project per se, it can only be a partial answer to what needs to be done in this vast and yet underdeveloped country.

The hardship of everyday life faced by Indians has a history far older than that of Mr. Modi’s prime ministership. It is the result of decades of misgovernance. Resolving the citizens’ problems also involves a role for the States, where his writ hardly runs. But, as Prime Minister he is expected to show leadership in providing solutions to these. The least he can do is to draw attention to them, set up bi-partisan committees to propose permanent solutions, and suggest means of financing them. The role of the rest of the world — which, it seems, looms large in Mr. Modi’s imagination — in solving these problems faced by the people of India is somewhat limited.

The technical element in the solutions is fully understood and entirely within our capability to handle. Even the financial constraints can be overcome through political will. For instance, should the public sector not be required to yield a much larger surplus than it does? And shouldn’t the government plead with the well off to give-up regressive consumption subsidies? Here, even Mr. Asaduddin Owaisi, with his niche[neesh(position,आला,स्थान)] presence in the political firmament, has shown greater statesmanship by reportedly proposing that subsidies for pilgrimages, mostly undertaken by men, be diverted to educate the girl child.

Nevertheless, we wish our Prime Minister an enjoyable visit to the San Francisco Bay Area where a festival of ideas awaits him. He will find that though California is the home of the IT industry, it also has a flourishing agriculture. He will find that it is a society where diversity is celebrated — as a result of which minorities bring their best to the table. He will find women, of Indian origin at that, in highest public office. And if he ever travels to the headquarters of the iconic Apple Computers, he will find that it is headed by a gay man. Being a keen observer, he can hardly remain unaffected by these rich rewards of freethinking. In turn, we await his safe return, hopefully rewired and ready, at last, to govern.

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