Scientists shouldn’t rush to dismiss fears about ‘three-parent babies’ Sceptics(doubtful) can be useful critics
It was always going to be a controversial technique. Sure, conceiving babies this way could alleviate(less) suffering, but as a Tory peer warned in the Lords debate, “without safeguards and serious study of safeguards, the new technique could imperil(endanger) the dignity of the human race, threaten the welfare of children, and destroy the sanctity(holy) of family life.” Because it involved the destruction of embryos(unborn baby), the Catholic church inevitably(surly) opposed it. Some scientists warned of the dangers of producing “abnormal babies.” . Wasn’t it a slippery slope from here to a “Frankenstein future” of designer babies?
I’m not talking about mitochondrial replacement and so-called three-person babies, which Britain became the first country in the world to support this week, but about the early days of IVF in the 1970s and 80s, when governments dithered(act nervously) about how to deal with this new reproductive technology. Today, with more than 5 million people having been conceived by IVF, the term “test tube baby” seems archaic if not a little perverse. Assisted conception in the U.K. didn’t bring about the breakup of the traditional family and the birth of babies with deformities but the formation of the HFEA in the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1990, providing a clear regulatory framework for research involving embryos.
It would be unscientific to argue that because things turned out fine on that occasion, they will inevitably do so for mitochondrial replacement. No one can be wholly certain what the biological consequences(result) of this technique will be, which is why the HFEA will grant licenses to use it only on the carefully worded condition that they are deemed “not unsafe.” But the parallels in the tone of the debate then and now are a reminder of what deep-rooted fears technological intervention in procreation can awaken.
Scientists supportive of such innovations often complain that the opponents are motivated by ignorance and prejudice. They are right to conclude that public engagement is important, but they shouldn’t suppose that explaining the science will banish all these misgivings. They resurface every time there is an advance in reproductive technology.
In all these cases, much of the opposition came from people with a strong religious faith. As one of the versions of mitochondrial replacement involves the destruction of embryos, it was bound to fall foul of Catholic doctrine(philosophy). But the Archbishops’ Council of the Church of England adduced(mention) other reasons for hesitation, emphasising that it was worried about the safety and ethical aspects of the technique. Safety is of course paramount in the decision, but the scientific assessments have given it a great deal of attention already.
There are secular voices opposing the technology, too, in particular campaigners against genetic manipulations in general. For instance,Marcy Darnovsky of the Center for Genetics and Society responded to the ongoing deliberations of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration over mitochondrial transfer not only by flagging up alleged safety issues, but also insisting that we consider babies conceived this way to be “genetically modified,” and warning of “mission creep” and “high-tech eugenics.”
Sense of unease
Parallels between the objections from religious and secular quarters suggest that there is a deeper and largely unarticulated(not given) sense of unease here. Bioethicist Leon Kass has argued that instinctive disquiet about some advances in assisted conception and human biotechnology is rather healthy: “the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason’s power fully to articulate it,” an idea he calls the wisdom of repugnance(horror). “Shallow are the souls that have forgotten how to shudder(shiver),” he says. I strongly suspect that beneath many of the arguments about the safety and legality of mitochondrial replacement lies an instinctive repugnance that is beyond reason’s power to articulate.
Like many of our subconscious fears, such feelings of repugnance are revealed in the stories we tell. Disquiet at the artificial intervention in procreation goes back a long way: to the tales of Prometheus, of the medieval homunculus and golem(automation), and then to Goethe’s Faust and Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein, modern stories of clones and Ex Machina’s Ava
so often they turn out on closer inspection to explore more intimate questions of, say, parenthood and identity. They do the universal job of myth, creating an “other” not as a cautionary warning but in order more safely to examine ourselves.
So, for instance, when we are warned that a man raising a daughter cloned from his wife’s cells would be irresistibly attracted to her, we are really hearing anxieties(tension) about our own incestuous(relating to) fantasies. I don’t think it is reading too much into the “three-parent baby” label to see it as a reflection of the same anxieties. Many children already have three effective parents, or more — through step-parents, same-sex relationships, adoption and so forth. When applied to mitochondrial transfer, this term shows how strongly personhood has become equated with genetics, and indicates to geneticists that they have some work to do to move the public on from the strictly deterministic rhetoric(loud and confusing) around genetics.
We can feel justifiably proud that the U.K. has been the first country to grapple(deal) with the issues raised by this new technology. It is right that that decision canvassed a wide range of opinions. Some scientists have questioned why religious leaders should be granted any special status in pronouncing on ethical questions like this. But the most thoughtful of them often turn out to have a subtle(elusive) and humane moral sensibility of the kind that a questing faith can require. There is a well-developed strand(run) of philosophical thought on the moral authority of nature, and theology is a part of it. But on questions like this, we should examine our own responses as honestly as we can. — © Guardian Newspapers Limited, 2015