Maximising the post office

Instead of hamstringing(ineffective,प्रभावहीन) public sector banks with social schemes, it is time to transfer many of these financial tasks to India Post.
Public sector bank employees are so overwhelmed by the sheer number of government-sponsored schemes they are saddled(burdened,लादना) with, that they have begun to come up with parodies(mockery,मज़ाक). One such spoof(mockery) scheme is what they have named the Pradhan Mantri Sishu Palan Yojana, where customers with SB accounts can leave their children with the bank manager for babysitting services at a nominal cost.

This might be just a joke, but it does reflect the deep frustration among bankers at being mandated to carry out an enormous(many,बहुत) number of the government’s social objectives.

There has been a lot of commentary asking the government to reduce its involvement in Public Sector Banks (PSBs). The government has been asked to reduce holdings, step away from appointments of chairmen and board of directors, and to not interfere in bank schemes such as the farm loan waiver or mandatory priority sector lending, But nobody is talking about the government using PSBs to roll out its various populist schemes, which will affect their day-to-day operations in the short run, and its overall competitiveness in the long run.

A quick search will reveal that the number of government social schemes that use PSBs is uncomfortably high. The schemes cover a range of areas such as insurance (Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana, Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana, etc), pension (Atal Pension Yojana), financial inclusion (Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana), and priority sector lending, which includes various schemes under agriculture, micro and small enterprises, education, housing, export credit and others.

Ambitious targets

Each scheme usually comes with countrywide targets set by the concerned ministry, which are then distilled and divided into smaller numbers for each bank branch. For example, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) has an ambitious target of opening 10 crore accounts, to be divided among the banks. One PSB was assigned a target of 1 crore accounts and one of its branches in Bengaluru had a target of 1,000 accounts to be opened within a week. Such targets are rarely met, and even if they are, they rarely match the desired outcomes, due to complete misalignment of incentives. With a severe dilution of Know Your Customer norms, there is enough evidence about the actual success of the scheme — 75 per cent of the accounts are empty, multiple accounts have been opened by single persons, and there are huge costs that the banks bear (Rs. 200 per bank account).

But what is perhaps the biggest cost to banks is the opportunity cost they lose in implementing these schemes. Ambitious targets and time frames take up precious time that could have otherwise been used to carry out the original mandate of the banks — accept deposits and make loans. All normal bank activity comes to a standstill during such public drives, with employees being swamped(fill,भरा होना) by the targets. Even big business clients are asked to wait until the pressure eases. The PMJDY drive halted(hold,रोकना) all normal banking activities for an entire week.

At a time when public sector banks are finding it hard to beat the competition posed by deep-pocketed foreign and private sector banks, they can ill afford to let their biggest customers take a back seat while they meet social goals.

Relevance of India Post

However, since social security measures are important, how about using another government-run behemoth, India Posts, for this task? As it struggles to find relevance in the digital age, perhaps the answer lies in reusing its enormous reach for delivering social schemes. In the U.S., this idea is being examined, and the U.S. Postal Service presented a report this month outlining exactly how postal banking could promote financial inclusion while turning in a neat profit for the service.

Two criteria have to be considered: reach and capability. India Post has a network of over 1.5 lakh branches across India, a reach that far exceeds all the PSBs combined. Of the 1.5 lakh branches, about 1.4 are in rural areas, compared to the combined 23,000 rural branches of the public sector banks.

India Post already runs the Post Office Savings Bank account, which handles cash worth Rs 6 lakh crore per year across 28 crore accounts. The service has also been quite successfully handling cash payments in the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act — nearly 5.6 crore MGNREGA accounts, and wages amounting to nearly Rs. 10,000 crore have been disbursed to beneficiaries through 97,709 post offices across the country. Of the three main building blocks of financial inclusion — cash storage, disbursing payments, and giving credit — India Post has already shown that it is quite capable of handling the first two.

In the longer run, for India Post to play a bigger role in the fulfilment of the government’s social objectives, the following steps can be taken: First, one of the smaller and healthier PSBs could be merged with Indian Post so that the latter acquires a banking licence and a trained workforce. Second, incentives could be offered to the present workforce to sit for the banking exams. Third, banking exams could be made a requirement for a percentage of the new recruits; and, finally, the banking division of the post office could be brought under the RBI’s regulatory purview.

With this, India Post can expand from financial inclusion to handling insurance and pension accounts, priority sector lending in rural areas, and many other financial functions as well.

Some post offices around the world have undergone this transformation quite successfully. The Royal Mail of the U.K., for example, does all the things a bank does and additionally even provides telephone and broadband service.

This move could free public sector banks from being yoked(link,जोड़ना) to social sector objectives and allow them to become competitive and function freely in the highly cut-throat banking sector. Simultaneously, it could harness the potential of the post office network in India.

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From universities to coaching shops

The proposed standardisation of university syllabus will only drag down the quality of education to the lowest common denominator.
The Ministry of Human Resource Development announced a short while ago that it was introducing changes in the structure and functioning of central universities, numbering around 40. The suggested changes were made public in a proposed Universities Act. A large number of academics from various colleges and universities based in the National Capital Region examined the suggestions. They went through the proposed changes with a fine-tooth comb, since the proposed changes, if implemented, would affect the academic quality of tertiary education at the college and university level. After frequent meetings over six months, they have jointly produced a document titled ‘What is to be Done About Indian Universities? Reflections from Concerned Teachers’.

The document explains at length why they have found unacceptable, for academic reasons, much of what has been suggested. It is available on Facebook and has already brought in many worthwhile posts. It is an extremely important statement from a large body of teachers, containing their responses to the proposals, as had been requested. Hopefully, it will be discussed widely by the HRD Ministry, the University Grants Commission, and other organisations related to undergraduate and graduate teaching.

Education, unfortunately, has not been taken seriously enough by governments, either past or present. The abysmally(terribly,बेकार) low budget for education is now down to around a minuscule(small,सूक्ष्म) 3 per cent. Despite this, there is still a fond belief that development can be achieved. Development needs well-educated people or else it goes nowhere. Do politicians fear an educated citizenry?

Reform over overhaul

Governments tend to start at the wrong end in their attempts to improve education, drawing plans to make dramatic changes at the highest levels, advocating more central universities, IITs, IIMs and the like. As is often said, the concern should be to improve the levels of existing institutions. Yet the nitty-gritty of education lies in the quality of schooling. Proposals made by United Progressive Alliance-II, for more universities, continue to be the project of the present government. But a serious revision of the educational system in India requires laying a good foundation for primary and secondary schooling by improving their quality in a systematic and rational manner. This applies as much to content as is does to facilities.

A higher budget would allow for a larger number of schools, and these are desperately needed. But numbers are not enough. The location of the school has to be such that it is not hijacked or marginalised by upper castes and the wealthy. The socially and economically underprivileged are then left without education. Schools also have to be adequately(enough,पर्याप्त) equipped, teachers properly trained, and the benefits of education made apparent. This needs as much careful attention as tertiary education. Without good quality schooling, the institutes of higher learning are handicapped. Students with substandard schooling are unable to cope with higher education, the heavy financing of which has little meaning.

Education has many functions. It provides information, as the Internet does, but the difference is that it is meant to provide reliable information, and teach students to think logically and analytically. If knowledge has to advance, existing knowledge should be questioned. Such critical enquiry is the crucial point of education in any field — whether the sciences, social sciences or the humanities. It is also incidentally the best job training a student can receive. Myth-spinning is important to a child’s imagination but should not be confused with learning and scholarship.

The linking of schooling to tertiary education also has to do with some reactions to the suggestions made in the proposed Universities Act. The proposed standardising and centralising of the syllabus has been suggested as a way to improve the quality of education. Also, the centralised recruitment of faculty and students, we are told, will allow them mobility. Can the complete syllabus for all subjects in 40 universities be centralised and standardised? It will be a mammoth(large,विशाल), unnecessary exercise, predictably a disaster. The budget would have to be doubled to provide for adequate libraries and laboratories. Or will education be reduced to a set of statements to be memorised?

Better institutions will have to lower their standards to accommodate those that are inferior(low quality,घटिया), in order to standardise the syllabus. The quality of education will have to be that of the Lowest Common Denominator. High standards demand diversity and a constant and reliable upgrading of knowledge, essential for nurturing intellectual curiosity. With standardisation and centralisation, universities will become teaching shops and coaching schools. A common entrance exam will mean a rush for the metropolitan universities, as these are better launching pads for decent jobs. How then will the system of quotas and reservations play out? Will the numbers have to be continually reconfigured?

The other major problem will be language. Today, regional languages are the effective medium in most universities, particularly at the undergraduate level. So, can teachers and students be moved from, say, Punjab to Kerala, with the demand that they have to use whatever language is current in the new place? Or will the transfer of teachers and students be also used as a punitive(punishableदंडात्मक) measure to silence opposition? Bilingualism — a regional language and a common language — may be one solution, provided a common language can be agreed upon.

Schools for the rich and poor
This is just a sample of the kind of problems that will confront us if the proposed changes are introduced. It doesn’t take much foresight to predict the major casualties in our university system. Poor quality education and large numbers of young people who are unqualified for the jobs they seek doesn’t make for a healthy society. Neither the sciences nor the social sciences can be taught merely as identical information in 40 universities. Every discipline requires thinking, questioning and debating, as there is intellectual content in each subject, essential to its understanding. This debate cannot be dictated. A syllabus handed down ‘from above’ and not thought through by the faculty will be turned into merely memorising information.

If state universities provide poor quality education, then quality education will shift to private universities that do not have such restrictions. But private universities are usually unaffordable for most students. Public universities will become institutions for the poor, just as the government school system has.

A bigger problem will be the end of the autonomy of the university, as has been pointed out in the response by the Delhi academics. The viability of a university depends on its being an autonomous institution responsible for maintaining high standards and initiating innovation. The quality of the public university system and its continuance is crucial to any modern society. Private universities, however good they may be, cannot provide the required tertiary education for everyone. The proposed changes will therefore destroy the more significant aspects of the role and function of the university as an educational institution.

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The Chinese fault line in foreign policy

A lack of coherence(orderly,सुसंगत) marks the Modi government’s foreign policy, especially in strategic relations with China and Pakistan. Nothing that has been said or done during the past year has reduced differences between India and them
This is the season of results and of drawing up report cards. Having completed a year of governance, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government’s performance is up for review, with its approach on the foreign policy front attracting a great deal of attention. Not surprisingly, political pundits have accorded it an ‘A’. Nevertheless, it still merits a more detailed look.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s record of visiting 18 countries in 57 days has to be appreciated. Yet, it should not be overlooked that even a less ebullient(high spwrite,प्रफुल्लित) Prime Minister like Dr. Manmohan Singh of the predecessor United Progressive Alliance government managed a hectic schedule during his first year in office. But two major differences, no doubt, exist. The first is that in marked contrast to visits by previous Prime Ministers to foreign countries, each of Mr. Modi’s visits has involved detailed planning to ensure the best teleological impact.

The second is in terms of economic content — new business openings, substantial increases in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, estimated to be around $28.8 billion, and talk of India as being the next big investment destination. If the raison d’être of high profile prime ministerial visits is Business with a big ‘B’, then Mr. Modi has made a spectacular start.

Mixed results

Both aspects are in keeping with the Prime Minister’s penchant(preference,झुकाव) for transformational initiatives, an aspect that was evident during his more than a year-long election campaign. Foreign visits have the added advantage of linking the Prime Minister’s persona with outcomes, and where the Prime Minister’s image becomes the crucial selling point. Mr. Modi’s visit to the United States in 2014 demonstrated what impact a brilliantly calibrated campaign could produce.

However, on many of the substantive issues, the balance sheet tends to be mixed. For instance, the Prime Minister kept his commitment to pursue an “activist neighbourhood policy”. Yet, to claim that his visits have already produced concrete results would be premature. Foreign policy outcomes need a long period of gestation and it would be naive to think that a single visit would alter another country’s policies. This is particularly true of countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal who tend to hedge(save,बचाना) their bets when it comes to India versus China. Nevertheless, the energy and drive on display has helped push the boundaries, enabling India to demonstrate its determination to be the pre-eminent power in the region.

Coming to strategic aspects, one discerns a certain lack of coherence and consistency. This is specially true of strategic relations with our two biggest neighbours, China and Pakistan. Vis-à-vis Pakistan, the inconsistencies in our attitude have further compounded the dysfunctional nature of Pakistan’s approach to India. Nothing that has been said or done during the past year has reduced tensions between the two countries. If anything, the degree of suspicion has increased.

Dealing with Beijing

The approach towards China has clearly needed to be more subtle(perceptive,संवेदी) and dexterous(skilled,दक्ष) than has been the case. The bonhomie on display during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014 and Mr. Modi’s visit to China in May 2015 was exceptional. Notwithstanding this, the hype and glamour have tended to obscure the reality that little progress on most aspects of the relationship has taken place. Mr. Modi’s recent visit did yield(return,देना) much in economic terms — agreements and business-related memoranda of understanding worth at least $22 billion. He also unveiled a vision of unlimited opportunities for Chinese business and investment in infrastructure and energy-related projects. The Joint Statement issued after the visit is extremely positive on trade, development and investment issues, and also on taking the necessary measures “to remove impediments(blocks,बाधा) to bilateral trade and investment and facilitate greater market access”.

However, dealing with China is like dealing with the unknown. Rather than protocol-driven statements, one needs to look out for signals and nuances(shade,बारीकी) which are often better indicators of where the relationship is headed. Hence, references in the Joint Statement issued after Mr. Modi’s discussions with Chinese leaders, to the “historic imperative for India and China to enrich their bilateral relations” and that “India-China bilateral relations are poised to play a defining role in the 21st Century in Asia and Globally”, count for little. In specific terms, the Chinese have given no indication, whatsoever, that they would back India’s claim to a seat in the United Nations Security Council; no assurance of helping India with nuclear Export Control Regimes(government,शाशन), and in overcoming the remaining obstacles(problem,बाधा) to nuclear trade issues, and no signs of softening its stance on the vexed(controversial,विवादस्पद) boundary question, merely committing itself to maintaining peace in the border areas, pending a final resolution. As a keen observer, the Prime Minister would certainly have noted the absence of any reaction from the Chinese side during the visit, to both the contents of the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region (unveiled by him and U.S. President Barack Obama during Mr. Obama’s visit to India in January 2015), and to the deepening of India’s relations with Shinzo¯ Abe’s Japan. This is significant and disconcerting, compounded further by the absence of any serious discussion on the situation prevailing in Pakistan and West Asia, and the implications for the region of Mr. Xi’s signature initiative viz., the Maritime Silk Road. Apparently, the Chinese believe that there is not much scope for a meeting of minds on crucial issues.

The Afghan vacuum

Meanwhile, China continues to engage in a series of moves that are highly detrimental(harmful,हानिकारक) to India’s interests. With Pakistan as the fulcrum of China’s approach to South Asia, China is now seeking to exploit the vacuum in Afghanistan, at a time when India’s leverage there has been greatly reduced following Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani taking charge. China has also very recently hosted “secret talks” between Afghan and Taliban leaders in China, which were attended by both Chinese officials and representatives of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). China also continues to stall India’s moves in the United Nations to have Hizbul Mujahideen chief and head of the ‘United Jihad Council’, Syed Salahuddin declared as a “global terrorist”. The proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor linking Western China with the Gwadar Port in Pakistan through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), is an even more serious matter, directly impinging(attack,अतिक्रमण) on India’s sovereignty(authority,आधिपत्य) and security. Its implications are far graver than the border dispute between India and China.

Enhancing strategic thinking

All this means that the element of strategic distrust between the two countries appears to be increasing. This will need to be tackled by Mr. Modi on a war footing over the next few years. Forging “strategic trust” does find a mention in the Joint Statement, but it is evident that frequent exchanges at the leadership level, regular visits at the level of heads of states/government, or enhanced military ties and joint military exercises and counter terrorist training (all reflected in the Joint Statement) would be hardly enough. Closing the gap that exists in the strategic thinking of the two sides will require a more sophisticated approach.

As Mr. Modi enters his second year in office, he needs to demonstrate that India can become a counterpoise to an aggressive China. This would need going beyond economic matters or viewing economic interdependence as a means to limit the ambit of China’s designs. His “Act East Policy” must involve managing the “rise of China” which, with its aggressive designs and military capabilities, is a cause for deep concern to countries in the region.

In Mr. Modi, India has a leader who is credited with skills to penetrate(come to understand,पता लगाना) the opaque(unclear,अस्पष्ठ). He must use his manifest skills in the coming years to create opportunities for a proper framework for a peaceful, political and strategic relationship across the region without succumbing(give up,झुक जाना) or overreacting to fears of where China is headed..

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Building on strategic reserve

With the country consuming more than four million barrels of crude a day, the argument for a strategic oil storage project is a no-brainer.
In 1990, as the Gulf war engulfed(soak up,निगल लेना) West Asia, India was in the throes(pain,वेदना) of a major energy crisis. By all accounts India’s oil reserves at the time were adequate(enough,पर्याप्त) for only three days. While India managed to avert(avoid,बचा लेना) the crisis then, the threat of energy disruption continues to present a real danger even today.

To address energy insecurity, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government mooted(controversial,विवादस्पद) the concept of strategic petroleum reserves in 1998. Today, with India consuming upwards of four million barrels of crude every day (January 2015 figures), the case for creating such reserves grows stronger. It is unlikely that India’s energy needs will dramatically move away from fossil fuels in the near future. Over 80 per cent of these fuels come from imports, a majority of which is sourced from West Asia. This is a major strategic risk and poses a massive financial drain for an embattled economy and its growing current account deficit.

Global and domestic scenes
In March, Saudi Arabia and a coalition of regional allies launched a military operation in Yemen against the Houthi rebels. This clearly indicates the deep-rooted fissures in the Gulf. An end to the conflict(battle,विवाद) does not appear to be on the horizon. This impacts India and it continues to bear the brunt(force of blow,समाघात) of uncertainty of global crude supply and pricing. A case in point is the March 2014 test sale of five million barrels of crude from the U.S. emergency oil stockpile, the first since 1990, which saw global oil prices dip by $2. While it sent a powerful message to Russia, it also delivered a subtle(elusive,जटिल) warning to India. Oil being the vital commodity that it is, mere ‘intent’ can affect supply-demand dynamics considerably — an issue that oil importers like India simply cannot ignore. However, opportunities to change this tide do exist. With a stable political situation and readily accessible markets, India is in a good position to address some of its disadvantages.

India has been slow in getting off the starting block. Its strategic oil reserve project was mooted in 1998 and commissioned in 2003. After extensive land acquisitions and tackling site suitability, security and design-related issues, it was only in February this year that the country began filling up a strategic storage facility. With the government planning to add storage capacity to the tune of 39 million barrels in the future, India stands poised to cover only a 10-day supply of imports (January 2015 figures). This is well short of Vision 2020 that envisages(imagine,विचार करना) 90 days of imports, conservatively pegged at almost 360 million barrels of oil, according to 2014 figures.

But all this capacity building is expensive. For instance, 10 days of imports are pegged at almost Rs. 4,000 crore for infrastructure and subsequent storage costs work out to $17-18 per barrel. Moreover, there is also a time delay involved. According to a 2012 statement by Rajan Pillai, CEO, Indian Strategic Petroleum Resources Ltd, adding 12.5 million tonnes of stockpile would take at least five years.

Despite these constraints, recent moves by countries like China, Japan, South Korea or even relative minnows like Kenya and Malawi make India’s dilly-dallying inexplicable. However, there is a silver lining for India. While China has a head-start on India, evident by its incessant(continuous,लगातार) stockpiling since the supply glut(oversupply,भरमार) began, India’s open governance structures and its convenient trade-geography as well as its historic trade links with the Persian Gulf may help its cause.

Commercial imperatives
Considering the volatile energy situation in the Gulf and elsewhere, can India really afford to waste time or spend unnecessary money on this issue? The fact that India imports almost 80 per cent of its oil and boasts of a world-class high-capacity refining infrastructure makes the possibility of commercially-led but strategically regulated storage alternatives a no-brainer. This is where ‘commercial agreements’ come to the fore.

By getting into commercial ‘forward’ agreements with exporters/ refiners, India can benefit from closer access to the commercial reserves while reducing the cost of access. This can be done by inviting investment in the stockpile programme, and through tie-ups with Gulf producers. In 2005, Saudi Aramco had mooted a similar plan, but nothing came of it. Reassessing such initiatives under the current geopolitical circumstances could result in a cost-efficient and time-bound plan that reconciles capital, energy and infrastructure in the most effective manner.

Beyond such commercial engagements, agreements around obligatory sharing mechanisms during emergencies could help address India’s critical energy security concerns. Such clauses can be instituted for national contingencies(possibility,सम्भावना), or as goodwill gestures with our neighbours to service their needs during exigencies.

Finally, considering the government’s interest in boosting infrastructure development and its focus on reclaiming the geopolitical high-ground, this initiative can symbolise a great milestone — a pragmatic Vision 2020 towards creating a semblance of ‘control’ in an area over which it has traditionally enjoyed very little. This will ensure that India will never have to see the dire days it saw during the 1990 crisis.

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Know your English

What is the meaning and origin of ‘go/come under the hammer’?

(S Dongre, Bangalore)

The expression is mostly used to refer to objects that are on sale at a public auction. People who are interested in buying the object attend the auction and bid for it. The person who bids the highest — offers the maximum amount of money — takes the article home. Nowadays, of course, even people ‘go under the hammer’. In the IPL, for example, players come under the hammer every year.

*Some of Ravi Varma’s paintings are going under the hammer next month.

*The repossessed cars and motorcycles will be coming under the hammer.

In a public auction, the person who is in charge of the event — the auctioneer — usually carries a wooden hammer with him. When the bidding for an article is over, he shouts ‘sold’, and hits the table with the hammer to indicate that the transaction has been completed.

How is the word ‘cerebral’ pronounced?

(J Indira, Chennai)

There are two different ways of pronouncing the word. Some people pronounce the first ‘e’ like the ‘e’ in ‘set’, ‘bet’ and ‘wet’, and the second like the ‘i’ in ‘pit’, ‘kit’ and ‘bit’. The final ‘a’ is usually pronounced like the ‘a’ in ‘china’. In British English, the word is pronounced ‘SE-ri-bril’ with the stress on the first syllable. Americans, on the other hand, pronounce the vowel in the second syllable like the ‘ee’ in ‘feet’, ‘meet’ and ‘greet’. They pronounce the word ‘se-REE-brel’ with the stress on the second syllable. The word comes from the Latin ‘cerebrum’ meaning ‘brain’. In everyday contexts, ‘cerebral’ is used to mean ‘intellectual rather than emotional or physical’.

*I don’t enjoy his books — they are too cerebral for me.

What is the difference between ‘indict’ and ‘indite’?

(Charumathi, Nagpur)

Believe it or not, the two words are pronounced the same way — their meanings, however, are very different. The first syllable in both words is pronounced like the word ‘in’, and the second rhymes with the words ‘light’, ‘right’ and ‘might’. The stress in both the words is on the second syllable — ‘in-DIGHT’. So, what happens to the ‘c’ in ‘indict’? It’s not pronounced! Both words come from the Latin ‘indictare’ meaning ‘to declare’. Of the two, ‘indict’ is frequently heard in legal contexts. When a person who has committed a crime is indicted, charges are officially levelled against him or her.

*The former CEO was indicted on corruption charges.

*Preetham was indicted for selling drugs and distributing fake currency.

Unlike ‘indict’, the word ‘indite’ is not frequently used nowadays. It means to write down or compose.

Is it okay to say ‘avoid presentations’ at the bottom of a wedding card?

(KV Rajan, Chennai)

No, it isn’t. People usually give presents or gifts at a wedding; they do not make presentations! A presentation is usually a talk given by someone who wishes to provide information about something. For example, salesmen often make presentations on a product. Scholars make presentations on their research. If you don’t want your invitees to bring gifts, then on the wedding card, you should say ‘No presents’ and not ‘No presentations’. Why anyone would actually say this is beyond me. After all, presents are the best part of getting married!

******

“Many a man in love with a dimple makes the mistake of marrying the whole girl.” — Stephen Leacock

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Mr. Modi’s war on welfare

The Modi government is determined to dismantle(break,तोडना) the two-pronged welfare paradigm(image,प्रतिमान).
It is now an established fact that one area where the Narendra Modi administration has acted with a sense of purpose, urgency and resolve is in slashing(cut down,काटना) social expenditure. Be it education, health, agriculture, livelihood security, food security, panchayati raj institutions, drinking water or the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes sub-plan, central government funds earmarked for social protection have been cut.

The cutbacks have been so drastic(forceful,प्रबल) that one of NDA’s own Cabinet members, Maneka Gandhi, the Minister for Women and Child Development, felt compelled to write a dissenting note to the Finance Minister. According to the estimates doing the rounds, the overall reductions in social sector spending add up to about Rs. 1.75 lakh crore.

No Indian Prime Minister has ever launched such a full frontal attack on the welfare state that India, for a brief period, has tried to be, or some might say, pretended to be. Considering that the biggest beneficiaries of these schemes were the poor and the marginalised — typically dismissed as vote banks responsible for the political nuisance(pain,परेशानी) of populism — Mr. Modi deserves full credit for this achievement, the most noteworthy of his first year in office.

But these cuts in social spending tell only half the story. We need to look at the other half — what he wants to replace the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, the Public Distribution System, and all the other existing social provisions with — to get the rest.

Social security that isn’t

The ruling party’s spokespersons, in response to the charges levelled by the Opposition that their government is anti-poor, have been pointing to the social security initiatives launched by the NDA including the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, the Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana, the Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana and the Atal Pension Yojana.

If anyone wants to find out how pro-poor the NDA administration really is, all they need to do is to compare the provisions of the social expenditures it wants out, such as the MGNREGA, with the ones it is pushing. The larger design becomes immediately apparent.

The MGNREGA and the Food Security Act (which governs the Integrated Child Development Services, PDS and the Midday Meal programmes) are both rights-based social provisions. The MGNREGA legally recognises the citizen’s right to demand work as a right, and if the state cannot deliver 100 days of work in a financial year, it has to provide unemployment allowance.

Similarly, while it may come as a shock to economists imported from Washington DC, many people in this country hold the bizarre(strange,अजीब) belief that it would be difficult to stay alive without food — which is why the FSA makes food a citizen’s right.

The NDA’s various Pradhan Mantri Yojanas, in contrast, put the onus(responsibility,दायित्व) of social security on those who lack it the most — the poor themselves.

Launched by Mr. Modi on August 15 last year, the Jan Dhan Yojana has been touted(show off,जोर शोर से प्रचार करना) as an initiative for financial inclusion, a slippery term that can be spun to say one thing and mean another. It could mean real financial empowerment, which is what it is being projected as. What it entails(mean,मतलब) in reality is having your income, however meagre, made accessible (via the banking system) to global financial capital, which has run out of options in the economies that have finished emerging and don’t know what to do.

Sections of the media have already begun writing glibly(slickly,धारा प्रवाह) about the “success” of the Jan Dhan Yojana. What do they mean? Simply that a great number of bank accounts have been opened — 14.99 crore of them as of April 15, 2015. But as per the government’s own figures, the majority of these accounts (58 per cent as of March 31, 2015) have no money in them. Thankfully, India has enough public sector banks that can be arm-twisted to take on the potentially ruinous(harmful,हानिकारी) burden of these lakhs of ‘no-frills’ accounts that are also, at the moment, ‘no money’ accounts.

But the Jan Dhan Yojana is at the heart of the NDA’s whole social security framework, such as it is, or will be. It is the basis for the life insurance, accident insurance, and pension schemes scheduled to commence(start,शुरू) from June this year.

While a detailed scrutiny(examine,जांच) of each of these schemes is beyond the scope of this essay, the broad contours can be summarised.

First of all, unlike the schemes on the NDA’s chopping block, none of these are rights-based, which means they can be wound up at any time, or the benefits denied on technical grounds (no Aadhar card, for instance).

Second, they are contributory, and earnings-linked. If the poor don’t have jobs, they won’t have an income, and if they don’t have an income, they won’t have money to put in the Jan Dhan accounts, (which is why 58 per cent of them are lying empty). And if they don’t have money to put into their accounts, they will default on their insurance premiums and pension payments — and if they default, well, there ends their social security from the Pradhan Manthri Yojanas.

All the three schemes — the Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana, the Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana, and the Atal Pension Yojana — operate on an auto-debit basis from the Jan Dhan bank account. All three state categorically in their rules that if there is insufficient balance to keep the insurance/pension plan going, the benefits will cease.

Of course, on paper, the Jan Dhan account is where the subsidies, such as the cash equivalent of the food grain subsidy, are supposed to be transferred. But cash transfers alone, without jobs, will never be adequate(enough,पर्याप्त) to live on, let alone pay insurance premiums.

Put simply, the government’s intent behind these Yojanas seems to be to disavow(refuse,अनदेखा) any responsibility for the socio-economically vulnerable(weak,कमज़ोर).

Welfare to paternalism

The very idea of social welfare in a modern, capitalist, market economy has been informed by two essential principles. One, because capitalism doesn’t work equally well for everyone, it requires some cushioning, achieved through income redistribution from the comparatively wealthy to the poor. This is accomplished via progressive taxation, and by setting up a public infrastructure of certain universal social benefits such as a free health service, or subsidised schooling, or housing.

Two, a recognition that social entitlements are a political right, not a charity. The post-World War II golden era of capitalism — which lasted till the ascendancy of neo-liberal economics — was able to deliver a good life to so many only because of a strong welfare state premised on these two principles. The social democracies of the Scandinavian countries, which always top any global ranking for quality of life, still largely operate on this model.

It is precisely this two-pronged welfare paradigm — rights-based social provisions and redistribution of gross national income — that the Modi government is determined to dismantle.

Under so-called Modinomics, citizens shall have no right to work, no right to food, and no right to ask for what is their due by right (which might explain why the government hasn’t filled the post of the Central Information Commissioner for the past eight months).

Of course, insurance-based schemes driven by contributions from the citizenry are also a widely employed social protection tool. But these are more suited to the developed economies with less acute(intense,प्रभाव) poverty. Its role there has been to offer protection against economic risks such as unemployment or sickness. Social insurance is not a poverty alleviation measure — which is what India needs at present.

So, what does a social protection scheme that is also an effective poverty alleviation measure look like? This is what the radical communist organisation, the OECD, says in a report released this week, “India has one of the largest public works programme in the world in terms of coverage, the NREGS, which plays an important role in reducing short-term poverty and smooth employment and income throughout the year for rural labourers.” And it adds, for good measure, “The programme, however, remains little used, mainly in poorer States, because of lack of funding”.

Unfortunately, for India’s rural labourers, Mr. Modi doesn’t think as highly of the MGNREGA. There is, however, a practical reason for this dislike of any rights-based welfare measures: by definition, and by law, a rights-based entitlement cannot be subjected to fiscal tyranny(dictatorship,तानाशाह).

This is precisely why all of India’s rights-based legislations — the right to work, the right to food, the right to education, and the right to information represent a huge achievement for Indian democracy. They symbolize the triumph(victory,जीत) of politics over blind monetarism. And today, they form the legislative edifice on which the social and economic aspirations of a vast majority of Indians rest.

But the Modi dispensation — like the one that preceded it — is also under pressure to kowtow to the dogma(doctrine,सिद्धान्त) of fiscal rectitude(honesty,ईमानदारी). Yet fiscal discipline is not the only agenda behind the savage spending cuts in its very first year. The aim is also to prepare the ground for fundamentally altering the default settings of social welfare in India — from a rights-based one that honours the dignity of the poor, to a paternalistic one that will push thousands more of the landless poor into a debt trap, depress rural wages, and make them ever more dependant on government charity, and at the brutal mercy of the unorganised labour market.

At the end of the day, all that the average Indian asks of the state are basic amenities(comfort,सुविधा) for a life of dignity, not life insurance. It is doubtful, however, if this expectation will much impress our ‘tough love’ Prime Minister.

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Not a sprinkle, but a spread of saffron

The Hindutva agenda is moving forward, the voices of minorities are being marginalised and social hatred is being spread, but the political order continues to escape blame.
At a time when Prime Minister Narendra Modi is completing one year in office, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi made an embarrassing statement. The beef ban, Mr. Naqvi said, “is not a matter of loss or profit; it is an issue of faith and belief.” All those who want to eat beef can “go to Pakistan,” he added.

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s rise to power in 2014 with an absolute majority for the first time in the history of independent India was termed by some as a Modi victory. During the election campaign, the Sangh Parivar, to which the BJP belongs, did not seem too pleased with the development and personality-oriented campaign style of the party. But with the BJP’s landslide victory, things took a different turn. Vishwa Hindu Parishad leader Ashok Singhal called Mr. Modi the “ideal swayamsevak”, and saw his victory as the return of the Hindus to power after Rajput ruler Prithviraj Chauhan’s defeat way back in the 12th century.

An opportunity to seize

Over the past year, the manner in which the Parivar has conducted itself shows its enthusiasm in spreading Hindutva in India. As it believes that the BJP government is its own, it also apparently believes that it can stride(Step,लाँघना) confidently ahead by injecting vigour(energy,Jजोश) into Hindutva programmes. With the BJP’s victory, the Sangh Parivar feels that it has got a mandate and an opportunity to make all possible efforts to Hinduise social spaces, implement its ideology and show the minorities their “rightful place”. However much one disagrees with or feels for Prime Minister Modi’s development agenda, the fact is that the Parivar comes first — before any individual or office. And its list of ‘things to do’ cannot be locked up in cold storage by a few individuals at the helm of power. While Mr. Modi might express unhappiness when forced to, about the outrageous(offensive,घृणित) public conduct of his Sangh family members, the latter has been working overtime to communalise social relations and saffronise the polity. We must not forget that Mr. Modi and his development team also belong to this very Sangh family; they have been nurtured and moulded by the Hindutva agenda. The question we need to ask therefore is not whether Mr. Modi is for development or Hindutva, but rather how Hindutva has moved in the last one year.

In August 2014, Yogi Adityanath, BJP MP from Gorakhpur in Uttar Pradesh and also a VHP leader, was seen telling a crowd of about thousand people, “If they take one Hindu girl, we will take [a] 100 Muslims girls”. Holding the minority community responsible for communal violence, he said on a television show, “In places where there are 10 to 20 per cent minorities, stray communal incidents take place. Where there are 20 to 35 per cent of them, serious communal riots take place. And where they are more than 35 per cent, there is no place for non-Muslims”.

In December, Sadhvi Niranjan Jyoti, Minister of State for Food Processing, kicked up a storm when she said at a rally in New Delhi that the electorate faced a choice between “a government of ramzadon (followers of Ram) and haramzadon (illegitimate children)”. The former referred to a BJP government; the latter to a Congress or Aam Aadmi Party government. She later withdrew the remark after coming under fire from the opposition, but the damage had been done.

And just a month later, after the Prime Minister advised MPs to exercise caution while making public statements, Sakshi Maharaj, the fiery(passionate,जोशीला) VHP leader and BJP MP from Unnao, said in Meerut, “The time has come when a Hindu woman must produce at least four children in order to protect Hindu religion”. He added that those involved in conversion and cow slaughter must be punished with death, though ghar vapsi, the process of converting minority communities to Hinduism, is not equivalent to conversion. “Wait for some time,” he said, “a law will be passed in Parliament in which anyone indulging in cow slaughter and conversion will be punished with the death sentence”.

In another reference to conversions, RSS supremo Mohan Bhagwat said in February in Bharatpur, Rajasthan, that Mother Teresa’s service to the poor in India had been motivated by a desire to convert them to Christianity. BJP leader Sadhvi Prachi echoed(repeat,दोहराना) his sentiments in Dehradun while calling for a boycott of films starring the three Khans of Bollywood. “I, for one, would ask the Bajrangis to tear the posters of films of Shahrukh Khan, Salman Khan and Aamir Khan of the walls and burn them in the fire of Holi,” she said. “They spread a culture of violence.”

The Sangh Parivar also intensified conversions to the Hindu fold through their ghar vapsi programme. While conversions of Hindus to other “alien” religions were opposed, conversions to Hinduism were not only encouraged, but actively conducted. It is the economically backward and often destitute(helpless,असहाय) people who became targets of these campaigns. Groups situated on the lower rungs of the caste structure agreed to go through shuddhi rituals for material gratification, aspiring for social dignity and equality. What is significant is that ghar vapsi was defended by some members of the ruling party. Even BJP president Amit Shah called for a debate and a legal ban on “forcible” conversions, implying that conversions through ghar vapsi are not forcible and would be exempt from such a ban.

Another issue close to the Sangh Parivar’s heart is cow slaughter. Laws banning cow slaughter already exist in many States, but the blanket ban imposed in Maharashtra and then Haryana further indicate the creeping in of Hindutva in the Indian body politic. The ban extended to bulls and bullocks with utter disregard for the dietary needs of a large section of the impoverished citizenry and the already distressed agrarian economy.

A slow but sure strategy

All this has been happening in a context of low intensity violence against minorities. Attacks against Christians and Muslims have gone up, and they have been reported from all across the country. The impact of these skirmishes(clash,मुठभेड़) in terms of the spread of religious intolerance is the same as that of religious riots. The problem of such localised attacks is that Hindutva moves forward, minorities voices are marginalised and social hatred spreads, but the political order escapes the blame for dividing people. Statements can be denounced and there can be exasperation(क्रोध) over certain doings, but there has to be acknowledgement that all this is being done to gain control over the nation’s polity and society. The Sangh Parivar is doing this in its own typical way by using the strategy of a death by a thousand cuts. These cuts are, slowly but surely, meant to mark out who belongs to the nation and who does not, by defining what people will eat, who they will marry, where they will live, what they will read and watch. Prime Minister Modi’s first year has seen some great successes in this aspect.

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Pushing the envelope in foreign policy

Narendra Modi’s foreign policy has been continuous with that of his predecessors but he has also sought to push the boundaries of certain engagements much further.
Foreign policy is all about securing permanent interests. As such, it may be best judged in the long run. Nevertheless, since foreign policy has been so prominent during the government’s first year in office, an interim assessment may be useful. What are the areas of continuity and change, the successes and blind spots?

Since the early 1990s, the overarching(important,महत्वपूर्ण) goal of our foreign policy has been a stable and conducive(contributing,सहायक) external environment for India’s internal economic transformation and a larger international profile. Towards these ends, successive governments have sought simultaneously(at the same time,एक साथ) to preserve India’s key security interests and to deepen its ties with the global economy. From this standpoint, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign policy has been continuous with that of his predecessors. Yet, Mr. Modi has also sought to push the boundaries of certain engagements much further. This is not just a question giving a fresh vim(energy,जोश) to foreign policy, although the vigour(vim) is palpable(touchable,स्पर्शग्राह).

The U.S. and China

Consider his approach to dealing with the two most important powers: the United States and China. For over two decades now, every Indian government has tried to impart more substance to relations with these countries. Even as New Delhi has moved steadily to forge(form,विकसित करना) strategic ties with Washington, it has sought to place its relations with Beijing on an even keel. However, Mr. Modi has been exceptionally clear in articulating(express,उल्लेख) India’s interests and trying to leverage the relationship with the U.S. and China. Thus, during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to India in January 2015, India issued a separate joint statement on security in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean. And on Mr. Modi’s trip to China this month, a separate joint statement was issued on climate change in the light of the upcoming conference in Paris. In both cases, there may be a gap between rhetoric(confuse words,वाक्पटुता) and reality. Still, Mr. Modi is clearly attempting to push the envelope and advance India’s interests without making binary choices in its engagement with these countries.

In South Asia
Closer home, he has consistently outlined a vision of shared prosperity for South Asia and has credibly projected Indian leadership in the region. His visits to Nepal, in August 2014, and Sri Lanka, in March 2015, have gone a long way in helping reset relations with both these countries. Similarly, his decision to abandon(give up,त्याग करना) the Bharatiya Janata Party’s stance and ratify(approve,पुष्टि करना) the Land Border Agreement with Bangladesh has given a shot in arm to the bilateral relationship. Yet, the real challenges lie ahead of him. The earthquake in Nepal will certainly delay — and may even complicate — the arduous(hard,कठिन) task of drawing up an agreed constitution. India will not only have to prepare for longer-term assistance in reconstruction, but will also have to engage Nepalese parties more proactively to prevent the political process from drifting. In Sri Lanka, the present government has rolled back the worst features of the presidential system. It has also moved to return the land acquired by the security forces, including in the Tamil areas. But it remains to be seen if Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena is open to a political settlement with the Tamils. After all, his own base includes a slice of the Sinhala chauvinists. In any event, the Tamil question remains a potentially thorny issue in bilateral relations. Colombo’s relationship with Beijing is another sensitive area. On campaign trail, Mr. Sirisena had spoken out against his predecessor, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s tilt towards China. In office, he has struck a more equivocal note. This is hardly surprising given China’s economic importance to Sri Lanka — ties that will deepen further with China’s plans for a maritime silk route.

During his forthcoming trip to Dhaka, in the first week of June, Mr. Modi will undoubtedly seek to capitalise on the boundary agreement. Bangladesh also seems open to improve transportation and transit links with India. So far, New Delhi’s inability to deliver on an agreement on Teesta river waters had led Dhaka to hold back on transit arrangements. It is unlikely that Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will execute a complete volte-face and fall in with India’s requirements. Yet, growing international pressure on her government may make her more amenable(conformable,सुवश्य) to Indian interests. New Delhi has done well to stand by Ms. Hasina in the face of the ongoing onslaught by the Islamists. Yet India must also be mindful of the problem of being identified solely with the Awami League. A stable two-party democracy in Bangladesh is in India’s long-term interests.

The Pakistan question

As ever, the sharpest challenge for India’s regional ambitions comes from Pakistan. Despite getting off to a good start with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Mr. Modi has been unable to craft a coherent(logical,सुसंगत) and consistent approach to dealing with Pakistan. Like his predecessors, he has swung from engagement to disengagement — only to be forced to pick up the diplomatic pieces and return to the table. There is something curious about India’s policy towards Pakistan, which consists of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting a different result. Mr. Modi has to break this mould(model,शैली). Diplomatic engagement should not be seen as a reward for Pakistan’s good behaviour. The symbolism of diplomacy should be reduced — even if substantive progress remains tough to achieve.

The current impasse with Pakistan also impinges(entrench,अतिक्रमण) on our ties with Afghanistan. Here, Mr. Modi faces a situation that has turned rather unfavourable from New Delhi’s perspective. Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani’s attempt to cosy(comfortable,आरामदेह) up to Pakistan has led to an inevitable(necessary,जरुरी) downgrading of ties with India. Whether or not this yields(return,स्वीकार) results, India has to ensure that its interests in Afghanistan are not placed on the chopping block. China’s backing for reconciliation with the Taliban will further complicate India’s position on Afghanistan. Unless New Delhi adopts a clear strategy, Mr. Modi may well find himself presiding over a retrenchment in Indian engagement with Afghanistan.

While the overall record in South Asia has been mixed, there has been a startling(surprising,आश्चर्यजनक) lack of focus on our extended neighbourhood to the west. Even as West Asia is roiled by a range of conflicts(battle,विवाद), the government has remained content with mounting(rise,बढ़ता हुआ) rescue missions for Indians living in trouble spots. This policy will prove unsustainable if instability deepens and widens in West Asia: some seven million Indians live in the Gulf countries. India needs to position itself as a force for stability in the region, which in turn will require enormous(large,बड़ा) diplomatic engagement. So far, the government has proved purblind(dim-sighted,मंददृष्टि) on West Asia.

Part of the problem is the persisting flaws in the institutional set-up on foreign policy and security. Despite considerable centralisation in the Prime Minister’s Office, the silos between various ministries seem intact. The lack of functional integration of expertise is evident in several areas. Think of the ill-considered decision to purchase 36 Rafale fighter jets. The Defence Minister is still unable to explain how the remaining 90 aircrafts will be procured — if at all. The inability to grasp the import of mega regional trade pacts being negotiated under American leadership is another case in point. The Ministry of Commerce has done little more than set up a company to invest in countries like Vietnam—hoping thereby to secure access to other markets if the Trans-Pacific Partnership goes through. There is still no indication of a strategic response to attempts by leading industrial economies to change the rules of world trade. The government’s stance on Intellectual Property Rights in yet another example. Conflicting statements issued by the government have unnecessarily put India on the defensive.

Fine-tuning the institutional support for foreign and strategic policy is imperative to following through on the early successes as well as addressing various gaps. Recall that the first United Progressive Alliance government chalked up rather more impressive accomplishment after just over a year in office: the joint statement with the U.S. on the nuclear deal and the agreement on parameters for settling the boundary with China. The challenge is to sustain focus and momentum in the tougher years that lie ahead.
the first United Progressive Alliance government chalked up rather more impressive accomplishment after just over a year in office: the joint statement with the U.S. on the nuclear deal and the agreement on parameters for settling the boundary with China. The challenge is to sustain focus and momentum in the tougher years that lie ahead.

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Best poised to deliver results

Mr. Modi has been proactive and successful in foreign relations but has stalled(postpone,टालना) in Pakistan. It is time he scripted a new narrative.
In the one year of his government, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s travels to five continents have been marked by one common motif(motive,उद्देश्य): that he is on the front foot. To borrow a phrase, he has boldly gone where many PMs have not gone before, with a first visit to Mongolia, and the first stand-alone visits to Sri Lanka, Canada, Fiji, and the Seychelles in decades. The government has taken up challenges abroad and pursued them unequivocally(clearly,सुस्पष्ठ रुप से) despite the possible backlash domestically: ratifying(approve,पुष्टि करना) the Land Boundary agreement with Bangladesh, pressing ahead with the nuclear deal with the U.S., the announcement of defence buys in Paris, disregarding the security establishment by offering e-visas to China, and several other steps. However, Mr. Modi’s dealings with Pakistan are the one exception to his otherwise proactive style. With Pakistan, the NDA government has appeared indecisive and risk-averse, in sharp contrast to Mr. Modi’s first bold move of inviting Mr. Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony a year ago.

Limited engagement

At the time, the invitation to Mr. Sharif had been hailed(announce,घोषणा) as a ‘masterstroke’, but the strokes played since have puzzled many in both Islamabad and in New Delhi, including the government’s supporters. Thus, while the government drew red lines around the Pakistan High Commissioner Abdul Basit’s meeting with the Hurriyat ahead of the Foreign Secretary talks in August, it failed to follow through when he met them in March this year. While Mr. Modi and Mr. Sharif exchanged gifts for their mothers, an obviously intimate gesture, the warmth didn’t translate into the bilateral process. While India and Pakistan saved each other’s citizens in Yemen, they didn’t come any closer as a result. Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar went to Islamabad to talk, but didn’t engage in any substantive way, and while Mr. Modi has dialled Mr. Sharif on at least three occasions, on the two occasions when they have been in the same city, even in the same room — New York for the UNGA and Kathmandu for SAARC — they have not held any formal talks. The two leaders may be afforded another opportunity in July, as both are expected to be in Russia’s Ufa city for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit.

Eventually though, evented meetings and “talks for the sake of talks” aren’t a substitute for policy, and Mr. Modi alone cannot be expected to take the entire blame or credit for the relationship. The policy undertaken by the government in 2014 has in effect become what India’s default position has been since the 2008 Mumbai attacks: a limited engagement without a defined process. As a result, it seems to have no desired outcomes other than avoiding another Mumbai, which in itself is a defensive position. The initiatives discussed last year, in terms of trade, power supplies, and increased visas for businessmen remain proposals for a time when the countries move out of this phase.

Explaining the stasis

Is there a point, as many within our government argue, to the present stasis(inactivity,गतिहीनता) in ties between India and Pakistan? After all, while infiltration(घुसपैठ) and Pakistan-sponsored terror activity remain a concern, it would seem that those able to control terror groups within the establishment have been deterred from planning another attack all this time. Second, not talking to Pakistan until it shows results on terror keeps the pressure on the Sharif government to deliver on justice in the Mumbai 26/11 attacks. Third, at a time when the world is grappling(fight,लड़ना) with IS terror, a sharp focus on Pakistan’s terror activities will ‘isolate’ it diplomatically from others who are fighting jihadi terror like the U.S. and China. Fourth, while government to government engagement is at a standstill, India “stands with the people of Pakistan”, as both the PM and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval have said in the past year, and that will pay off in goodwill inside Pakistan. All these arguments are given by those inside the government who work on diplomatic policy with Pakistan.

Unfortunately, not the least because Pakistan works in counter-intuitive ways itself, none of the above has been borne out on the ground in the past year. Terror networks, both those supported by the Pakistani state like LeT and JeM, and those fighting the state, including the TTP and now even IS, continue to thrive(grow,पनपना), giving no indication that India is any safer today for the lack of engagement. Second, the “pressure” on the Sharif government has worn thin, and the case against the Mumbai attackers has never seemed more tenuous(weak,कमज़ोर), with bail for Zaki Ur Rahman Lakhvi and complete freedom granted to Hafiz Saeed. Meanwhile, despite Pakistan’s actions and its blatant(noisy,खुल्लमखुल्ला) disregard of David Headley’s corroboration of the case against Hafiz Saeed as detailed again in a memoir, the world is far from holding it to account. Days after Mr. Barack Obama’s visit to India in January, his government proposed a sixfold increase in military aid ($265 million in FMF or foreign military financing) to Pakistan, and a total aid outlay of $1 billion for the year. China has announced a $46 billion package to build Pakistan’s infrastructure, and even India’s oldest friend Russia has offered military exercises and helicopters to Pakistan.

What’s more dangerous perhaps is the U-turn by Afghanistan, which has backed India for years against the terror groups that threaten them both. Last week’s revelation of a joint counter-terrorism MoU between Afghanistan’s intelligence agency NDS and the ISI will deeply impact India’s defences, not the least in Kabul, where four Indians were killed in an attack possibly meant to target the Indian ambassador. President Ghani, who spearheaded the MoU within weeks of returning from meeting Mr. Modi, could hardly have taken such a drastic step without American support.

Finally, the absence of government to government engagement and the PM and NSA’s comments are not being allowed to percolate to the ground in Pakistan to produce the desired goodwill: Pakistani TV channels run more repeats of Mr. Doval’s speech from February 2014 where he explained his “offensive defence” strategy as “if you do one Mumbai, you may lose Balochistan”, while for the first time in decades, the Pakistan government has tried to blame RAW for heinous(brutal,जघन्य) massacres(killed in many,हत्याकांड) in Peshawar and Karachi. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s recent comments on “targeted killings” in Jammu and Kashmir and using “terrorists to kill terrorists” will only serve more grist to Rawalpindi’s propaganda mill.

Moving forward

None of these disappointing developments of the past year, however, should discourage Mr. Modi. Instead, they underline the need for him to take the narrative of India-Pakistan ties back into his hands. It is now time to prepare the country for the long-term vision he hopes to implement.

He has no need to reinvent the wheel, but can pick up from where so many of his predecessors left off. Each of them may have tried and failed to resolve issues, or to deter those in Pakistan who wish India harm, but they left indelible(unerasble,पक्का) stamps on the process: Inder Kumar Gujral gave us the neighbourhood doctrine(belief,सिद्धान्त) and the composite dialogue; Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s Lahore declaration is considered a template along with the Simla pact for diplomatic dealings; while Manmohan Singh’s four-step formula on Kashmir remains the only solution theoretically acceptable to all sides. Mr. Modi has what none of the others possessed: a clear mandate, an uncritical Cabinet with no coalition compulsions or threat from the opposition. He has shown, as he did with the Bangladesh agreement and China engagement, that he is able to curb(control,नियंत्रण) the most extremist views on relations with neighbours. It is a moment in Indian history that even the Pakistani government should be able to recognise as unique, and Mr. Modi is best poised to deliver the promise.

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The one-man show

The Prime Minister is mostly absent in Parliament. When present, he is scornful(disrespectful,अपमानजनक) of the system.
On his first day, first show at Parliament House on May 20, 2014, Prime Minister-in-waiting Narendra Modi was a picture of humility. He was seemingly overwhelmed by the moment and by the enormity(darkness,भयावहता) of it all, even choking on his words, standing in the imposing 87-year-old structure awaiting the formal coronation(राज्याभिषेक) by his party.

He knelt on the stairs of Parliament House to touch his forehead to the ground in a show of respect to the “temple of democracy” and later acknowledged the work done by previous governments for India’s development. There was little sign of his default option — the stump speech.

That carefully calibrated appearance at the Bharatiya Janata Party Parliamentary Party meeting in the Central Hall of Parliament House had a short use-by date. Seventeen days later, on June 6, while introducing his Ministers to the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister Modi encountered his first brush with some heckling(disturb,तंग करना) from the fragmented(divided,अलग थलग) Opposition when it became evident that Minister of State for Power Piyush Goyal was not present.

Visibly irritated at being interrupted as he raced through the introductions — almost turning a parliamentary convention into a roll-call — he cast an impatient glance at the Opposition and said in his gruff(crusty,रुखा) style in Hindi, “OK, will introduce him later”. There was none of the tentativeness of a rookie(unprofessional,नौसिखिया), not just at the premier’s job but also as a Member of Parliament.

He is, after all, the first of 15 Prime Ministers, including interim premier Gulzari Lal Nanda, to get the top job without any parliamentary experience. By a curious coincidence, he also entered the Gujarat Assembly for the first time as Chief Minister without any legislative background.

Charges piling up

According to Shaktisinh Gohil, former Leader of the Opposition in the Gujarat Assembly, Mr. Modi is trying to replicate the much-talked-about Gujarat model in Parliament. “He once got 12 laws passed in 17 minutes in 2009 after getting the Opposition suspended from the House. Under him, the Assembly would be convened once every six months just to meet the constitutional requirement.”

The Congress insists that Mr. Modi “never addressed the legislature — not even during the motion of thanks to the Governor's address — nor responded to questions pertaining to ministries under his watch.” Further, a third of the starred questions asked by the Opposition would never even reach the Assembly, where it had become a norm to suspend Opposition members every Session. And the Gujarat Assembly never met for more than 23 days in a year through his years as Chief Minister.

“ The Opposition began to cry foul when it became evident that the Prime Minister had made more addresses in parliaments abroad than at home in his first five months in office. ”

With a bicameral(two-chamber,द्विसदन) legislature, multiparty Opposition and national media scrutiny(examine,जांच), no replication of the “Gujarat model of parliamentary democracy” has been attempted in Parliament till now but charges of “disregard for parliamentary procedures” are piling up. Standing committees are being given a go-by in the name of the ‘speed’ mantra of the Modi government, new bills are sprung upon the House through supplementary business circulated at the eleventh hour, efforts were made to amend certain laws by “smuggling” them into the Finance Bill to bypass the Rajya Sabha — where the government is in a minority — and, now, the two Houses are being pitted against each other to reduce the significance of the Council of States because it is “indirectly” elected. “Mr. Modi entered Parliament with the theatrical gesture of calling it a temple but that is only if it is monotheistic(believe in one god,एकेश्वरवाद). There can’t be more than one god and this is reflected in Finance Minister Arun Jaitley — who does a ventriloquist’s job — questioning the indirectly elected Rajya Sabha’s right to scrutinise Bills cleared by the Lok Sabha,” says Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, author of Narendra Modi: The Man, The Times.

 Mr. Modi himself rarely puts in an appearance — unless absolutely unavoidable — and even missed the crucial vote on the Constitution Amendment to introduce the Goods and Services Tax regime(government,शाशन). He made amends the following day when the Constitution Amendment for the land swap agreement with Bangladesh was put to vote and, in a rare show of bipartisanship, even thanked the Opposition for its passage.

Few interventions

Let alone the Opposition, he seldom engages with his own party legislators — or ministers — when he does attend the Lok Sabha. Few BJP members dare to approach him, even though he is the Leader of the House. His interventions have been few and far between, and he does not brook(tolerate,बर्दाश्त) counter-questions. After ceaselessly calling his predecessor ‘Maun (silent) Mohan Singh’, Mr. Modi’s silence in Parliament speaks volumes. Even the mandatory statement presented in both Houses after an overseas visit is left to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj.

The Opposition held its fire for the first couple of sessions but began to cry foul from the Winter Session of 2014 when it became evident that the Prime Minister had made more addresses in parliaments abroad than at home in his first five months in office. Till then, the only time he had addressed both Houses was in the mandatory reply to the Motion of Thanks to the President’s Address.      

He was conciliatory(friendly,मैत्रीपूर्ण) then but when it was time to repeat the annual exercise this year, Mr. Modi went back to his default option — scornfully announcing in the Lok Sabha that he would keep the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Act alive as a “monument to the failure” of successive Congress governments and accusing the Communists of following an “imported idea” in the Rajya Sabha. In the process, he invited upon himself and his government the first embarrassment in the Upper House, with a united Opposition forcing an amendment in the Motion of Thanks, something that has happened only three times since Independence.

Sitaram Yechury (CPI-M), who pressed for the amendment, said he would have withdrawn it had Mr. Modi heard him out. “But it seems they [treasury benches] want a fight. So let there be a fight.” For close watchers of Mr. Modi’s political journey like Mr. Gohil and Mr. Mukhopadhyay, his evident lack of interest in Parliament — except as theatre for the occasional grandstanding — is no surprise. “It reflects his inability to work with systems and structures. He is most comfortable with a unitary system — one people, one faith, one institution, one House (read unicameral legislature) — where there is only one-way traffic; a monologue, not dialogue. And, certainly, no questions.”

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When the traveller returns

If Year One was about diplomacy, Year Two has to be about the economy. The world is waiting to see what India has to offer in real terms.
At the end of a year of hectic diplomacy, Prime Minister Narendra Modi may well have come to the same conclusion that his predecessor Manmohan Singh did when he told the India Today Conclave in February 2005, “The world wants India to do well… our real challenges are at home.”

It is by ensuring that the Indian economy kept in step with an annual rate of economic growth of over 8.0 per cent in 2003-10, creating expectations of an India on the rise, that the government of the day was able to undertake important diplomatic initiatives. The economic slide after 2011, and the crisis of domestic governance that followed, brought the India Story to a grinding halt by 2012-13. A year ago, the political consequences(result,परिणाम) of that misgovernance followed. A new leader took charge.

Most comments this past week on the Modi government completing one year have made the point that while the Prime Minister shines on foreign policy, his record at home on political and economic management has been below par. While Mr. Modi’s foreign forays(visit,दौरे) have been impressive, both in style and substance, how the world will come to view India in the years ahead will depend on how the Indian economy performs and the polity managed. That Mr. Modi understands where the real challenges lie is demonstrated by the fact that he has made national economic development the focus of his international diplomacy.

Bilateral tripod

Nobel Prize economist Thomas C. Schelling famously observed, in a testimonial to a United States Congressional Committee on U.S. foreign policy, way back in 1993, that international relations is all about three things: war and the avoidance of conflict(battle,विवाद); migration and the management of the movement of people; and trade, in its many dimensions.

This way of viewing international relations and foreign policy enables one to quantify the importance of bilateral relations. If the three dimensions to foreign policy are government-to-government (G2G), people-to-people (P2P) and business-to-business (B2B) relations, then it is possible to track relations between nations based on an analysis of how they fare along these three tracks.

For example, India’s bilateral relationship with the U.S. would score high on all three — G2G, P2P and B2B. The Soviet Union also used to score high on all three during the 1970s when India had close G2G relations, the Soviet Union was an important trade partner, and students of my generation were as willing to study in Moscow as in any other Western capital. Russia slipped down the B2B and P2P rankings even as it has maintained high scores on the G2G dimension.

China, after 1962, scored low on all three counts. Over the last two decades there has been a gradual improvement of G2G relations, but it is the sharp rise in B2B interactions over the past decade that has contributed to increased G2G and P2P relations. Given that the India-China G2G relationship can only improve when India feels more comfortable with China’s geopolitical stance in Asia and the resolution of the border question, Mr. Modi seems to have decided that the border issue can wait till the B2B and P2P aspects of India-China relations improve further and inject greater trust into the bilateral relationship.

Since the focus of foreign policy is on a widening of the space for India’s economic development and creating a stable regional environment to facilitate this, Mr. Modi has extended the policy of non-reciprocal ‘unilateral liberalisation’, pursued in the past with less developed economies in Asia and Africa, to China, offering e-visas to Chinese tourists. Such a policy is aimed at creating mutually beneficial inter-dependencies and constituencies for better relations.

It’s still the economy

Having surprised the world and citizens at home with his energetic and flamboyant(fancy,भड़कीला) diplomacy, Mr. Modi would do well to turn his attention to an improved management of the economy and domestic affairs in the months ahead. After all, the question can be asked, why does the world want India to do well? In large part because the economic betterment of over a billion people, as in China, presents opportunities for the rest of the world. Which is why the proper management of the economy is the key that will open new doors for Indian foreign policy.

Views about Mr. Modi’s management of the polity and economic policy tend to gravitate to two extremes. His critics focus on communal polarisation, agrarian distress, tax terrorism and the persistent(continuity,लगातार) unease of doing business in India. His admirers view all such criticism as sour grapes and the frustrated rage of the marginalised elite(group of best,विशिष्ट वर्ग).

The truth is that Mr. Modi’s record at home has been mixed. The economy is certainly doing better, but things could have been even better. For reasons so far not explained, the government wasted its first six months in office as far as economic policy and governance reform were concerned. It paid a political price when it lost the local elections in Delhi and a handful of by-elections elsewhere.

For all his political brilliance, Mr. Modi initially allowed himself to be portrayed as a friend of business oligarchs, thereby curtailing(reduce,कम करना) his political space for policy action on the economic front, and has subsequently tried to distance himself from this image by not paying enough attention to improving the ‘ease of doing business’. If the ‘Make in India’ campaign had been launched instead as a ‘nation-building’ effort, like the Swachch Bharat campaign — “Bharat Mein Banao, Bharat Ko Banao” (Make India by Making in India) — the Prime Minister and all his economic ministers would have had wider political space to act.

The economy needs to move back to higher rates of investment and savings and higher levels of spending at home. This means expectations must turn decisively(crucial,निर्णायक) positive and remain so. The opportunity to alter expectations for the better immediately after coming to power last May was wasted. And only in 2015 has the government focussed on governance.

Birthdays are always occasions for resolutions and renewals. If the government decides that the coming year will be about better and inclusive governance, and about increasing investment and business opportunities to create new jobs and better infrastructure, then expectations can still be turned around. This also requires careful management of social and political tensions at home. The quality of both the political and the administrative leadership dealing with these challenges has declined. Thus, more effort is required to translate the slogan ‘minimum government, maximum governance’ into meaningful improvement in the quality of administration.

What the world wants

Man does not live by bread alone, nor do nations. So, it is not just the performance of the economy that matters for India’s relations with the world, but also what India brings to the global plate, so to speak. The international community does, by and large, celebrate the idea of India. Successive prime ministers have used the metaphor of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (The world as one family) to define India’s own identity, as a nation, and its approach to the international community. Mr. Modi, too, has adopted this idea.

Apart from India’s economic rise, the success of its secular, liberal and plural democracy is also desperately sought by a world divided along sectarian, ethnic, racial and religious lines. India’s rise as a democracy, and on the basis of the inclusive concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, has an appeal as important as the market for goods and talent that India represents.

These impulses ought to define the agenda for the government’s second year in office. The ruling coalition(Alliance,मिलाजुला) still has the advantage of numbers. The principal opposition party remains hobbled(disabled,अटकना) and unable to regain momentum. The government can have no excuses, other than its own inertia(inactivity,निष्क्रियता) or lack of imagination, for not moving forward faster, and in a more inclusive way.

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